Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of New York v. Jacques

09-5353-cv
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of New York v. Jacques
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER ”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 7 th day of September, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 REENA RAGGI,
9 Circuit Judge,
10 JED S. RAKOFF,
11 District Judge. *
12
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
14 METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
15 Plaintiff,
16
17 -v.-
18 09-5353-cv
19 ANNE M. JACQUES,
20 Defendant-Appellee,
21
22 -v.-
*
District Judge Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York,
sitting by designation.
1
1
2 CRAIG JACQUES,
3 Defendant-Appellant.
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
5
6 APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: George F. Newton, Muehe &
7 Newton, LLP, Canandaigua, NY.
8
9 APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: Christopher S. Ciaccio, Law
10 Office of Christopher Ciaccio,
11 Esq., Rochester, NY.
12
13 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
14 Court for the Western District of New York (Arcara, J.).
15
16 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
17 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
18 AFFIRMED.
19
20 Defendant-Appellant Craig Jacques appeals the judgment
21 granting life insurance plan proceeds to Defendant-Appellee
22 Anne Jacques. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
23 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
24 presented for review.
25
26 [1] Mr. Jacques argues that the district court erred in its
27 application of the burden of proof. In an interpleader
28 action, a claimant must succeed in establishing his right to
29 the property by a preponderance of the evidence. Midland
30 Ins. Co. v. Friedgood, 577 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (S.D.N.Y.
31 1984); accord 7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary
32 Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1714, at 629 &
33 n.21 (3d ed. 2001). The district court found that Ms.
34 Jacques established her claim to the proceeds by a
35 preponderance of the evidence; therefore, it applied the
36 proper standard.
37
38 To the extent Mr. Jacques challenges the district
39 court’s ultimate findings of fact following a bench trial,
40 we review such findings for clear error. Rose v. AmSouth
41 Bank of Fla., 391 F.3d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2004). As the trier
42 of fact, the district court was entitled to draw inferences
43 in favor of either party regardless of who offered each
44 piece of evidence.
45
2
1 Sufficient facts support the district court’s decision.
2 The contested change of beneficiary to Ms. Jacques occurred
3 shortly after her marriage to the decedent, which is an
4 occasion that would ordinarily inspire the insured to update
5 a life insurance beneficiary. And even if an unintended
6 change was finalized erroneously by the company, the
7 decedent had nearly ten years prior to his death to discover
8 and remedy the error. Since the district court’s account of
9 the evidence is plausible, we may not reverse regardless of
10 whether we would have weighed the evidence the same way.
11 Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
12
13 [2] Mr. Jacques contends that the district court
14 erroneously relied on an evidentiary principle of “common-
15 sense inferences.” The district court properly drew common-
16 sense inferences to resolve disputed issues of fact. See,
17 e.g., Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 83-84 (2d Cir.
18 2005) (“[I]n drawing inferences . . . a fact finder is not
19 required to operate in an experiential vacuum. To the
20 contrary, he may draw on the full range of his reason,
21 experience, and common sense.”). Further, this challenge
22 duplicates the argument challenging the district court’s
23 findings of fact. For the reasons mentioned above, the
24 district court was not clearly erroneous in its findings.
25
26 [3] Mr. Jacques argues that the district court erroneously
27 employed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The district
28 court did not rely upon res ipsa for its findings; rather,
29 it was used to “further support[] the Court’s inference.”
30 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jacques, No. 06-CV-444A, 2009
31 WL 6055839, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2009). Because the
32 district court’s fact-finding was not clearly erroneous, we
33 need not consider whether res ipsa loquitur is useful
34 outside the tort context.
35
36
37
38 For the foregoing reasons, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of
39 the district court.
40
41
42 FOR THE COURT:
43 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
44
3