Medrano-Sanchez v. Barr

18-2818
Medrano-Sanchez v. Barr
BIA
Kolbe, IJ
A206 772 805
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 14th day of September, two thousand twenty.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JON O. NEWMAN,
8 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
9 DENNY CHIN,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 ADAN FRANCISCO MEDRANO-SANCHEZ,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 18-2818
17 NAC
18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: William M. Brooks, Immigration
24 Law Clinic, Touro College, Jacob
25 D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Central
26 Islip, NY.
27
28
1 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant
2 Attorney General; John S. Hogan,
3 Assistant Director; Lindsay
4 Corliss, Trial Attorney, Office of
5 Immigration Litigation, United
6 States Department of Justice,
7 Washington, DC.
8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
9 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
10 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
11 is DENIED.
12 Petitioner Adan Francisco Medrano-Sanchez, a native and
13 citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of a September 18, 2018,
14 decision of the BIA affirming an April 20, 2018, decision of
15 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Medrano-Sanchez’s
16 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
17 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Adan
18 Francisco Medrano-Sanchez, No. A 206 772 805 (B.I.A. Sept. 18,
19 2018), aff’g No. A 206 772 805 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 20,
20 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
21 underlying facts and procedural history.
22 We review both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake
23 of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448
24 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The standards of review are
25 well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he
2
1 administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
2 reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
3 contrary.”); Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 325, 332 (2d Cir. 2013)
4 (reviewing factual findings for substantial evidence and
5 questions of law and application of law to fact de novo).
6 To obtain asylum or withholding of removal, Medrano-
7 Sanchez was required to establish that “race, religion,
8 nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
9 political opinion was or will be at least one central reason
10 for” the claimed persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)
11 (asylum); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding);
12 Matter of C-T-L, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 346 (B.I.A. 2010)
13 (holding that the “one central reason” standard also applies
14 to withholding of removal). Medrano-Sanchez asserted he
15 would be harmed on account of his membership in the particular
16 social groups of Salvadoran boys aged 15 or older who attend
17 school, eldest sons, or eldest sons who attend school. To
18 constitute a particular social group, a group must be “(1)
19 composed of members who share a common immutable
20 characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3)
21 socially distinct within the society in question.” Matter
3
1 of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); see
2 Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195–97 (2d Cir. 2014). An
3 “immutable characteristic” is one that members of the group
4 “either cannot change, or should not be required to change
5 because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
6 consciences.” Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 72-73 (2d
7 Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 “Particularity refers to whether the group is sufficiently
9 distinct that it would constitute a discrete class of
10 persons.” Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 210 (B.I.A.
11 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To be socially
12 distinct, a group . . . must be perceived as a group by
13 society.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240.
14 Medrano-Sanchez’s proposed groups failed to satisfy the
15 particularity or social distinction requirements. Contrary
16 to his arguments, these requirements have significant overlap
17 and both are within the scope of our review. “Societal
18 considerations . . . will necessarily play a factor in
19 determining whether a group is discrete or is, instead,
20 amorphous.” Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196 (internal citation and
21 quotation marks omitted); see Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N.
4
1 Dec. at 214-15. “The ‘social distinction’ and
2 ‘particularity’ requirements . . . overlap because the
3 overall definition [of a particular social group] is applied
4 in the fact-specific context of an applicant’s claim for
5 relief.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241.
6 “Societal considerations have a significant impact on whether
7 a proposed group describes a collection of people with
8 appropriately defined boundaries and is sufficiently
9 ‘particular.’” Id.
10 Medrano-Sanchez’s proffered groups, Salvadoran boys aged
11 15 or older who attend school, eldest sons, or eldest sons
12 who attend school, are all groups whose characteristics are
13 shared by a broad range of individuals of various ages and
14 backgrounds, making the boundaries of the proposed groups too
15 amorphous. Cf. Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73. While a shared
16 past experience can unify a particular social group, it does
17 not negate the requirements that the shared experience
18 creates a group with particularity and distinction. See
19 Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 263 (2d Cir. 2007).
20 As for Medrano-Sanchez’s argument that gang members
21 target his proposed groups and therefore influence the
5
1 perception of these groups by others, he was still required
2 to show that the groups were perceived as distinct groups by
3 society at large. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
4 at 242 (“[A] group’s recognition . . . is determined by the
5 perception of the society in question, rather than by the
6 perception of the persecutor.”); Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196 (“[A]
7 persecutor’s perception alone is not enough to establish a
8 cognizable social group.”). In sum, given the lack of
9 particularity and social distinction of Salvadoran boys aged
10 15 and over who attend school, eldest sons, and eldest sons
11 who attend school, we find no error in the agency’s
12 determination that Medrano-Sanchez’s proposed groups were not
13 cognizable.
14 Finally, Medrano-Sanchez argues that the agency erred by
15 failing to perform a mixed motive analysis. “[A]sylum may
16 be granted where there is more than one motive for
17 mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for the
18 mistreatment is on account of a protected ground.” Acharya
19 v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal
20 quotation marks omitted). We do not reach this issue,
21 because Medrano-Sanchez’s failure to establish a cognizable
6
1 particular social group is dispositive. See INS v.
2 Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts
3 and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the
4 decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
6 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
7 stays VACATED.
8 FOR THE COURT:
9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
10 Clerk of Court
7