Coale v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad

14-3074-cv
Coale v. Metro-North R.R.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
York, on the 13th day of July, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER,
PIERRE N. LEVAL,
REENA RAGGI,
Circuit Judges.
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WILLIAM COALE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 14-3074-cv
METRO-NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
NEW HAVEN PARKING AUTHORITY,
Third-Party-Defendant.*
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APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: GEORGE J. CAHILL, JR. (Scott E. Perry, on the
brief), Cahill & Perry, P.C., New Haven,
Connecticut.
*
The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption as shown above.
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APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: BECK S. FINEMAN, Ryan Ryan Deluca LLP,
Stamford, Connecticut.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut (Charles S. Haight, Jr., Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment entered on August 5, 2014, is VACATED and the case
is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.
Plaintiff William Coale, a former assistant conductor for Metro-North Commuter
Railroad Co. (“Metro-North”), appeals from an award of summary judgment in favor of
defendant Metro-North on Coale’s Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) claim, see
45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., for negligent failure to provide a safe work environment, causing
him to suffer a serious back injury. We review an award of summary judgment de novo,
and we will affirm only if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, reveals no genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Zann Kwan v.
Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 842–43 (2d Cir. 2013). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as
necessary to explain our decision.
1. FELA Claim
FELA places a duty on railroad employers to provide their employees with a safe
workplace, see 45 U.S.C. § 51; Tufariello v. Long Island R.R., 458 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir.
2006), which “includes the duty to maintain and inspect work areas,” Sinclair v. Long
Island R.R., 985 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1993). A railroad breaches its FELA duty “if it knew
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or should have known of a potential hazard in the workplace, and yet failed to exercise
reasonable care to inform and protect its employees.” Williams v. Long Island R.R., 196
F.3d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts apply a more
relaxed standard of both negligence and causation to FELA negligence claims than to those
arising under common law. See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957);
Williams v. Long Island R.R., 196 F.3d at 406. This does not make FELA a strict liability
statute, see Williams v. Long Island R.R., 196 F.3d at 406; claimants must offer some
evidence to support a finding of negligence, O’Hara v. Long Island R.R., 665 F.2d 8, 9 (2d
Cir. 1981). But it does mean that juries have more latitude to infer negligence than at
common law, such that the question can rarely be taken from them and decided by the court
as a matter of law. See Williams v. Long Island R.R., 196 F.3d at 407; Ulfik v.
Metro-North Commuter R.R., 77 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1996).
Coale argues that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that
Metro-North could not be held liable under FELA for his workplace injuries because it
lacked actual or constructive notice of the precipitating hazardous condition, namely, an
oily, shiny substance on the floor of Metro-North’s New Haven Employee Register Room.
As the district court correctly recognized, under our precedent, “the essential element of
reasonable foreseeability in FELA actions . . . requires proof of actual or constructive
notice to the employer of the defective condition that caused the injury.” Sinclair v. Long
Island R.R., 985 F.2d at 77 (internal citation omitted). Here, Coale did not demonstrate
notice through specific evidence that a Metro-North employee or agent created the hazard.
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Nor did he adduce evidence that the hazard was so obvious and persistent in nature that
Metro-North can be charged with constructive notice under its duty to inspect. See, e.g.,
id. (holding that jury could reasonably infer from proffered photographs that hazardous
condition existed long enough to impart constructive or actual notice to railroad).
Nevertheless, we conclude that summary judgment should not have been awarded
to Metro-North because we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that his negligence claim
necessarily fails on a theory of res ipsa loquitur. To pursue that theory, a plaintiff must
show that (1) the injurious event “was of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone’s negligence,” (2) “it was caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant,” and (3) “it was not due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” Potthast v. Metro-North R.R., 400 F.3d
143, 149 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court concluded
that Coale could not satisfy either the first or second elements. As to the first, it observed
that “[s]lip and fall cases often occur in the absence of negligence.” Coale v. Metro-North
R.R., 34 F. Supp. 3d 206, 219 (D. Conn. 2014). While that may be true in the abstract, it
cannot be said, as a matter of law, about the slip and fall here at issue. Coale slipped
because an oily substance had pooled on the Register Room floor. There is no apparent
explanation for the presence of that substance except someone’s negligence. Indeed,
Metro-North has proffered no non-negligent explanation.
As to the second element, the district court noted “the possibility that someone other
than Metro-North or [its contract agent] NHPA could have caused the spill, . . . such that
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this Court cannot conclude that Metro-North or NHPA had exclusive control of the
substance upon which Coale slipped.” Id. But the “possibility” seems remote given that
the Register Room was a restricted area, accessible only through a keypad-secured door.
While Metro-North offered evidence that a technician entered the room approximately
once a year to service a vending machine, and that Amtrak employees occasionally used a
secured bathroom, it made no showing that any such persons, for whose actions it would
not have been responsible, had been in the Register Room on the day of Coale’s injury.
By contrast, Coale offered evidence that the Register Room had been used as usual by
Metro-North employees throughout the day of his injury. On this record, the res ipsa
loquitur question should not have been taken from the jury. See Potthast v. Metro-North
R.R., 400 F.3d at 150–51 & n.9 (noting that “‘requirement’ of exclusive control has not
been read so strictly in our cases, by the Restatement, and by many state courts,” as to
foreclose res ipsa loquitur liability whenever third parties had access to injuring
instrumentality, but rather that case properly proceeds to jury “so long as adequate
evidence was presented [to] allow[] a jury to exclude the actions of such third parties as
significant causes of the injury”); id. at 152 (cautioning that “in making determinations
regarding the plaintiff’s eligibility for a res ipsa loquitur charge, the court should be
especially careful not to take to itself the role and responsibility of the jury,” and further
observing that “[i]n persuading the court that a plaintiff merits a res ipsa loquitur
instruction, the plaintiff cannot be required to meet as high an evidentiary hurdle as would
ultimately be needed to convince a jury”); see also Dermatossian v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,
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67 N.Y.2d 219, 227, 501 N.Y.S.2d 784, 789 (1986) (“The exclusive control requirement,
as generally understood, is that the evidence must afford a rational basis for concluding that
the cause of the accident was probably such that the defendant would be responsible for
any negligence connected with it. The purpose is simply to eliminate within reason all
explanations for the injury other than the defendant’s negligence. The requirement does
not mean that the possibility of other causes must be altogether eliminated, but only that
their likelihood must be so reduced that the greater probability lies at defendant’s door.”
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
We therefore vacate the award of summary judgment in favor of Metro-North, and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this order, including trial.
2. Denial of Spoliation Sanction
Coale argues that the district court abused its discretion in failing to sanction
Metro-North for spoliation of evidence, specifically, the oily substance on which he
slipped. See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)
(reviewing district court’s decision on spoliation for abuse of discretion). A party seeking
an adverse inference instruction based on the destruction of evidence must establish
“(1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the
time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed with a culpable state of mind; and
(3) that the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party’s claim or defense such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.” Residential
Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
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marks omitted)). In denying Coale’s motion, the district court concluded—moving
directly to the third factor—that the destroyed evidence was not relevant to Coale’s claim.
See Coale v. Metro-North R.R., 34 F. Supp. 3d at 220. We are not persuaded. Insofar as
identifying the substance may have shed light on the party who spilled it, the substance
provided evidence relevant to an element of Coale’s negligence claim—i.e., whether
Metro-North had “actual or constructive notice . . . of the defective condition that caused
the injury.” Sinclair v. Long Island R.R., 985 F.2d at 77 (internal citation omitted); see
Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (observing that party’s
destruction of evidence “relevant to proof of an issue at trial can support an inference that
the evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction”).
Nevertheless, because the district court did not evaluate the remaining factors in reaching
its decision, we vacate the spoliation decision and remand for the district court to
determine, in its discretion, whether a spoliation sanction is warranted in this case.
3. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and
REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this order.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court
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