Johnson v. Barney

07-5597-pr
Johnson v. Barney
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
R U LIN GS BY SU M M A R Y O RD ER D O N OT H AVE PR EC ED EN TIA L EFFEC T . C IT A TIO N T O A SU M M A R Y O R D ER F IL ED O N O R
A FTER J AN UA RY 1, 2007, IS PERM ITTED AN D IS GOVERNED BY F EDER AL R U L E O F A PPELLATE P RO CED UR E 32.1 A N D
TH IS C OU R T ’ S L OC AL R ULE 32.1.1. W H EN C ITIN G A SU M M A R Y O RD ER IN A DO CU M EN T FILED W ITH TH IS C OU R T , A
PA R TY M U ST C ITE EITH ER THE F EDERAL A PPEND IX OR A N ELECTR ON IC D ATA BASE ( W ITH TH E N OTA TIO N “ SU M M A R Y
OR DER ”). A PAR TY CITING A SUM M AR Y ORD ER M UST SERVE A C OPY OF IT ON A NY PA R TY N O T R EP R ES EN TED BY
CO UN SEL .
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Daniel Patrick Moynihan Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 12th day
of January, two thousand ten.
PRESENT:
WILFRED FEINBERG,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Circuit Judges,
T. S. ELLIS, III,*
District Judge.
_______________________________________________
Johnathan Johnson,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-5597-pr
Barney, Sergeant Oracz, Sgt. Sullivan, Several Unknown Guards,
Michael Lavender, David Lawrence, Joseph Palermo, Sergio Reyes,
Defendants-Appellees,
Frank Tracy,
Defendant.
______________________________________________
*
T. S. Ellis, III, Senior Judge of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting
by designation.
For Appellant: JOHNATHAN JOHNSON, pro se,
Malone, N.Y.
For Appellees: ANDREW M. CUOMO, Attorney
General of the State of New York,
(David Lawrence, III, on the brief),
New York, N.Y.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Sand, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Johnathan Johnson, pro se and incarcerated, appeals from a judgment
of the district court entered after a jury verdict was rendered in favor of several employees of the
New York State Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”), dismissing Johnson’s
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Johnson alleged that (1) he was physically assaulted by
DOCS corrections officers during a search of his prison cell in violation of the Eighth
Amendment; (2) Frank Tracy, the prison superintendent, failed to preserve videotape footage of
the alleged assault; and (3) Daniel Sullivan, an employee of the Southport Correctional Facility
where Johnson was later incarcerated, fabricated a report of the investigation into the incident.
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,
and the issues raised on appeal.
On appeal, Johnson challenges, inter alia, (1) the dismissal of his claim as to Sullivan for
failure to state a claim; (2) the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Tracy for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies under the Prisoner’s Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”); (3) the
denial of his request that the district court order adverse inference jury instructions due to the
alleged intentional or negligent disposal of the videotapes and other evidence; (4) the
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introduction of the testimony of defendants’ witness James Cavaleri without first certifying him
as an expert; and (5) the introduction of evidence at trial regarding Johnson’s history of receiving
misbehavior reports in prison.
We review de novo (1) a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002),
(2) a district court’s order granting summary judgment, Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.,
321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003), and (3) jury instructions, Hudson v. New York City, 271 F.3d
62, 67 (2d Cir. 2001). Where a party fails to object at trial, we review challenged jury
instructions and evidentiary rulings for plain error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d); Shah v. Pan Am.
World Servs., Inc., 148 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Evid. 103(d); United States v. Shaoul,
41 F.3d 811 (2d Cir. 1994).
First, Johnson’s claims against Sullivan were properly dismissed because, as the district
court concluded, Sullivan’s allegedly false statements did not prevent Johnson from pursuing his
administrative remedies or from having meaningful access to the courts. See Freeman v.
Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that, where an inmate was granted an
administrative hearing and given the opportunity to rebut the charges against him, a prison
correctional officer’s “filing of unfounded charges against the inmate did not give rise to a per se
constitutional violation actionable under § 1983”). Second, Johnson’s claims against Tracy
failed as a matter of law because Johnson failed to allege sufficient personal involvement on
Tracy’s part to make him liable under § 1983. See Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding that defendant, the Commissioner of DOCS, was not personally involved in an
alleged constitutional violation where an inmate’s letter addressed to the Commissioner was
forwarded to another prison official for decision). Third, Johnson’s argument that the district
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court erred by declining to order adverse inference jury instructions is meritless because Johnson
failed to demonstrate how the defendants at trial were ever in control of the videotapes or had an
obligation to preserve such evidence. See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93,
107 (2d Cir. 2001). Fourth, the district court correctly allowed Cavaleri to testify as a lay witness
regarding the policies and practices of the prison because he had personal knowledge of such
policies and practices through his everyday experiences as an employee there. See United States
v. Munoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25, 35 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing how, under Federal Rule of
Evidence 701, courts have allowed lay witnesses to express opinions about their place of
employment “based on the witness’s own perceptions and knowledge and participation in the
day-to-day affairs of [the workplace]”). Finally, the district court did not err in allowing the
defendants to question Johnson about his history of misbehavior reports because they were not
used to prove that Johnson had a propensity to misbehave. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a); Hynes v.
Coughlin, 79 F.3d 285, 290 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Evidence of prior acts is not admissible to prove
that the actor had a certain character trait, in order to show that on a particular occasion he acted
in conformity with that trait.”). Moreover, it was Johnson, and not the defendants, who first
indicated that Johnson had received misbehavior reports while in prison. See United States v.
Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1225 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the concept of “opening the door” to permit
a party to introduce inadmissible evidence).
We have reviewed Johnson’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
By:________________________
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