Scott v. New York City Department of Correction

10-931-cv
Scott v. New York City Department of Correction
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
2 Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York,
3 on the 2nd day of November, two thousand eleven.
4 PRESENT:
5 JOHN M. WALKER, Jr.,
6 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,
7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
8 Circuit Judges.
9 __________________________________________
10
11 Collette J. Scott,
12
13 Plaintiff-Appellant,
14
15 v. 10-931-cv
16 New York City Department of Correction,
17 Correction Officer’s Benevolent Association of the
18 City of New York Inc., Norman Seabrook, individually
19 and in his official capacity,
20 Defendants-Appellees.
21 __________________________________________
22
23 FOR APPELLANT: Collette J. Scott, pro se, Magnolia, DE.
24 FOR APPELLEES: Elizabeth S. Natrella, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Michael A.
25 Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York,
26 NY, for Defendant-Appellee New York Department of Correction
27
1 Alan Serrins, Serrins & Associates, LLC, New York, NY, for
2 Defendants-Appellees Correction Benevolent Association of the City
3 of New York and Norman Seabrook
4 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
5 York (Stein, J.).
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
7 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
8 Appellant Collette J. Scott, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment
9 denying her motion for leave to amend the complaint and reopen discovery, partially granting
10 summary judgment in favor of the defendants, conditionally granting a motion in limine filed by
11 certain defendants, and dismissing her remaining claims pursuant to a jury verdict. We assume the
12 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on
13 appeal.
14 I. Denial of Motion for Leave to Amend and Reopen Discovery
15 We review a district court’s decision denying leave to amend a complaint under a Fed. R.
16 Civ. P. 16 scheduling order for abuse of discretion. See Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204
17 F.3d 326, 339-40 (2d Cir. 2000). Similarly, we review discovery rulings for abuse of discretion,
18 including the denial of a motion to reopen discovery. See Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 232
19 (2d Cir. 2004); see also In re DG Acquisition Corp., 151 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] trial court
20 enjoys wide discretion in its handling of pre-trial discovery, and its rulings with regard to discovery
21 are reversed only upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.”) (internal quotation marks
22 omitted).
2
1 Here, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the apparent
2 negligence of Scott’s former attorney was not sufficient to establish “good cause” for amending the
3 scheduling order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). See Parker, 204 F.3d at 339-40 (adopting the holding
4 of other Circuits that “the Rule 16(b) ‘good cause’ standard, rather than the more liberal standard
5 of Rule 15(a), governs a motion to amend filed after the deadline a district court has set for
6 amending the pleadings”); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (suggesting that
7 a party who voluntarily chooses her attorney generally “cannot . . . avoid the consequences of the
8 acts or omissions of this freely selected agent”). Additionally, the magistrate judge did not abuse
9 his discretion in concluding that the defendants would have been prejudiced by the untimely filing
10 of an amended complaint, as they had already deposed Scott, otherwise completed discovery, and
11 moved for summary judgment, and Scott’s original complaint could not fairly be read to assert a
12 claim for gender discrimination based on unequal terms and conditions of employment.
13 Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Scott’s motion for leave to amend and to reopen discovery.
14 II. Partial Grant of Summary Judgment
15 We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and ask whether the district court
16 properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was
17 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292,
18 300 (2d Cir. 2003). “In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are
19 required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party
20 against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)
21 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not
22 sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. State of N.Y., 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.
23 2002).
3
1 Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these
2 principles, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment decision for substantially the same
3 reasons stated by the magistrate judge in his thorough and well-reasoned report. On appeal, Scott
4 has not presented a specific and discernable challenge to the district court’s summary judgment
5 decision.
6 III. Motion In Limine and Jury Verdict
7 We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, and “will reverse only if an erroneous
8 ruling affected a party’s substantial rights.” Marcic v. Reinauer Transp. Cos., 397 F.3d 120, 124
9 (2d Cir. 2005). Scott has offered no basis for concluding that the district court abused its discretion
10 in conditionally granting the motion in limine filed by Norman Seabrook and the Correction
11 Officers’ Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc (the “COBA”). The district court
12 did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence at issue—the allegations of two other
13 individuals that Seabrook had sexually harassed them—was inadmissible on the ground that it was
14 offered to “prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” See
15 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Furthermore, there is no indication that Scott was prejudiced by the court’s
16 failure to make a definitive ruling on the motion prior to trial.
17 Finally, Scott has not articulated a specific challenge to the jury verdict in favor of Seabrook
18 and the COBA. To the extent that she is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, such a
19 challenge is unpreserved, as she did not move for judgment as a matter of law following trial. See
20 Borger v. Yamaha Int’l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 395 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that, in the absence of a
21 motion for judgment as a matter of law, this Court is “without power to direct the District Court to
22 enter judgment contrary to the one it had permitted to stand” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
23 In any event, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
4
1 We have considered Scott’s other arguments on appeal and have found them to be without
2 merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
3 FOR THE COURT:
4 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5
5