McCullough v. World Wrestling Entertainment

16-1231-cv
McCullough v. World Wrestling Entertainment
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2016
Submitted: August 30, 2016 Decided: September 27, 2016
Docket Nos. 16-1231(L), 16-1237(Con)
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Russ McCullough, Ryan Sakoda, and Matthew Robert Wiese,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; William Albert Haynes, III,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
World Wrestling Entertainment, Incorporated,1
Movant-Defendant-Appellee.
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Before: NEWMAN, WINTER, and RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
Motion to dismiss appeals of orders dismissing two of
several cases consolidated in the District Court for the
District of Connecticut (Vanessa L. Bryant, District
Judge).
Motion granted.
1
This caption, altered for purposes of this opinion, does
not change the official caption.
1
David R. Fine, K&L Gates LLP,
Harrisburg, PA (Jerry S.
McDevitt, Curtis B. Krasik, K&L
Gates LLP, Pittsburgh, PA,
Jeffrey Mueller, Day Pitney LLP,
Hartford, CT, on the motion),
for Movant-Defendant-Appellee
World Wrestling Entertainment,
Incorporated.
William M. Bloss, Koskoff, Koskoff &
Bieder, P.C., Bridgeport, CT
(Konstantine W. Kyros, Kyros Law
Offices, Hingham, MA, Charles J.
LaDuca, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca,
LLP, Bethesda, MD, Michael J.
Flannery, Cuneo Gilbert &
LaDuca, LLP, St. Louis, MO,
Robert K. Shelquist, Scott
Moriarity, Lockridge Grindal
Nauen P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN,
Harris L. Pogust, Pogust Braslow
& Millrood, LLC, Conshohocken,
PA, Erica Mirabella, Mirabella
Law, LLC, Boston, MA, on the
memorandum in opposition), for
Plaintiffs-Appellants Russ
McCullough, Ryan Sakoda, Matthew
Robert Wiese, and William Albert
Haynes, III.
JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:
The pending motion to dismiss two appeals merits a
brief opinion to clarify the circumstances under which
judgments entered in some, but not all, cases that have
been consolidated are final for purposes of appellate
jurisdiction. Clarification is needed in the aftermath of
2
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gelboim v. Bank of America
Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897 (2015).
The appeals arise from cases in the District Court for
the District of Connecticut. That Court (Vanessa L. Bryant,
District Judge) consolidated six cases, five of which were
brought against Defendant-Appellee World Wrestling
Entertainment, Inc. (“WWE”). See McCullough v. WWE, No.
3:15-cv-01074-VLB (D. Conn.), Dkt. Nos. 41 (July 23, 2015),
49 (Aug. 4, 2015), 79 (Oct. 5, 2015). On WWE’s motion to
dismiss, the District Court later entered an order
dismissing two of the cases, one brought by Plaintiffs-
Appellants Russ McCullough and others, and one brought by
Plaintiff-Appellant William Albert Haynes III. Id. Dkt. No.
116 (Mar. 21, 2016). From the order entered in favor of WWE
in these two cases, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed timely
notices of appeal. Id. Dkt. Nos. 123, 124 (Apr. 20, 2016).
WWE, relying on our decision in Hageman v. City
Investing Co., 851 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1988), moved to dismiss
these appeals on the ground that other consolidated cases
remained pending in the District Court. The Plaintiffs-
Appellants oppose dismissal, urging us to reconsider
Hageman in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
3
Gelboim. Although only an in banc court can reject a prior
decision of this Court, see United States v. Wilkerson, 361
F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004), a panel that believes an
intervening Supreme Court decision has abrogated a prior
decision can present that view to the active judges, and,
in the absence of objection, disregard the prior decision.2
We therefore proceed to consider the effect, if any, of
Gelboim on Hageman.
Hageman concerned two employment discrimination cases
that a district court had consolidated. Like the
consolidation in the pending matter, this was a district
court consolidation for all purposes, not a consolidation
by the Multi-District Litigation Panel (“MDL”) for
“coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings”
authorized by 28 U.S.C. ¶ 1407. The district court in
Hageman dismissed the sole claim in one of the consolidated
cases. The plaintiff appealed the order of dismissal, and
the defendants moved to dismiss the appeal because claims
in the other consolidated case remained pending.
2
A recent example of that procedure is Doscher v. Sea Port
Group Securities, LLC, No. 15-2814, 2016 WL 4245427, at *4-5 &
*5 n.9 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 2016) (circulation to active judges
prior to filing opinion that considered effect of intervening
Supreme Court decision).
4
The opinion in Hageman identified three possible
approaches to the issue presented by the motion to dismiss
the appeal: (1) a judgment disposing of any claim in a
consolidated action could be appealed, (2) an “absolute
rule” that a judgment in a consolidated action could be
appealed only if it disposed of all claims, and (3) “a
flexible approach, examining the type of consolidation and
the relationship between the consolidated actions in order
to determine whether the actions could be appealed
separately absent Rule 54(b) certification.” Hageman, 851
F.2d at 71. Hageman adopted a variant of the flexible
approach. We stated:
[T]he best way to weigh these competing benefits
of an absolute rule and a more flexible approach
is to hold that when there is a judgment in a
consolidated case that does not dispose of all
claims which have been consolidated, there is a
strong presumption that the judgment is not
appealable absent Rule 54(b) certification. In
highly unusual circumstances, a litigant may be
able to overcome this presumption and convince us
that we should consider the merits of the appeal
immediately, rather than waiting for a final
judgment.
Id. Concluding that the presumption had not been
overcome, we dismissed the appeal.
Several years later we again considered the
appealability of an order dismissing a complaint in a
5
consolidated action. The consolidation involved a large
group of cases transferred by the MDL Panel to the Southern
District of New York “for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings.” In re: Libor-Based Financial
Instruments Antitrust Litigation, No. 1:11-md-02262-NRB
(S.D.N.Y.) (“Libor I”) Dkt. No. 1 (Aug. 12, 2011), reported
at 802 F. Supp. 2d 1380, 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2011). The District
Court entered an order dismissing the complaint of Ellen
Gelboim and Linda Zacher, which had made one claim, an
antitrust violation. Libor I, 935 F. Supp. 2d 666, 738
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).3 On appeal from that order, this Court
dismissed “the appeals” because all claims in the
consolidated action had not been dismissed. In re Libor-
3
The District Court dismissed the Gelboim-Zacher complaint
in an order entered March 29, 2013. See Libor I, Dkt. No. 286.
The Plaintiffs-Appellants’ timely notice of appeal (“NOA”) from
that order states that they “believe” a judgment was later
“entered on or about August 26, 2013 by operation of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58(c)(2)(B). Id. Dkt. No. 409 at 2 n.1
(Sept. 17, 2013). That subsection of Rule 58 provides that
judgment “is entered” for rulings that are required to be set
forth in a separate document when the ruling is so set forth or
”150 days have run from the entry in the civil docket.”
Presumably, this subsection means that a judgment is deemed to
be entered 150 days after entry of the ruling in the civil
docket. See Mora v. United States, 323 F. App’x 18, 19-20 (2d
Cir. 2009) (“If a separate judgment is not entered, it is deemed
to have been entered 150 days after entry of the dispositive
order.”). The docket in Libor I does not reflect a judgment
dismissing the Gelboim-Zacher complaint.
6
Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, Nos. 13-
3565, 13-3636, 2013 WL 9557843 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 2013)
(“Libor II”).4 Libor II did not cite Hageman, but did cite
Houbigant, Inc. v. IMG Fragrance Brands, LLC, 627 F.3d 497(2d Cir. 2010), see 2013 WL 9557843, at *1, which had
relied on Hageman, see Houbigant, 627 F.3d at 498.
The Supreme Court reversed this Court’s decision in
Libor II. Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897(2015).5 The Court, citing Hageman, noted that our Court
“does not differentiate between all-purpose consolidations
. . . and . . . § 1407 consolidations for pretrial
proceedings only.” Id. at 904 n.2. The Court ruled that the
Gelboim-Zacher appeal should not have been dismissed
4
This Court’s dismissal order refers to “appeals” and bears
two docket numbers, Nos. 13-3565 and 13-3636. No. 13-3565 is the
appeal brought by Ellen Gelboim and Linda Zacher. No. 13-3636 is
an appeal brought by several Charles Schwab entities whose case
was included in the consolidated MDL action. Those two appeals
were administratively consolidated by our Clerk’s Office, an
action implicitly reflected by Dkt. No. 11 in No. 13-3565.
5
The Supreme Court understood this Court to have dismissed
only “the appeal filed by Gelboim and Zacher,” Gelboim, 135 S.
Ct. at 902, see also id. at 904, although our order had
dismissed both the Gelboim-Zacher appeal and the appeal of the
Schwab entities. See footnote 4, supra. Only Gelboim and Zacher
filed a petition for certiorari seeking review of our Court’s
order. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, id. (No. 13-1174) (Mar.
26, 2014). The Supreme Court granted their petition. 134 S. Ct.
2876 (2014). The Schwab entities did not file a petition for
certiorari.
7
because it was an appeal from a judgment dismissing one
case that had been consolidated only for MDL purposes. As
the Court explained:
Cases consolidated for MDL pretrial proceedings
ordinarily retain their separate identities, so an
order disposing of one of the discrete cases in
its entirety should qualify under § 1291 as an
appealable final decision.
Id. at 904 (footnote omitted).
Relevant to the pending matter, the Court added, “We
express no opinion on whether an order deciding one of
multiple cases combined in an all-purpose consolidation
qualifies under § 1291 as a final decision appealable of
right.” Id. at 904 n.4. Because the McCullough and Haynes
cases, the subjects of the pending motion, were
consolidated with other cases in the District Court for all
purposes,6 and because the Supreme Court in Gelboim
6
The Plaintiffs-Appellants dispute that the cases were
consolidated for all purposes. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 3. They call our attention to
Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 521 F.2d 1354 (2d Cir. 1975), and
Greenberg v. Giannini, 140 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1944). In Katz, the
district court explicitly consolidated cases “for all pretrial
purposes.” 521 F.2d at 1356. In Greenberg, the consolidation
“was only a convenience, accomplishing no more than to obviate
the duplication of papers and the like.” 140 F.2d at 552. The
consolidation orders in the pending cases give no indication
that consolidation was accomplished for anything less than all
purposes. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2).
8
explicitly declined to express an opinion on the
appealability of a dismissal of one of multiple cases in
such a consolidation, Gelboim does not oblige us to
reconsider the continuing validity of Hageman. Applying
Hageman, we see nothing in the Plaintiffs-Appellants’
papers that overcomes the “strong presumption that the
judgment is not appealable.” Hageman, 851 F.2d at 71.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the appeals in 16-
1231 and 16-1237 is granted, without prejudice to renewal
of these appeals upon entry of a final judgment in the
District Court disposing of all the cases with which the
McCullough and Haynes cases have been consolidated.
9