United States v. Samlal

10-1153-cr
United States v. Samlal
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 17th day of March, two thousand eleven.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
9 PETER W. HALL,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
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13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
14 Appellee,
15
16 -v.- 10-1153-cr
17
18 GILDA SAMLAL,
19 Defendant-Appellant.
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21
22 FOR APPELLANT: Colleen P. Cassidy, Federal Defenders of
23 New York, Inc., Appeals Bureau, New York,
24 New York.
25
26 FOR APPELLEE: Karin Orenstein, Assistant United States
27 Attorney (Susan Corkery, Assistant United
28 States Attorney, on the brief), for
29 Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney
30 for the Eastern District of New York.
1
2 Appeal from judgment of conviction in the United States
3 District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Townes,
4 J.).
5
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
7 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
8 AFFIRMED.
9
10 Defendant-Appellant Gilda Samlal (“Samlal”) appeals
11 from a conviction for smuggling an alien into the United
12 States for private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
13 § 1324. Samlal challenges her conviction on the ground that
14 the district court erred in admitting prior act evidence
15 pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) to establish knowledge. We
16 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
17 the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
18
19 We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
20 United States v. Mercado, 573 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2009).
21 “To find such abuse, we must conclude that the trial judge’s
22 evidentiary rulings were arbitrary and irrational.” United
23 States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2006)
24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25
26 “To determine whether a district court properly
27 admitted other act evidence, we consider whether ‘(1) the
28 prior acts evidence was offered for a proper purpose; (2)
29 the evidence was relevant to a disputed issue; (3) the
30 probative value of the prior act evidence substantially
31 outweighed the danger of its unfair prejudice; and (4) the
32 court administered an appropriate limiting instruction.’”
33 Mercado, 573 F.3d at 141 (quoting United States v. Brand,
34 467 F.3d 179, 196 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Huddleston v.
35 United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988) (setting forth
36 the four factors a district court should consider when
37 evaluating Rule 404(b) evidence). “In so doing, we take an
38 ‘inclusionary approach.’” Mercado, 573 F.3d at 141.
39 (quoting United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1307 (2d
40 Cir. 1992)).
41
42 The Huddleston factors were satisfied. The evidence
43 was offered for the proper purpose of establishing that
44 Samlal either knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that
45 the child she escorted was different from the person
2
1 identified in the passport that the alien used. Taken as a
2 whole, the following evidence was relevant to establishing
3 Samlal’s knowledge: (1) Samlal had escorted four different
4 people, who used recycled passports; (2) on two occasions
5 (December 2007 and August 2008) the same passport was used
6 for different people; (3) she received between $1,500 and
7 $2,000 to perform a service that airlines perform for $75-
8 $100; and (4) an agent of Customs and Border Patrol had
9 warned her in April 2008 about the consequences of escorting
10 illegal aliens. Finally, the district court gave several
11 limiting instructions, during the trial and in its final
12 charge, directing the jury to consider the evidence solely
13 for the purpose of Samlal’s state of mind. See Mercado, 573
14 F.3d at 141-42 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The evidence was also
15 accompanied by a careful and thorough instruction limiting
16 the evidence to relevant Rule 404 grounds. That instruction
17 was delivered on several occasions during testimony as well
18 as in clear jury instructions on the issue. In light of the
19 purpose and value of the evidence, and of the limiting
20 instructions, we find no abuse of discretion in deeming the
21 evidence admissible under Rule 404.”).
22
23 Accordingly, we find that the district court did not
24 abuse its discretion in admitting the prior act evidence and
25 thus affirm the judgment of conviction.
26
27 We have considered Samlal’s remaining arguments and
28 find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons,
29 the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED.
30
31
32 FOR THE COURT:
33 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
34
3