United States v. Williams

10-2588-cr (L)
USA v. Yeagley, et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,
2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 18th day of May, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY,
7 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
8 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY
9 Circuit Judges,
10
11
12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
13
14 Appellee,
15
16 -v.- 10-2588-cr (Lead)
17 11-0098-cr (Con)
18
19 RAMEL WILLIAMS, CHRISTOPHER YEAGLEY, AKA TAZ,
20
21 Defendants-Appellants.
22
23
24
25 FOR APPELLANTS: MALVINA NATHANSON, New York, NY, for
26 Defendant-Appellant Christopher Yeagley,
27 aka Taz.
28
29 Larry Sheehan, Law Office of Larry
30 Sheehan, Bronx, NY, for
31 Defendant-Appellant Ramel Williams.
32
33
1 FOR APPELLEE: DIANE GUJARATI, Assistant United States
2 Attorney (Anna M. Skotko, Chi T. Steve
3 Kwok, Assistant United States Attorneys,
4 on the brief), for Preet Bharara, United
5 States Attorney for the Southern District
6 of New York, New York, NY.
7
8 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
9 Southern District of New York (Karas, J.).
10
11 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
12 AND DECREED that the judgments of the United States District
13 Court for the Southern District of New York be AFFIRMED.
14 Defendant-Appellant Christopher Yeagley appeals the
15 decision of the United States District Court for the
16 Southern District of New York (Karas, J.) denying Yeagley’s
17 motion to suppress and the court’s unanimity instruction to
18 the jury in response to a question posed by the jury during
19 deliberation. Defendant-Appellant Ramel Williams appeals
20 from the district court’s decision sentencing him to 360
21 months’ imprisonment following Williams’s plea of guilty to:
22 (1) conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to
23 distribute one kilogram or more of heroin in violation of 21
24 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846 (Count I); (2)
25 distributing and possessing with intent to distribute heroin
26 in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), and
27 841(b)(1)(C) (Count III); (3) distributing and possessing
2
1 with intent to distribute MDMA (ecstasy) in violation of 21
2 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count IV); (4)
3 possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony in
4 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count V); and (5) using
5 and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug
6 trafficking crime for which he may be prosecuted in federal
7 court in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(i)(A)(I) (Count
8 VI).
9 Defendant-Appellant Yeagley argues that the district
10 court erred in denying his motion to suppress heroin seized
11 from the front lawn of Yeagley’s home on the morning of his
12 arrest on March 26, 2008. He contends the seizure violated
13 his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court determined
14 that exigent circumstances warranted the officer’s seizure
15 of heroin. The officer witnessed Yeagley drop the heroin
16 over a fence and onto Yeagley’s front yard. We review a
17 district court’s determination of exigent circumstances for
18 clear error. United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769
19 (2d Cir. 1990). The seizure occurred at 3:30 a.m. on March
20 26, 2008 in a high-crime area. Officer Lahar observed
21 Yeagley in a hand-to-hand drug transaction with a third
22 party on the steps leading to Yeagley’s home. Officer Lahar
23 drove around the block, stopped his vehicle in front of
3
1 Yeagley’s home, and asked Yeagley and the third party what
2 they were doing. At that point Officer Lahar saw the third
3 party put something in his mouth and Yeagley drop something
4 over a waist-high fence onto his yard. After a backup
5 officer arrived and began to search Yeagley, Officer Lahar
6 looked over the fence in the area where Yeagley had dropped
7 something and saw several packets of heroin. Officer Lahar
8 told the backup officer to place Yeagley in custody, and he
9 then heard Yeagley yell toward his home. Officer Lahar then
10 stepped over the waist-high fence and seized the heroin.
11 All of these facts support the district court’s
12 determination that Officer Lahar would have been objectively
13 reasonable in believing that the evidence was at risk of
14 destruction and the officers’ safety was threatened. See
15 United States v. Schaper, 903 F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1990).
16 Because we find the district court’s determination not
17 clearly erroneous, we affirm its denial of Yeagley’s motion
18 to suppress.
19 Yeagley also appeals the district court’s response to a
20 jury question raised on the morning of the second day of
21 deliberations. The jury wrote to the judge asking: “Must we
22 be unanimous on both charges against C. Yeagley? If not,
23 what happens?” Judge Karas explained his interpretation of
4
1 the jury’s question and asked both defense counsel and the
2 government whether either party had a different view. Both
3 responded “No.” Judge Karas also stated his proposed
4 response to the jury’s question on the record and asked both
5 defense counsel and the government whether they agreed with
6 the proposed response. Both defense counsel and the
7 government indicated that they did. Judge Karas then
8 instructed the jury accordingly: “The answer is, you must be
9 unanimous as to each of the two charges in the Indictment,
10 and of course Mr. Yeagley is the only person charged, so the
11 answer is you must be unanimous. All right. I hope that
12 answers your question.”
13 On appeal, Yeagley argues that the district court’s
14 response was erroneous because it coerced a guilty verdict
15 and deprived Yeagley of a fair trial. But because Yeagley’s
16 counsel explicitly accepted the court’s proposed instruction
17 before it was given, he has waived his right to challenge
18 that instruction on appeal. See United States v. Polouizzi,
19 564 F.3d 142, 153 (2d Cir. 2009).
20 Defendant-Appellant Williams argues that the district
21 court erred in failing to depart downward from the
22 sentencing Guidelines on the basis that his Criminal History
23 Category overstated his actual criminal history and that his
5
1 360-month sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s
2 prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The district
3 court’s refusal to downwardly depart is unappealable. See
4 United States v. Stinson, 465 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir. 2006).
5 Williams’s sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment
6 because it is not grossly disproportionate to the crime, is
7 in line with several Supreme Court cases affirming sentences
8 comparable to or longer than Williams’s sentence for
9 similar, or less serious crimes, and represents a sentence
10 at the low end of the Guidelines range.
11 For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the
12 district court are hereby AFFIRMED.
13
14 FOR THE COURT:
15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
16
17
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