Gardner v. McArdle

10-1977-pr
Gardner v. McArdle
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,
2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 16th day of February, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY,
7 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
8 Circuit Judges,
9 LEE H. ROSENTHAL,
10 District Judge.*
11
12
13
14 PHILLIP JEROME GARDNER,
15
16 Plaintiff-Appellant,
17
18 -v.- 10-1977-pr
19
20 SERGEANT MCARDLE, DETECTIVE KRISTOFFSEN,
21 DETECTIVE JIMENEZ, POLICE OFFICER ZOROVIC,
22 POLICE OFFICER COSTALES, all of the 77th
23 Precinct in Kings County,
24
25 Defendants-Appellees.**
26
*
The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
**
The Clerk of Court is respectfully instructed to amend
the caption as set forth above.
1 FOR APPELLANT: James W.B. Benkard, Andrew Ditchfield,
2 Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, New York,
3 NY.***
4
5 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
6 Southern District of New York (Preska, C.J.).
7
8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
9 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
10 VACATED and the case be REMANDED with directions to grant
11 leave to amend the complaint.
12 Plaintiff-Appellant Phillip Gardner appeals from a
13 judgment of the United States District Court for the
14 Southern District of New York (Preska, C.J.), dismissing his
15 pro se, in forma pauperis complaint brought pursuant to 42
16 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed Gardner’s
17 complaint sua sponte on the basis that the complaint failed
18 to plead proper venue and failed to state a claim upon which
19 relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
20 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
21 and procedural history of the case.
22 We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal
23 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) de novo. Giano v. Goord,
***
Corporation Counsel of New York has chosen not to appear
as counsel for Defendants-Appellees in this appeal because the
district court dismissed the case before any defendant was ever
served.
2
1 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001). We agree with the
2 district court that Gardner’s complaint fails to state a
3 cognizable claim if it is construed to assert a failure to
4 provide Miranda warnings and false arrest. Accordingly,
5 dismissal of the case would normally be proper. However,
6 “[a] pro se complaint is to be read liberally. Certainly
7 the court should not dismiss without granting leave to amend
8 at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives
9 any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum
10 v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation
11 omitted).
12 Having conducted an independent review of the record,
13 we conclude that the district court should have afforded
14 Gardner an opportunity to amend his complaint to replead a
15 due process claim stemming from a Miranda violation. “A
16 Miranda violation that amounts to actual coercion based on
17 outrageous government misconduct is a deprivation of a
18 constitutional right that can be the basis for a § 1983 suit
19 even when a confession is not used against the declarant in
20 any fashion.” Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 348 (2d
21 Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
22
3
1 In our view, a liberal reading of the complaint does
2 give an indication that Gardner might state a valid claim
3 that his due process rights were violated on the basis that
4 police coercion led to inculpatory statements. Indeed,
5 Gardner’s complaint alleges that while he was in custody for
6 approximately fourteen hours, he was (1) placed in a line-
7 up; (2) forced to make written and videotaped statements;
8 and (3) told that he could not place a phone call until he
9 made a written statement—all without receiving Miranda
10 warnings. Moreover, the mention of Gardner’s use of mental
11 health medication alludes to the possibility that he
12 suffered from mental health issues. Finally, the affidavit1
13 attached to Gardner’s complaint specifically contends that
14 his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was infringed
15 and discusses that Gardner was suffering from mental health
16 problems at the time of the incident. Thus, Gardner’s
17 complaint, construed liberally, alleges more than a simple
18 Miranda violation and suggests that an amended complaint
19 would succeed in stating a claim. See Gomez v. USAA Fed.
20 Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999).
21
1
The affidavit was previously submitted in New York state
court in support of Gardner’s motion to vacate his conviction
pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure § 440.10.
4
1 We recognize that an amended complaint brought by
2 Gardner faces several difficulties, to say the least. Among
3 others, the circumstances of Gardner’s interrogation may
4 have not been “so coercive as to amount to a constitutional
5 violation.” Deshawn E., 156 F.3d at 348. In addition, the
6 doctrine of collateral estoppel may bar relitigation of
7 Gardner’s claim as it appears that the claim may have been
8 previously adjudicated in state court. See Allen v.
9 McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980). Despite these
10 challenges to Gardner’s Section 1983 action, we cannot “rule
11 out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an
12 amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim.” Gomez,
13 171 F.3d at 796. Accordingly, Gardner should be permitted
14 to amend his complaint.
15 Finally, the district court erred in dismissing
16 Gardner’s complaint sua sponte for improper venue because
17 there were no extraordinary circumstances to justify such a
18 dismissal. See Concession Consultants, Inc. v. Mirisch, 355
19 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Stich v. Rehnquist,
20 982 F.2d 88, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1992). Neither the complaint’s
21 insufficient venue allegations nor failure to state a
22 cognizable claim constitute the type of extraordinary
23 circumstances that warrant a sua sponte dismissal. See
24 Gomez, 171 F.3d at 795-96.
5
1 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
2 court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED with instructions
3 to permit Gardner to amend his complaint.
4
5 FOR THE COURT:
6 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
7
8
6