Rahim v. Secretary, Establishment Div., Gov?t of People?s Republic of

11-3458
Rahim v. Secretary, Establishment Div., Gov’t of People’s Republic of Bangladesh
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York,
on the 21st day of September, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
GUIDO CALABRESI,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________
Md. Hafizur Rahim,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 11-3458-cv
Secretary, Establishment Division,
Government of the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: Md. Hafizur Rahim, pro se, Long Island City, N.Y.
FOR APPELLEE: No appearance.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Matsumoto, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Md. Hafizur Rahim, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district
court’s judgment sua sponte dismissing his complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), because it is barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq. Rahim alleges that, while employed as a tax inspector by the government
of Bangladesh, he was subjected to an unspecified form of discrimination that resulted in his
being denied a promotion. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
This Court reviews de novo both a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), and a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001); Celestine v. Mount
Vernon Neighborhood Health Ctr., 403 F.3d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2005). The complaint must
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are
assumed to be true, this is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. Although pro se complaints must contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the
plausibility standard, the Court will look for such allegations by reading pro se complaints with
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“special solicitude” and interpreting them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest.”
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (emphasis in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We review denial of leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. Hutchison v.
Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 647 F.3d 479, 490 (2d Cir. 2011). While we have held that district
courts should generally not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting the plaintiff leave to
amend, leave to amend is not necessary when it would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222
F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
Having conducted an independent review of the record, we conclude that the district
court properly dismissed Rahim’s complaint. We reject Rahim’s argument that the exception to
sovereign immunity found in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)(A) applies, as the record contains no
indication that he and Defendant-Appellee had any agreement to arbitrate their disputes in the
United States. Moreover, for this same reason, we conclude that the district court acted within
its discretion in denying Rahim an opportunity to amend his complaint, as any amendment would
have been futile.
We have considered all of Rahim’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without
merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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