Hinterberger v. Catholic Health Gordon v. Kaleida Health

12-0630; 12-0670
Hinterberger v. Catholic Health; Gordon v. Kaleida Health
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 21st day of August, two thousand thirteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 DENNIS JACOBS,
8 Chief Judge,
9 GUIDO CALABRESI,
10 RALPH K. WINTER,
11 Circuit Judges.
12
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
14 GAIL HINTERBERGER, BEVERLY WEISBECKER,
15 CYNTHIA WILLIAMS, MARCIA CARROLL, on
16 behalf of themselves and all other
17 employees similarly situated,
18
19 Plaintiffs -Appellants,
20
21 v. 12-0630
22
23 CATHOLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., JOSEPH
24 MCDONALD, MICHAEL MOLEY, CHESTNUT RIDGE
25 MEDICAL SUPPLIES, INC., CATHOLIC HEALTH
26 SYSTEM PROGRAM OF ALL INCLUSIVE CARE FOR THE
1 ELDERLY, INC., CATHOLIC HEALTH SYSTEM
2 CONTINUING CARE FOUNDATION, KENMORE MERCY
3 HOSPITAL, MCAULEY SETON HOME CARE
4 CORPORATION, MERCY HOSPITAL OF BUFFALO,
5 NAZARETH HOME OF THE FRANCISCAN SISTERS OF
6 THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION, NIAGARA HOMEMAKER
7 SERVICES, INC., SISTERS OF CHARITY HOSPITAL
8 OF BUFFALO, NEW YORK, ST. ELIZABETH'S HOME
9 OF LANCASTER, NEW YORK, ST. FRANCIS
10 GERIATRIC AND HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., ST.
11 FRANCIS HOME OF WILLIAMSVILLE, NEW YORK, ST.
12 JOSEPH HOSPITAL OF CHEEKTOWAGA, NEW YORK,
13 ST. JOSEPH'S MANOR OF OLEAN, N.Y., ST.
14 VINCENT'S HOME FOR THE AGED, ST. CLARE MANOR
15 OF LOCKPORT, N.Y., ST. LUKE MANOR OF
16 BATAVIA, N.Y., OUR LADY OF VICTORY
17 RENAISSANCE CORPORATION, CHESTNUT RIDGE
18 FAMILY PRACTICE, PLLC, ST. MARY'S MANOR,
19
20 Defendants-Appellees.
21
22
23 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
24 CATHERINE GORDON, JAMES SCHAFFER, TERESA
25 THOMPSON, PAMELA MIKA, JENNIFER PFENTNER,
26 DIANA GALDON, on behalf of themselves
27 and all other employees similarly
28 situated,
29
30 Plaintiffs- Appellants,
31
32 v. 12-0670
33
34 KALEIDA HEALTH, JAMES R. KASKIE, DAVID R.
35 WHIPPLE, MFHS MANAGED CARE, INCORPORATED,
36 FAMILY PHARMACEUTICALS, WESTLINK CORPORATION,
37 COMMUNITY MEDICAL PC, GENERAL PHYSICIANS PC,
38 MILLARD FILLMORE AMBULATORY SURGERY CENTER,
39 VISITING NURSING ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN NEW
40 YORK, INCORPORATED, VNA HOME CARE SERVICES,
41 INCORPORATED, VNA OF WNY, INCORPORATED,
42 GENERAL HOMECARE, INCORPORATED, WATERFRONT
2
1 HEALTH CARE CENTER, INCORPORATED, KALEIDA
2 HEALTH FOUNDATION, WOMEN AND CHILDREN'S
3 HOSPITAL OF BUFFALO FOUNDATION, KALEIDA IPA,
4 LLC, KALEIDA MCO, LLC, GRACE MANOR HEALTH
5 CARE FACILITY, INCORPORATED, SCHENK PHYSICAL
6 THERAPY, PC,
7
8 Defendants-Appellees.
9
10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
11
12 FOR APPELLANTS: GUY A. TALIA (J. Nelson Thomas,
13 Michael J. Lingle, on the
14 brief), Thomas & Solomon LLP,
15 Rochester, NY.
16
17 FOR APPELLEES: MARK A. MOLLOY & SUSAN C. RONEY
18 (Todd R. Shinaman, Joseph A.
19 Carello, Lynnette Nogueras-
20 Trummer, on the brief), Nixon
21 Peabody LLP, Buffalo, NY.
22
23 Appeals from judgments of the United States District
24 Court for the Western District of New York (Skretny, C.J.).
25
26 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
27 AND DECREED that the judgments are VACATED AND REMANDED.
28
29 Gail Hinterberger, Beverly Weisbecker, Cynthia
30 Williams, Marcia Carroll, Catherine Gordon, James Schaffer,
31 Teresa Thompson, Pamela Mika, Jennifer Pfentner, and Diana
32 Galdon (collectively, the “employees”) appeal from the
33 judgments of the United States District Court for the
34 Western District of New York (Skretny, C.J.), denying their
35 motions to remand to state court, and dismissing their
36 complaints. We review a denial of a motion to remand to
3
1 state court de novo. Shafii v. British Airways, PLC, 83
2 F.3d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1996). We also review the grant of a
3 motion to dismiss de novo. City of Omaha v. CBS Corp., 679
4 F.3d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 2012). We assume the parties’
5 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
6 history, and the issues presented for review.
7 The employees argue that the case should have been
8 remanded to state court because the district court lacked
9 jurisdiction over their claims. “[F]ederal subject-matter
10 jurisdiction can be founded only on those allegations in a
11 complaint that are well pleaded.” Sullivan v. Am. Airlines,
12 Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
13 marks omitted). “The artful-pleading doctrine, a corollary
14 to the well-pleaded-complaint rule, rests on the principle
15 that a plaintiff may not defeat federal subject-matter
16 jurisdiction by artfully pleading his complaint as if it
17 arises under state law where the plaintiff’s suit is, in
18 essence, based on federal law.” Id. at 272 (internal
19 quotation marks omitted). “The artful pleading doctrine
20 allows removal where federal law completely preempts a
21 plaintiff’s state-law claim.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La.,
22 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998). However, only a handful of
4
1 federal statutes support “complete preemption.” Sullivan,
2 424 F.3d at 272 (noting that the Supreme Court has only
3 recognized the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
4 (“ERISA”), Labor-Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), and the
5 National Bank Act as members of this select group). In
6 cases involving these statutes, federal law “substitutes a
7 federal cause of action for the state cause of action,
8 thereby manifesting Congress’s intent to permit removal.” 7
9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
10 Procedure § 3722.2 (4th ed. 2012).
11 Here, the district court held that it had subject
12 matter jurisdiction because the Fair Labor Standards Act
13 (“FLSA”) precluded the employees’ claims “to the extent
14 [they were] seeking unpaid overtime wages that are available
15 under the FLSA”. Hinter[b]erger v. Catholic Health Sys.,
16 No. 08 Civ. 948S (WMS), 2012 WL 125152, at *4-7 (W.D.N.Y.
17 Jan. 17, 2012). The court reasoned: “[a]lthough the Second
18 Circuit has held that statutory wage claims under the
19 NYLL . . . are not preempted by the FLSA, it has not yet
20 considered whether preemption applies when unpaid wages are
21 sought . . . via common law claims.” Id. at *5. This was
22 error. The Supreme Court has not extended complete
5
1 preemption to the FLSA. The district court had no subject
2 matter jurisdiction on the basis of the FLSA.1
3 However, it is possible that the district court did
4 have jurisdiction on the basis of “complete” LMRA
5 preemption. “[T]he preemptive force of [LMRA] § 301 is so
6 powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action
7 ‘for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
8 organization.’ Any such suit is purely a creature of
9 federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would
10 provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301.”
11 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
12 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (citation omitted). If the named
13 plaintiffs were covered by collective bargaining agreements
14 (“CBAs”), then the district court had subject matter
15 jurisdiction over their claims. Otherwise state law would
16 apply, and remand to state court would be appropriate
17 because there would be no other basis for subject matter
18 jurisdiction alleged.
19
1
The health systems may still have an opportunity later down
the line to present an ordinary FLSA preemption defense, but it
is not sufficient to vest federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Domnister v. Exclusive Ambulette, Inc., 607 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir.
2010); Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 277-78.
6
1 The employees argue that LMRA preemption is irrelevant
2 because the health systems failed to cross-appeal on that
3 issue. However, “[a] cross-appeal . . . is not necessary to
4 challenge the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district
5 court, under the well-established rule that both district
6 court and appellate courts are obliged to raise such
7 questions on their own initiative.” 15A Charles Alan Wright
8 & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3904
9 (4th ed. 2012); see Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244
10 (1934) (“An appellate federal court must satisfy itself not
11 only of its own jurisdiction, but also of that of the lower
12 courts in a cause under review.” (citations omitted)).
13 Unfortunately, the record does not indicate whether the
14 named plaintiffs are union members bound by CBAs. The
15 district court observed that it lacked adequate information
16 to determine “which Plaintiffs are members of a bargaining
17 unit or which CBAs are relevant.” Hinter[b]erger, 2012 WL
18 125152, at *4.
19 This precise problem was encountered in a related class
20 action suit before the First Circuit. See Pruell v. Caritas
21 Christi, 645 F.3d 81, 83 (1st Cir. 2011). As the First
22 Circuit did, we remand for limited discovery to determine
23 whether the plaintiffs were union members. See id. at 84.
7
1 Following the procedures set forth in United States v.
2 Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994), a mandate shall
3 issue forthwith remanding the case to the district court for
4 it to decide, after any discovery proceedings it deems
5 necessary, whether the named plaintiffs were union members
6 subject to CBAs, and whether it has subject matter
7 jurisdiction as a result. Either party to this appeal may
8 restore jurisdiction to this court within 30 days of entry
9 of the district court’s judgment by letter to the Clerk’s
10 Office, without need for a new notice of appeal. The
11 Clerk’s Office will then set a briefing schedule and refer
12 the appeal to this panel for disposition without oral
13 argument unless otherwise ordered.
14 We have considered all of the employees’ remaining
15 arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly,
16 the judgments of the district court with respect to subject
17 matter jurisdiction are hereby VACATED AND REMANDED.
18
19 FOR THE COURT:
20 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
8