Styles v. Goord

10-3129-pr
Styles v. Goord
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED
WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States
Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 23 rd day
of June, two thousand eleven.
PRESENT:
BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges,
EDWARD R. KORMAN,
District Judge.*
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ANDREW STYLES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
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GLENN S. GOORD, Commissioner of
the State of New York, Department
of Correctional Services,
LESTER WRIGHT, Deputy Commissioner
of Health Services, Department
of Correctional Services,
Defendants-Appellees.
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*
The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by
designation.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: ANDREW STYLES, pro se, New York,
New York.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: MARTIN A. HOTVET, Assistant
Solicitor General (Andrea Oser,
Deputy Solicitor General, on the
brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman,
Attorney General for the State of
New York, Albany, New York.
Plaintiff-Appellant Andrew Styles, proceeding pro se,
appeals a post-judgment order of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of New York (Mordue, C.J.) denying his
motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, to vacate
the judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying
facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on
appeal. We review a district court order denying a Rule 60(b)
motion for abuse of discretion, see Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza
Aerea Boliviana, 162 F.3d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1998), and relief
pursuant to Rule 60(b) is available only in "exceptional
circumstances," Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191
(2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court had dismissed Styles' § 1983
complaint, pursuant to Rule 41(b), for failure to comply with an
order to keep the district court apprised of his current address.
Although a district court's Rule 41(b) dismissal is reviewed for
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abuse of discretion, see Spencer v. Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 112 (2d
Cir. 1998), we have emphasized that district courts "should be
especially hesitant" to dismiss a pro se litigant's complaint for
procedural deficiencies, and "deference is due to the district
court's decision to dismiss a pro se litigant's complaint only
when the circumstances are sufficiently extreme." Lucas v.
Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996).
In this case, the district court abused its discretion
when it concluded that relief from the Rule 41(b) dismissal was
not warranted. See United States ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys.,
Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 2004) (listing factors this
Court considers in reviewing a Rule 41(b) dismissal). The
district court's conclusion was based upon a failure-to-prosecute
analysis, first articulated in the order denying the Rule 60
motion. But the record shows that Styles was intent on
prosecuting the case. He submitted two sets of opposition to
defendants' summary judgment motion and a change of address form
when he was released from prison. Moreover, the district court
failed to consider ruling on the pending, fully-submitted summary
judgment motion as an alternative to dismissing under Rule 41(b).
As this Court has emphasized, "resolutions on summary judgment
. . . are generally to be preferred to dismissals under Rule
41(b)." LeSane v. Hall's Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 211
(2d Cir. 2001).
In addition, Styles' failure to ensure that he was able
to receive mail at the new address does not appear to have caused
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any delay in the adjudication of the action. Defendants' summary
judgment motion was fully submitted and pending throughout the
period between the October 2008 notice of change of address and
the March 2009 dismissal. Any additional delay was not likely to
increase meaningfully defendants' litigation costs or reduce
their ability to defend the case on the merits. Id. at 210.
Nonetheless, we affirm the post-judgment order because
a review of the record below demonstrates that the district court
should have granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. See
Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
N.J., Inc., 448 F.3d 573, 580 (2d Cir. 2006) ("This Court may
affirm an appealed decision on any ground which finds support in
the record, regardless of the ground upon which the trial court
relied." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Summary judgment
is appropriate "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party."
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986). Personal involvement of the defendants in an alleged
constitutional deprivation is a prerequisite to an award of
damages under § 1983. See Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435
(2d Cir. 2003). The mere fact that a defendant possesses
supervisory authority is insufficient to demonstrate liability
for failure to supervise under § 1983. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58
F.3d 865, 874 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Richardson, 347 F.3d at
435 ("mere linkage in the prison chain of command is insufficient
to implicate a state commissioner of corrections or a prison
superintendent in a § 1983 claim" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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In his complaint, Styles alleged that Goord and Wright,
two high-ranking prison officials, were grossly negligent in
failing to supervise unspecified subordinates who concealed
Style's medical condition from him and thus delayed any
treatment. Although Styles alleged that Goord and Wright
personally established certain state prison health policies, he
never explained how those policies related to his claims.
Notably, Styles did not allege, or submit evidence demonstrating,
any facts concerning Goord or Wright's particular conduct in
supervising their subordinates. In sum, Styles' claims were
premised on a theory of supervisory liability, and he did not
show that there was a question of fact suggesting that either
Goord or Wright was personally involved in any conduct related to
his medical condition that could give rise to § 1983 liability.
See Richardson, 347 F.3d at 435. Accordingly, we affirm the
denial of the Rule 60 motion because, even though Styles was
entitled to relief from the Rule 41(b) dismissal, the district
court should have granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment.
We have considered Styles' remaining arguments and find
them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of
the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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