Miner v. Goord

09-0674-cv
Miner v. Goord
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F OR T HE S ECOND C IRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . C ITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS FILED AFTER J ANUARY 1, 2007,
IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT ’ S L OCAL R ULE 32.1 AND F EDERAL R ULE OF A PPELLATE P ROCEDURE 32.1. I N A
BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN WHICH A LITIGANT CITES A SUMMARY ORDER , IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS , AT LEAST
ONE CITATION MUST EITHER BE TO THE F EDERAL A PPENDIX OR BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE NOTATION : “( SUMMARY ORDER ).” A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF THAT SUMMARY ORDER TOGETHER WITH THE PAPER IN WHICH THE SUMMARY ORDER IS
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IS PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEE ( SUCH AS THE DATABASE AVAILABLE AT HTTP :// WWW . CA 2. USCOUR T S . GOV /).
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At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 25 th day of November, two thousand and
nine.
Present: JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
Circuit Judges,
LAWRENCE E. KAHN,
District Judge. *
________________________________________________
LEROY MINER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
- v. - (09-0674-cv)
GLEN S. GOORD, ROBERT DENNISON,
WILLIAM GORMAN, MELVIN WILLIAMS,
THOMAS O’CONNOR, JANICE SMITH,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________________________________
*
The Honorable Lawrence E. Kahn, of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of New York, sitting by designation.
1
Appearing for Appellant: ROBERT N. ISSEKS, Law Office of
Robert N. Isseks, Esq.,
Middletown, New York.
Appearing for Appellee: RAJIT S. DOSANJH, Assistant
Solicitor General of Counsel,
State of New York Office of the
Attorney General, Appeals and
Opinions Bureau, Albany, New
York (BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD,
Solicitor General, ANDREA OSER,
Deputy Solicitor General, ANDREW
M. CUOMO, Attorney General of
the State of New York, on the
brief).
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York (Sharpe, J.).
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
2 AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District
3 Court for the Northern District of New York be AFFIRMED.
4 Plaintiff, Leroy Miner, appeals from the district
5 court’s January 21, 2009 judgment and order granting summary
6 judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing his complaint
7 in its entirety. Miner v. Goord, — F. Supp. 2d —, No. 1:06-
8 CV-0439 (GLS/GHL), 2009 WL 159156 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2009).
9 Plaintiff is a former state prisoner who brought an action
10 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against parole officers and
11 supervisory officials, among others, alleging that
2
1 Defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment.
2 Plaintiff, an atheist, claims that the Alcohol and Substance
3 Abuse Treatment (“ASAT”) program in place at the Willard
4 Drug Treatment Campus is “a form of religious indoctrination
5 based on the 12 Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous.” Plaintiff
6 contends that he “refused to subject himself to the
7 program’s religious indoctrination and, as a result,
8 defendants revoked his parole and forced him to serve an
9 additional nine months in prison until the expiration of his
10 sentence.” Plaintiff maintains that “Defendants’ failure to
11 offer [him] a secular alternative to the Willard program
12 violated [his] clearly established First Amendment right not
13 to be punished for refusing to engage in religious
14 practice.”
15 We presume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
16 facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on
17 appeal. Plaintiff elected to enter the Willard Drug
18 Treatment Program as a condition of his release on parole
19 supervision. Plaintiff contends that he did not enter the
20 Willard Program voluntarily, but rather did so under
21 pressure from the attorney who represented him at the time.
3
1 Nothing in the record even remotely supports this assertion.
2 Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that he did not raise a religious
3 objection at the time that he agreed to enter the Willard
4 Program.
5 Upon Plaintiff’s arrival at Willard, he refused to
6 sign a Memorandum of Agreement, which would indicate his
7 willingness to participate in the program. Petitioner was
8 informed that he would have twenty-four hours to reconsider
9 this decision, after which time, his parole officer would
10 commence the parole violation process. Plaintiff refused to
11 sign the Memorandum of Agreement a second time and was
12 charged with violating the conditions of his release.
13 Plaintiff’s parole was revoked and he was ordered to serve
14 the remainder of his sentence. Plaintiff filed this action
15 after completing his term of imprisonment.
16 After conducting a de novo review of the district
17 court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants,
18 see Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir.
19 2005), we affirm. As an initial matter, we agree with the
20 district court that Plaintiff’s § 1983 suit is not barred by
21 the “favorable termination” rule set forth in Heck v.
4
1 Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520
2 U.S. 641 (1997). Although the favorable termination rule
3 applies to § 1983 claims regarding parole revocations, the
4 doctrine is not implicated on these facts. In this case,
5 there is no danger that § 1983 is being utilized in a manner
6 that would allow Plaintiff to engage in an end-run around
7 the requirements for bringing a habeas corpus petition
8 because he has completed his term of imprisonment. See
9 Green v. Montgomery, 219 F.3d 52, 61 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000);
10 McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2007).
11 Because Plaintiff refused to enroll in the Willard
12 Program, he cannot show that his injury is “fairly traceable
13 to defendants’ conduct.” In re U.S. Catholic Conference,
14 885 F.2d 1020, 1024 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Garelick v.
15 Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1993). Had Plaintiff
16 enrolled in the program and been subjected to mandatory
17 religious programming, his claim could have survived a
18 motion for summary judgment if he had proffered facts that
19 demonstrated a causal link between the program’s alleged
20 religious orientation and his injury. See Garelick, 987
21 F.2d at 919. However, because Plaintiff chose not to enroll
5
1 in the program based only on an unconfirmed but fervent
2 belief that he would be required to participate in religious
3 activities, he cannot show that “he personally has suffered
4 some actual or threatened injury” as a result of conduct by
5 Defendants. DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247
6 F.3d 397, 421 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
7 omitted); see also Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 14 (2d
8 Cir. 1995). Therefore, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue
9 his claims.
10 We note that it is indisputable that the 12 Steps of
11 Alcoholics Anonymous are religious in nature. See Cox v.
12 Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 108 (2d Cir. 2002); Griffin v.
13 Coughlin, 88 N.Y.2d 674, 680-84 (1996). However, this fact
14 would not resolve the merits of Plaintiff’s claim, if we
15 were to reach the merits. The ultimate issues for purposes
16 of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is whether the Willard Program
17 requires participation in religious activity, see Warner v.
18 Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1069 (2d Cir.
19 1997), and whether Miner would have been exempted from any
20 religious portions of the Willard Program, see id. at 1074-
21 75; see also Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320 (2d Cir.
6
1 1999). Because we conclude that Plaintiff lacked standing,
2 we need not answer these questions definitively. However,
3 we note that as long as a secular alternative to Alcoholics
4 Anonymous is provided, it does not violate the Establishment
5 Clause to “include a noncoercive use of [Alcoholics
6 Anonymous’s] 12-step regimen.” Griffin, 88 N.Y.2d at 677.
7 An Establishment Clause challenge based on the “mere
8 inclusion” of Alcoholics Anonymous “as one element in [a]
9 program’s treatment plan” has been “foreclosed.” DeStefano,
10 247 F.3d at 408.
11 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s remaining arguments
12 and finds them to be without merit. Accordingly, the
13 judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
14
15 For the Court
16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
17
18 By: ______________________
19
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