Singh v. Lynch

14-2266
Singh v. Lynch
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A200 939 076
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
19th day of April, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
PETER W. HALL,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
SURJIT SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 14-2266
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Garish Sarin, Los Angeles,
California.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General; Jesse M.
Bless, Senior Litigation Counsel;
Raya Jarawan, Trial Attorney, Office
of Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Surjit Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a May 27, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming
a May 17, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
Surjit Singh, No. A200 939 076 (B.I.A. May 27, 2014), aff’g No.
A200 939 076 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 17, 2013). We assume
the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s
decision, including the portions not explicitly discussed by
the BIA. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.
2005). The applicable standards of review are well
2
established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin
Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
For asylum applications such as Singh’s, governed by the
REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality
of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on
inconsistencies in an applicant’s statements, so long as they
reasonably support an inference that the applicant is not
credible. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v.
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008). We defer “to an IJ’s
credibility determination unless, from the totality of the
circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could
make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d
at 167. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
credibility finding, based on inconsistencies in Singh’s
testimony and between his testimony and corroborating evidence,
and his submission of unreliable documents.
Singh testified inconsistently regarding whether he went
to the hospital after Congress Party members allegedly beat him
in 2008, and again in 2009, because he supported a party
advocating for Sikh independence. He first testified that he
did not go to the hospital, but after he was shown a letter he
3
submitted from an Indian hospital stating that he had been
admitted in 2008 and again in 2009, he conceded that he had gone
to the hospital in 2008. He explained that his hospital visit
must have slipped his mind. Singh also testified that he was
not admitted to the hospital after the 2009 beating but might
have stopped there incidentally. Singh stated that his mother
“might have made a mistake in writing,” in a letter submitted
to the IJ, that Singh was taken to the hospital after the 2009
attack. The IJ did not err in relying on these discrepancies
to find Singh incredible: they are particularly significant
because they relate to the alleged harm from which he seeks
asylum. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d
289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006). Singh’s explanations for the
inconsistencies would not compel a reasonable fact-finder to
credit his testimony. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81
(2d Cir. 2005).
The IJ reasonably found that Singh submitted a document of
questionable veracity: an Indian voting identification card
showing that he had a husband. The IJ also noted that the letter
Singh submitted from his political party in India did not
mention the persecution he allegedly suffered and was a form
4
letter the IJ had seen previously from other asylum applicants.
These suspect documents further undermined Singh’s
credibility. Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir.
2007); Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 524
(2d Cir. 2007).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s findings and a
totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s credibility
determination. Because the only evidence of a threat to
Singh’s life or freedom depended on his credibility, the adverse
credibility finding necessarily precludes success on his claims
for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Paul v.
Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5