Colliton v. Donnelly

09-4186-pr
Colliton v. Donnelly et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United
3 States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on
4 the 2nd day of November, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
8 DENNY CHIN,
9 Circuit Judges,
10 DAVID G. LARIMER,*
11 District Judge.
12 __________________________________________
13
14 James P. Colliton,
15
16 Plaintiff-Appellant,
17
18 v. 09-4186-pr
19
20 Ann Marie Donnelly, Rachel Lauren
21 Hochhauser, and Robert M. Morgenthau,
22
23 Defendants-Appellees.
24 __________________________________________
25
*
The Honorable David G. Larimer, District Judge of the
United States District Court for the Western District of New
York, sitting by designation.
1 FOR APPELLANT: James P. Colliton, pro se, Poughkeepsie, NY.
2
3 FOR APPELLEES: Susan C. Roque, Assistant District Attorney,
4 Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New
5 York County, New York, NY.
6
7 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
8 for the Southern District of New York (Kaplan, J.)
9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
10 DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.
11 Plaintiff-Appellant James P. Colliton, pro se, appeals the
12 judgment of the district court granting the Defendants-Appellees’
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss his 42 U.S.C. § 198314 complaint alleging various constitutional claims arising from his
15 arrest, prosecution, and state court conviction in 2006 and 2007
16 for various charges of sexual misconduct. Colliton argues that
17 the district court erred by finding his claims barred by Heck v.
18 Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and by collateral estoppel (issue
19 preclusion). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
20 underlying facts and procedural history.
21 “We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a
22 complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint
23 liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as
24 true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
25 favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d
26 Cir. 2002); see also Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321
27 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). To survive a motion to dismiss
2
1 under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must plead “enough facts to
2 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
3 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although all
4 allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true,
5 this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v.
6 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A claim will have “facial
7 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
8 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
9 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.10 After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the
11 majority of Colliton’s claims are precluded by his prior state
12 court conviction, while his remaining claims are either
13 insufficiently pleaded or barred by absolute immunity. See
14 ACEquip Ltd. v. Am. Eng’g Corp., 315 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2003)
15 (finding that the Court of Appeals may “affirm the district
16 court’s judgment on any ground appearing in the record, even if
17 the ground is different from the one relied on by the district
18 court”).
19 “The fundamental notion of the doctrine of collateral
20 estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that an issue of law or fact
21 actually litigated and decided by a court of competent
22 jurisdiction in a prior action may not be relitigated in a
23 subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies.” Ali
24 v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 489 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations
25 omitted)(emphasis added). This principle applies to a judgment
3
1 from a New York state court, to which a federal court must give
2 “the same preclusive effect as would be given to the judgment
3 under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.”
4 Johnson v. Watkins, 101 F.3d 792, 794 (2d Cir. 1996). Under New
5 York law, because a criminal conviction is considered a valid
6 final judgment for purposes of issue preclusion, it bars
7 relitigation of all of the factual issues upon which that
8 conviction was based. See Singleton v. City of New York, 632
9 F.2d 185, 205 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of
10 New York, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 304-05 (1973)).
11 The majority of Colliton’s claims rely on the presumption
12 that, as a factual matter, he was not guilty of the offenses to
13 which he entered a guilty plea in state court. But Colliton, who
14 neither appealed his state court conviction nor sought to
15 withdraw his plea, is collaterally estopped from challenging the
16 facts supporting his conviction. Colliton argues that collateral
17 estoppel is inapplicable to a § 1983 claim where the plaintiff
18 was denied a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate his claims
19 in the earlier action. Colliton contends that he was denied such
20 an opportunity due to incompetent counsel at his state court
21 proceedings. This is unavailing. Colliton, who practiced law at
22 Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP prior to his disbarment, entered a
23 plea under oath and stated that he understood and knowingly
24 admitted that he committed the offenses charged in the state
4
1 indictments, and that he voluntarily entered a plea free from any
2 coercion. Neither his complaint in this case nor his brief on
3 appeal alleges facts sufficient to render facially plausible his
4 claim that he was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to
5 litigate his factual innocence in that proceeding.
6 In addition, we find Colliton’s remaining claims to be
7 insufficiently pleaded or barred by absolute prosecutorial
8 immunity. See Ciambello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324-
9 25 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that complaints containing conclusory
10 or general allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to sustain
11 a § 1983 action); see also Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d
12 Cir. 2010) (“Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity. . .
13 because their prosecutorial activities are intimately associated
14 with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”) (internal
15 quotations omitted).
16 We have considered Colliton’s other arguments on appeal and
17 find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the
18 judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
19
20 FOR THE COURT:
21 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
22
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