Evans v. Fischer

11-4418-pr
Evans v. Fischer
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term, 2012
(Argued: October 3, 2012 Decided: April 3, 2013)
Docket No. 11-4418-pr
CARLOS EVANS,
Petitioner-Appellee,
— v. —
BRIAN FISCHER,
Respondent-Appellant,
B e f o r e:
LYNCH, LOHIER, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
__________________
Respondent Brian Fischer, the Superintendent of Sing Sing Correctional Facility,
appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Dearie, J.) granting petitioner Carlos Evans’s application for a writ of habeas
corpus. Evans was convicted after a jury trial of the burglary of a Brooklyn apartment.
On direct appeal, the Appellate Division held that a written statement introduced into
evidence at Evans’s trial was inadmissible hearsay but that the error was harmless. We
conclude that the district court erred because the decision of the Appellate Division was
not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, as required
for a grant of habeas corpus by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
REVERSED.
GLENN A. GARBER, (Angharad Vaughan, on the brief), Glenn A. Garber,
P.C., New York, New York, for petitioner-appellee.
THOMAS M. ROSS, Assistant District Attorney (Leonard Joblove, Ann
Bordley, Assistant District Attorneys, on the brief), for Charles J.
Hynes, Kings County District Attorney, Kings County, New York,
for respondent-appellant.
GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Carlos Evans was convicted by a jury of burglarizing a Brooklyn
apartment and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. He was tried along with two co-
defendants, Hudson Merzier and Anthony Foster, on the strength of evidence recovered
from the scene as well as the testimony of, among others, Aisha Walker. Walker was
both an acquaintance of the defendants and a neighbor and acquaintance of the burglary
victim, Olujimni Omitogun. One week before Evans’s trial, Walker agreed to testify
against the defendants in exchange for a non-custodial sentence for her own role in the
burglary.
2
On October 22, 2002, in New York Supreme Court in Kings County, a jury
convicted Evans of burglary in the first degree, two counts of criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree, and assault in the second degree. See N.Y. Penal Law §§
140.30; 265.03; 120.05. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of fifteen years’
imprisonment (on the burglary and weapons possession counts) and seven years’
imprisonment (on the assault count). Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence, but
the Second Department affirmed.
On October 31, 2006, petitioner filed the habeas petition at issue in this case in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Concluding that the
trial judge had improperly admitted a hearsay document into evidence, the district court
(Raymond J. Dearie, Judge) granted petitioner’s application for the writ. The state
appeals, arguing that the Appellate Division’s affirmance of petitioner’s conviction was
not an “unreasonable application” of United States Supreme Court precedent within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214 (“AEDPA”). We agree
and reverse the grant of habeas corpus.
BACKGROUND
I. The Evidence at Trial
Because this case centers on Walker’s various statements, including the hearsay
statement admitted at trial, it will be most useful to describe the facts as she told them at
3
trial, including the inconsistencies in her account revealed on cross-examination and
through the admission of her written statement.
A. Walker’s Testimony on Direct Examination
The account in this section relies only on Walker’s sworn testimony given on
direct examination at trial. Walker is a dancer who, at all times relevant to the facts of
this case, worked part-time at an adult club called Sweet Cherry, located in the Sunset
Park neighborhood of Brooklyn. Walker met Omitogun, the victim of the burglary, soon
after moving into the apartment complex where they both resided in the Canarsie
neighborhood of Brooklyn. She had visited his apartment on two occasions, observed
that he had “fairly nice things,” and heard him brag about his car, jewelry, and brand-
name clothes.
Walker met Evans’s co-defendant Merzier through a mutual friend three weeks to
a month prior to the evening of the burglary. That meeting was arranged so that Walker
could ask Merzier for a loan to pay her overdue rent, but Merzier was not able to lend her
the money at the time. She met Evans a few weeks before the burglary, and Foster only
one or two days before the crime.
On August 15, 2001, Walker was at her apartment with the three defendants and
one of her coworkers, Diamond. During this gathering, Foster told the group that he
intended to rob Omitogun. Foster then went to the roof of Walker’s building to canvass
Omitogun’s apartment, which was accessible via the roof. He later commented on the
similarity of the layout of Walker’s and Omitogun’s apartments. Over the course of the
4
evening, the group planned the burglary. Foster was to be the ringleader and direct the
burglary, Evans was to follow him into Omitogun’s apartment, and Merzier was to stay
behind in Walker’s apartment as a lookout and getaway driver. The proceeds from the
burglary were to be split among the defendants and Walker, whose share was promised in
exchange for allowing the burglars to use her apartment as a staging ground.
The next day, in the evening of August 16, 2001,1 Walker was at home with
Diamond, Evans, and Merzier. As she entered her apartment, Walker received a phone
call from Omitogun, who said that he was at a friend’s apartment in the same building.
Omitogun asked Walker if she and other dancers from Sweet Cherry would be willing to
entertain him and several friends from out of town. Walker told Omitogun that she had to
be at work in approximately half an hour, but that she would come by his apartment
afterward. Evans, having overheard this conversation, stated that he intended to rob
Omitogun that night. Shortly thereafter, Merzier left the apartment, Walker and Diamond
took a taxi to work at Sweet Cherry, and Evans stayed behind at Walker’s apartment.
Upon her arrival at the club, Walker was told that she was not allowed to work that
evening because she was late. Fearing for her safety, however, she decided to remain at
the club. Walker called Omitogun’s cell phone to arrange details related to her visit to
Omitogun’s apartment later that evening, particularly whether she and her coworkers
would be paid for their services. About an hour after her conversation with Omitogun,
1
Walker gave the date as August 17, but presumably this was a mistake, as all the
other evidence points to the burglary occurring late on the evening of August 16.
5
Walker spoke on the phone with Merzier, who by that point had returned to Walker’s
apartment. Walker testified, over defense objections, that Merzier told her that Foster and
Evans were in Omitogun’s apartment robbing him. She also testified that she believed no
weapons would be used in the robbery.
While returning home from work, Walker received a call from Omitogun.
Omitogun told her that he had been robbed. Another man, also on the phone, threatened
her with harm unless Omitogun’s money and belongings were returned. Shortly
thereafter, Walker had a series of telephone conversations with Merzier. Walker testified
(again over defense objections) that Merzier told her that he was unable to leave the
apartment complex because police cars and helicopters had surrounded the block.
Rather than returning home, Walker and Diamond decided to go to the police
precinct because Walker feared Omitogun’s threats. She also feared that her role in the
plan might be uncovered. Upon arriving at the 69th Precinct, Walker spoke with a police
officer whose name she could not remember. She explained that she was being
threatened and requested an escort home but did not mention anything about the burglary
at Omitogun’s home. The police officer asked where Walker lived and, when told,
informed Walker there had been a homicide (apparently unrelated to the events at issue in
this case) on her block. As a result, all the other officers were unavailable at that time.
Walker left the station, but returned some time later, at which point she spoke with
Detectives Ahern and Rivera.
6
Over the course of approximately two days, Walker gave varying statements about
the events at issue in this case to the two detectives. Most importantly, she told Detective
Rivera that Evans and Foster (but not Merzier) had discussed robbing Omitogun. She
also gave details about the plan to Detective Rivera in a seven-page written statement,
which omitted her role in the discussions.
B. Walker’s Testimony on Cross-Examination
The facts in this section are drawn from Walker’s testimony on cross-examination,
during which defense counsel successfully elicited several inconsistencies in Walker’s
account, as well as contradictions between Walker’s testimony on direct examination and
various other statements she had given at different times about her role in the burglary.
The defendants sought on cross-examination to demonstrate that Walker was willing to
tell different stories at different times to serve her interests.
Walker admitted that, when giving a statement to Detective Ahern, she “basically
lied and said [she] had nothing to do with” the burglary. She further testified that she did
not mention any of the defendants in her initial statement to Detective Ahern. She told
Detective Ahern that there was no one in her apartment and that nobody had her
permission to be there.
Walker testified that, after she spoke with Detective Ahern, the police
accompanied her back to her apartment. Upon arriving there, they found the three
7
defendants, who were then arrested for burglary of Walker’s apartment.2 When asked by
the police officers, Walker denied knowing the defendants except for Merzier. She then
swore out a complaint falsely stating that the defendants did not have permission to be in
her apartment that evening.
Defense counsel did not ask Walker about the specific contents of the seven-page
written statement other than to ask whether her comments to Detective Rivera were
consistent with her testimony on direct examination. Walker did not testify about the
contents of the written statement other than to say that the statement she gave to Detective
Rivera was at least partially false.
Finally, Walker admitted that she agreed to testify against the defendants in
exchange for a non-custodial sentence. Defense counsel also attempted to elicit
contradictions in Walker’s timeline of events and to raise questions about the true nature
of her profession and her relationships with Omitogun and Merzier. However, Walker
denied that she had misrepresented anything about those subjects.
C. Walker’s Written Statement
The state then called Detective Rivera. Over the objections of defense counsel,
Detective Rivera testified to the contents of Walker’s written statement. Defense counsel
argued that the statement’s contents were inadmissible because Walker had already
2
This testimony was consistent with that of a police officer, who testified that
upon entering Walker’s apartment, the police found Evans crouched in a corner, Foster
hiding in a closet, and Merzier lying on the bed.
8
testified, because she could have been asked about the statement during her testimony,
and because to admit the statement’s contents as prior consistent statements would
constitute improper bolstering under New York law. After hearing arguments outside the
presence of the jury, the trial judge overruled the objections to Detective Rivera’s
testimony about the contents of the statement, and admitted the statement itself into
evidence on the theory that, by asking Walker whether she had lied when she gave the
statement to Detective Rivera, defense counsel had made a charge of recent fabrication.
The trial judge did not redact the written statement and did not limit the jury’s
consideration of the statement as substantive evidence to the extent it was consistent with
Walker’s testimony.
The substance of the statement tracked much of Walker’s version of events on
direct examination, with the notable exclusion of any reference to Walker’s role in
facilitating the burglary. Walker stated that she had gone shopping the day of the incident
with Diamond, Merzier, and Evans. After being dropped at home, Diamond, Walker, and
Evans stayed at Walker’s apartment as the two women prepared for work. After leaving
for work, Walker received a phone call from Merzier informing her that Foster and Evans
were inside Omitogun’s apartment.
At that point, Walker’s statement departed from the version she gave at trial. In
the written statement, Walker claimed that she had told them to leave Omitogun’s
apartment, and that Merzier assured her that they would. Additionally, she stated that
Evans did have permission to be in her apartment, which contradicted what she had told
9
police at the apartment. The written statement also described in significant detail the
meeting during which the defendants discussed the proposed burglary and mentioned that
Evans had talked the week before about robbing her neighbor. The rest of Walker’s
statement was in line with the account given on direct examination, including the
threatening phone call from Omitogun and the threats made by Omitogun’s friend.3
D. Other Evidence at Trial
Also testifying at trial were the three victims: Omitogun and two of his friends,
who were at Omitogun’s apartment when the burglary took place. According to their
testimony, when the masked burglars entered the apartment, Omitogun was on the phone
with his girlfriend, who heard the burglary over the phone and informed the police. The
victims testified that the burglars restrained them with telephone cords as they took
valuables from the apartment. The burglars inflicted injuries on the victims that caused
broken bones and required stitches. Omitogun testified that, when the police arrived in
response to his girlfriend’s call, the burglars left the apartment through the upstairs
window, onto the roof. Further investigation showed footprints leading from Omitogun’s
window, including some in the direction of Walker’s apartment.
Although the victims testified that the burglars had the same general build as
Foster and Evans, the victims did not see the burglars’ faces. Moreover, police were
3
In Walker’s written statement, she indicated that Merzier “didn’t seem as if he
really wanted to do it. It seemed like a more go with the flow type situation on his
behalf.” This exculpatory statement about Merzier was absent from her trial testimony.
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unable to match fingerprints found at the scene with any of those of the defendants.
Although footprints found on the roof were consistent with the boots worn by Evans and
Foster, a police expert was unable to conclude that they were in fact made by any of the
defendants.
A few hours after finding the defendants in Walker’s apartment (during which time
the crime scene was unsecured), the police also found in Walker’s apartment Omitogun’s
briefcase (in the broiler of the stove), two loaded nine-millimeter handguns (underneath
the refrigerator, obscured by several articles of men’s clothing), $90,000 in cash (the
same amount Omitogun had reported missing), seven wristwatches (which Omitogun had
also reported missing), approximately twenty British pounds, and other personal effects
of Omitogun.
II. Procedural History
After hearing the evidence recounted above, the jury returned a verdict convicting
Foster (who had fled during trial) and Evans; Merzier was acquitted of all charges. Evans
appealed, arguing that the admission of Walker’s statement into evidence represented
improper bolstering. The prosecution argued that the statement was admissible as a prior
consistent statement to refute a charge of recent fabrication.
The Appellate Division held that the admission of Walker’s statement was error
because the statement did not predate her motive to lie. It additionally held that the
statement could not be admitted as a prior consistent statement, even if it had postdated
her motive to lie, since it was not entirely consistent with her testimony at trial. Finally, it
11
held that, during their cross examination of Detective Rivera, defense counsel had
refrained from asking about the specific contents of the statement and therefore had
avoided “open[ing] the door” to the issue. People v. Evans, 792 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113 (2d
Dep’t 2005).
The Appellate Division further held, however, that the error was harmless and did
not require reversal of petitioner’s sentence “because there is no reasonable probability
that the defendant would have been acquitted had the error not occurred,” as the
additional evidence adduced at trial “was overwhelming in establishing” petitioner’s
guilt. Id.Evans petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus on October 31, 2006.
On September 22, 2011, the district court granted the petition. Evans v. Fischer, 816 F.
Supp. 2d 171 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). In granting the writ, the district court relied on what it
called the “due process guarantee of trial fairness.” Id. at 185. The district court
concluded that this federal constitutional guarantee is violated where the state trial court
misapplies state-law evidence rules in such a fundamental way that it interferes with a
criminal defendant’s ability to put on a defense. In particular, the district court concluded
that the cumulative effects of the admission of the hearsay statement were so prejudicial
to the outcome of the case that the statement’s admission was “not reconcilable with basic
conceptions of justice.” Id. at 204. In finding that AEDPA authorized relief under such
circumstances, the district court identified four Supreme Court cases that, in its view, the
Appellate Division unreasonably applied: Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991);
12
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219(1941); and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). According to the district
court, McGuire, Lisenba, and Dowling together stand for the proposition that serious
evidentiary errors can go to the fundamental fairness of a trial. The district court read
Chambers to say that “the cumulative nature of . . . errors embedded in [a] single
evidentiary ruling and their cumulative effect” can render a trial unfair. Evans, 816
F. Supp. 2d at 203-04. On the basis of these principles, which it took to be “embodied” in
clearly established federal law, Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 1173 (2010), the
district court granted the petition and ordered the state either to retry or release petitioner
within ninety days. Evans, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
The state filed a timely notice of appeal, and the district court’s order was stayed
pending appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
We review a district court’s grant of a habeas application de novo. Langston v.
Smith, 630 F.3d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 2011). We focus on the state appellate court’s decision
and, for issues adjudicated on the merits in state court, we apply a “highly deferential
standard for evaluating state-court rulings.” Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
AEDPA authorizes a district court to grant an application for a writ of habeas
corpus based on an issue adjudicated on the merits by a state court only if the state
13
proceedings “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States” or if they “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Before the district court, petitioner effectively
challenged only the state court’s conclusions of law and its application of those principles
to the facts of his case.
The Supreme Court has made clear that when, as in this case, a petitioner seeks to
overturn a state court’s decision regarding “clearly established Federal law,” he may
pursue two distinct paths. First, a petitioner may show that a state court’s decision was
“contrary to” federal law, by demonstrating either (1) that the state court reached a
conclusion of law that directly contradicts a holding of the Supreme Court, or (2) that,
when presented with “facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme
Court precedent,” the state court arrived at a result opposite to the one reached by the
Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).
Alternatively, a petitioner may prevail by showing that a state court’s decision
involved an “unreasonable application” of federal law. A state court decision involves an
“unreasonable application” of federal law “if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts” of the
case before it. Id. at 413. An application of law is “unreasonable” only if it involves
“[s]ome increment of incorrectness beyond error.” Overton v. Newton, 295 F.3d 270,
14
277 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the Supreme Court
has made clear that the phrase “clearly established Federal law” refers to holdings, and
not dicta, of cases decided by the Supreme Court, as opposed to lower federal courts.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
Even apart from the requirements of AEDPA discussed above, to establish that an
erroneous application of state rules of evidence violates the federal guarantee of due
process, Evans must also demonstrate that the state court’s erroneous conclusions about
New York evidence law were so egregious as to implicate the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of due process. That guarantee, in this case, is one of “fundamental fairness,” a
principle that the Supreme Court has “defined . . . very narrowly.” Dowling, 493 U.S. at
352; see also McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72-73.
In short, in this case Evans faces a doubly difficult challenge. The combination of
the Supreme Court’s “fundamental fairness” cases and the limited habeas jurisdiction
granted by AEDPA means that Evans must demonstrate that the effect of the admission of
Walker’s statement was so prejudicial to his defense that he was deprived of due process
and he must identify a Supreme Court case that clearly establishes that the admission of
evidence that improperly bolsters a prosecution witness’s testimony constitutes a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because no Supreme Court case requires such a
conclusion, we reverse the judgment of the district court.4
4
The district court relied heavily on cases that stand for the proposition that
admission of hearsay evidence in violation of either New York or federal evidence rules
15
II. Application
In this case, Evans does not identify any Supreme Court holding that the Appellate
Division’s decision might be “contrary to” in AEDPA’s sense. Rather, he contends that
the district court was correct in holding that the decision was an “unreasonable
application” of Supreme Court precedent. We thus turn to the district court’s analysis,
which we find unpersuasive.
In granting petitioner’s application, the district court pointed to four Supreme
Court cases that it thought embodied principles that the Appellate Division unreasonably
applied. Evans, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 203. In McGuire and Dowling, the Supreme Court
rejected habeas petitions claiming violations of due process in cases that involved
evidentiary violations. In McGuire, the Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the
admission as substantive evidence of prior-injury evidence – which would have been
properly used only to prove battered-child syndrome –“‘so infused the trial with
unfairness as to deny due process of law.’” 502 U.S. at 75, quoting Lisenba, 314 U.S. at
228. The Court found, in view of additional evidence presented at trial and the judge’s
instructions to the jury, that the evidentiary violations did not fall into the narrow
can infect proceedings and require a new trial. See People v. McClean, 69 N.Y.2d 426,
430 (1987); Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995). But those cases do not
establish that the violation of evidence rules constitutes a violation of due process.
McClean is of course not a decision of the Supreme Court, and Tome explicitly limits its
holding “to the requirements for admission under [Federal] Rule [of Evidence]
801(d)(1)(B),” 513 U.S. at 167. Those cases therefore do not announce a constitutional
principle that federal courts can apply to § 2254 habeas petitions.
16
“category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness.” Id. at 73 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Similarly, in Dowling, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the
admission, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), of evidence of his role in a prior burglary
and assault, for which he was acquitted, violated the guarantee of fundamental fairness.
493 U.S. at 354. While the Court recognized “that the introduction of [this] evidence . . .
ha[d] the potential to prejudice the jury,” it framed the question as “whether it is
acceptable to deal with the potential for abuse through nonconstitutional sources like the
Federal Rules of Evidence, or whether the introduction of this type of evidence . . .
violates fundamental conceptions of justice.” Id. at 352 (internal quotation marks and
footnote omitted). At least in Dowling, the Supreme Court opted not to constitutionalize
this sort of evidentiary error. McGuire and Dowling therefore set precedents as to what
evidentiary errors would not violate due process, but they provide very limited guidance
as to which evidentiary errors would do so.
These cases are consistent with Lisenba, in which the Supreme Court had earlier
considered whether due process was violated when evidence was admitted in violation of
state-law evidence rules. On the evidentiary issues, the Supreme Court rejected
petitioner’s claims and noted that it did “not sit to review state court action on questions
of the propriety of the trial judge’s action in the admission of evidence.” 314 U.S. at 228.
What the Court found most relevant to the petitioner’s claims in Lisenba was the
admission of confessions, allegedly obtained under duress, made by petitioner regarding
17
crimes for which he was convicted; the question is therefore wholly distinct from the one
presented in the instant case. But even as to the admissibility of coerced confessions, the
Court rejected petitioner’s claims. Id. at 240-41. Not only does Lisenba not stand for the
proposition that the admission of hearsay evidence violates due process, its holding does
not embody a principle that could guide a federal court when granting an application for
habeas under AEDPA in a case such as this one.
The district court also relied on Chambers v. Mississippi, which it took to embody
the principle that the erroneous admission of hearsay can defeat a defendant’s
fundamental right to present his own defense. But Chambers stands for the inverse
proposition: that in some cases the exclusion of hearsay proffered by a defendant in a
correct application of state rules of evidence can violate the guarantee of due process by
denying a defendant his right to present witnesses in his own defense. 410 U.S. at 302.
In that case, Mississippi’s “voucher” rule prohibited litigants from impeaching their own
witnesses. Because the state refused to call a witness who had previously confessed to
the crime for which Chambers was then being tried, he sought to introduce other evidence
of those prior third-party confessions. The operation of Mississippi’s hearsay rule
prohibited Chambers from doing so. Id. at 294. In these circumstances, the Court held,
the state’s evidence rules produced an unconstitutional result. Id. at 302. To rely on
Chambers for more than that is to ignore the Supreme Court’s interpretation of AEDPA’s
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“as determined by the Supreme Court” language to include only the holdings of – and not
the dicta contained in – its cases. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.5
Finally, to the extent any of the cases on which the district court relied can be said
to provide a principle the Appellate Division unreasonably applied, such a principle
would be broad in nature. “[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable
requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway
[state] courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). We may assume, arguendo, that the admission of
hearsay statements, in some egregious instance, could render a trial fundamentally unfair
– though in most cases, the more specific provisions of the Confrontation Clause would
remedy such abuses.6 But the ruling in this case was hardly a clean example of such
abuse. The declarant, Walker, testified at trial and was extensively cross-examined about
the inconsistencies in her various statements; the hearsay statement added little of an
incriminating nature to Walker’s sworn and cross-examined in-court testimony, and its
inconsistencies with some details of that testimony added grist to the defense argument
5
We need not determine whether, in a case involving sufficiently egregious
evidentiary errors, a federal court could grant habeas relief notwithstanding that the
specific errors have not previously been held to violate due process by the Supreme
Court. This is not that case.
6
The Confrontation Clause is not implicated in this case, since the author of the
hearsay statement, Walker, testified at trial and was available for cross-examination,
presumably including further cross-examination after admission of the written statement,
which was not requested by defense counsel. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
53-54 (2004).
19
that Walker was an unreliable witness; and Walker’s testimony (and thus the hearsay
statement) was corroborated by a wealth of other evidence. Under these circumstances,
assuming arguendo that Supreme Court cases establish a general principle that the
reliance on hearsay testimony to support a conviction can violate the requirement of due
process, we could not conclude that the state court’s affirmance of Evans’s conviction,
finding any state evidentiary error harmless and Evans’s trial fundamentally fair, was an
unreasonable application of that principle.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court erred by granting
Evans’s application for the writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the district court is
accordingly REVERSED, and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition.
20