New York v. United States Department of Homeland Security, Make the Road

19-3591, 19-3595
New York v. United States Department of Homeland Security, Make the Road New York v. Cuccinelli
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term, 2019
Argued: March 2, 2020 Decided: August 4, 2020
Docket Nos. 19-3591, 19-3595
STATE OF NEW YORK, CITY OF NEW YORK, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF
VERMONT,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
— v. —
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SECRETARY CHAD F. WOLF,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, DIRECTOR KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI II, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS ACTING DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants-Appellants.*
*
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth
above.
1
MAKE THE ROAD NEW YORK, AFRICAN SERVICES COMMITTEE, ASIAN AMERICAN
FEDERATION, CATHOLIC CHARITIES COMMUNITY SERVICES, (ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW
YORK), CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
— v. —
KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING DIRECTOR OF UNITED
STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, CHAD F. WOLF, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY,
Defendants-Appellants.
B e f o r e:
LEVAL, HALL, and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
The Department of Homeland Security appeals from two orders of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.)
granting motions for preliminary injunctions in these cases. Two sets of Plaintiffs-
Appellees – one a group of state and local governments and the other a group of
non-profit organizations – filed separate suits under the Administrative
Procedure Act, both challenging the validity of a Department of Homeland
Security rule interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). This statutory provision renders
inadmissible to the United States any non-citizen deemed likely to become a
public charge. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs-Appellees
2
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the rule is
contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act and that it is arbitrary and
capricious. After finding that the other preliminary injunction factors also
weighed in favor of granting relief, the district court entered orders in both cases
to enjoin implementation of the rule nationwide. We agree with the district court
that a preliminary injunction is warranted, but modify the scope of the
injunctions to cover only the states of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont. The
orders of the district court are thus AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
JUDITH N. VALE, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, State of
New York, New York, NY (Letitia James, Attorney
General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General,
Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, Matthew
Colangelo, Chief Counsel for Federal Initiatives, Elena
Goldstein, Deputy Bureau Chief, Civil Rights, Ming-Qi
Chu, Section Chief, Labor Bureau, State of New York,
New York, NY, William Tong, Attorney General, State
of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, Thomas J. Donovan, Jr.,
Attorney General, State of Vermont, Montpelier, VT,
James E. Johnson, Corporation Counsel, City of New
York, New York, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellees
State of New York, City of New York, State of Connecticut,
State of Vermont.
JONATHAN H. HURWITZ, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP, New York, NY (Andrew J. Ehrlich, Elana
R. Beale, Robert J. O’Loughlin, Daniel S. Sinnreich, Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York,
NY, Ghita R. Schwarz, Brittany Thomas, Baher A.
Azmy, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, NY,
Susan E. Welber, Kathleen Kelleher, Susan Cameron,
Hasan Shafiqullah, The Legal Aid Society of New York,
New York, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellees Make
the Road New York, African Services Committee, Asian
3
American Federation, Catholic Charities Community
Services, (Archdiocese of New York), Catholic Legal
Immigration Network, Inc.
GERARD SINZDAK, Appellate Staff Attorney, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC
(Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, Geoffrey S. Berman, United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New
York, NY, Daniel Tenny, Joshua Dos Santos, Appellate
Staff Attorneys, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, DC on the brief), for
Defendants-Appellants United States Department of
Homeland Security, Acting Secretary Chad F. Wolf, United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Acting Director
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, United States of America.
WILLIAM E. HAVEMANN, Office of General Counsel, United
States House of Representatives, Washington, DC
(Douglas N. Letter, General Counsel, Todd B. Tatelman,
Principal Deputy General Counsel, Megan Barbero,
Josephine Morse, Adam A. Grogg, Office of General
Counsel, United States House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, Robert M. Loeb, Thomas M. Bondy,
Peter E. Davis, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP,
Washington, DC, Rene Kathawala, Orrick, Herrington &
Sutcliffe LLP, New York, NY, on the brief), for Amicus
Curiae United States House of Representatives, in
support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Additional amici curiae listed in Appendix A.
________________
4
GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:
In August 2019, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a
final rule setting out a new agency interpretation of a longstanding provision of
our immigration law that renders inadmissible to the United States any non-
citizen who is likely to become a “public charge.” See Inadmissibility on Public
Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (“the Rule” or “the Final
Rule”). The Rule expands the meaning of “public charge,” with the likely result
that significantly more people will be found inadmissible on that basis. Lawsuits
challenging the lawfulness of the Rule were quickly filed around the country,
including two cases in the Southern District of New York, which we now
consider in tandem on appeal.
These two cases – one brought by New York State, New York City,
Connecticut, and Vermont, and the other brought by five non-profit
organizations that provide legal and social services to non-citizens – raise largely
identical challenges to the Rule, centering on the Rule’s validity under the
Administrative Procedure Act. After hearing combined oral argument on the
Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunctions filed in both cases, the district
court (George B. Daniels, J.) concluded that the Plaintiffs had demonstrated a
5
likelihood of success on the merits of their claims and that the other preliminary
injunction factors also favored interim relief. The district court enjoined DHS
from implementing the Rule throughout the United States in the pair of orders
from which DHS now appeals.
We agree that a preliminary injunction is warranted in these cases,
but modify the scope of the injunctions to cover only the states of New York,
Connecticut, and Vermont. The orders of the district court are thus AFFIRMED
AS MODIFIED.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
I. 1999 Public Charge Guidance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
II. 2019 Public Charge Rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. The Proposed Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
B. Revised Definition and Relevant Public Benefits. . . . . . . . . . . 16
C. Adjudicative Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
III. Procedural Posture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
DISCUSSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
I. Threshold Arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A. Standing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
B. Zone of Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6
II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A. Legal Framework.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
B. The Rule is Contrary to the INA... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1. Origins of the Public Charge Ground.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2. The Immigration Act of 1917. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. . . . . . . . . . 51
4. The Current Public Charge Ground. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5. The Settled Meaning of “Public Charge”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6. The Rule’s Inconsistency with the Settled Meaning.. . . . . 67
C. The Rule is Arbitrary and Capricious.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
1. Explanation for Changed Definition.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2. Explanation for Expanded List of Benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
III. Irreparable Harm to the Plaintiffs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
IV. Balance of Equities and the Public Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
V. Scope of Injunction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Appendix A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
BACKGROUND
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) contains ten grounds of
inadmissibility, each listing various bases on which a non-citizen can be denied
admission to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(10). These appeals
concern the public charge ground, a constant feature of our immigration law
7
since 1882, which renders inadmissable any non-citizen who “is likely at any time
to become a public charge.” Id. § 1182(a)(4)(A). The statute itself does not define
“public charge,” and its precise meaning is the hotly contested question in this
litigation. In general terms, however, “public charge” has historically been
understood to refer to a person who is not self-sufficient and depends on the
government for support. See, e.g., 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,295.
The grounds of inadmissibility are assessed not only when a person is
physically entering the country, but at multiple points in the immigration
process. Consequently, the public charge ground of inadmissibility is applied by
three agencies that oversee different aspects of our immigration system. The
Department of State considers whether non-citizens are inadmissible as likely
public charges when adjudicating visa applications overseas. U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”), a unit of DHS, assesses the public charge ground
when it inspects non-citizens arriving at airports or other ports of entry. And U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), another component of DHS,
applies the ground when adjudicating applications for adjustment of status, the
process by which a non-citizen who is already present in the United States in a
temporary immigration status can become a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”),
8
authorized to live and work in the United States indefinitely.1 See id. at 41,294 n.3.
The Department of Justice also has a role to play when it comes to public
charge adjudications, albeit on a different statutory basis. In addition to the
public charge ground of inadmissibility, the INA also contains a public charge
ground of removal.2 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5). That provision authorizes the
government to remove non-citizens who have already been admitted to the
country but who became public charges within five years of their date of entry.
Id. The public charge ground of removal is primarily applied by the Executive
Office for Immigration Review, a component agency of the Department of Justice
that houses the immigration courts.
While multiple agencies are tasked with interpreting and applying the
public charge grounds of inadmissibility and removal, the Rule at issue in these
cases is an interpretation by DHS of the ground of inadmissibility. Accordingly,
the Rule governs only public charge determinations carried out by CBP and
1
LPRs are frequently referred to in popular discussion as “green card holders.”
2
“Removal” is the current legal term for the process popularly known as
“deportation.” See Karageorgious v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 2004).
9
USCIS, as component agencies of DHS.3 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,294 n.3. As a practical
matter, moreover, the Rule is likely to be applied primarily by USCIS as it
adjudicates applications for adjustment of status, as the lengthy application
process provides more opportunity for a full consideration of the Rule’s
provisions than a CBP screening at a port of entry. See id. at 41,478.
I. 1999 Public Charge Guidance
For twenty years preceding the publication of the Rule at issue in these
cases, the governing agency interpretation of the public charge ground was
guidance published in 1999 (“the 1999 Guidance”) by the Immigration and
Nationality Service (“INS”), the predecessor agency of DHS.4 See Field Guidance
3
In October 2019, the State Department issued an interim final rule aligning its
interpretation of “public charge” with the Rule. See Visas: Ineligibility Based on
Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 54,996 (Oct. 11, 2019). Litigation challenging
the State Department interim final rule is underway in the Southern District of
New York. See Make the Road New York v. Pompeo, No. 1:19-cv-11633 (S.D.N.Y.).
The Department of Justice has drafted a proposed rule that likewise is intended
to adopt a conforming interpretation of the public charge ground of removal,
which has been sent to the Office of Management and Budget for review, but no
actual text of such a rule has yet been published. See Inadmissibility and
Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, RIN 1125-AA84, Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Spring 2020 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions.
4
INS was dissolved, and many of its responsibilities were transferred to DHS, by
the Homeland Security Act of 2002. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 402(3), 471, 116
Stat. 2135, 2205, 2178.
10
on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg.
28,689 (May 26, 1999). The 1999 Guidance was issued in response to two pieces of
legislation passed by Congress in 1996 that had significant impact on the public
charge ground.
The first was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”), a sweeping set of reforms to various public
benefits programs. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). Among other
changes, PRWORA greatly restricted non-citizen access to public benefits in
response to concerns that non-citizens were “applying for and receiving public
benefits . . . at increasing rates.” 8 U.S.C. § 1601(3). The resulting benefits
eligibility scheme for non-citizens is complex, to say the least. It suffices for
present purposes to say that non-citizens who are present in the United States
illegally or who are admitted in a lawful non-immigrant (i.e., temporary) status
are ineligible for almost all federal benefits, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611(a), 1641(b), while
those who are in LPR status, which is permanent, are ineligible for means-tested
federal benefits for their first five years as an LPR, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1613(a), 1641(b).
11
At the conclusion of this five-year waiting period, LPRs become eligible to
receive benefits for which they otherwise qualify.5
A little over a month after enacting PRWORA, Congress passed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”). See Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). In IIRIRA, Congress revisited the
public charge ground to add five factors that adjudicators must consider when
determining whether a non-citizen is likely to become a public charge: the non-
citizen’s “[(1)] age; [(2)] health; [(3)] family status; [(4)] assets, resources, and
financial status; and [(5)] education and skills.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(B)(i). IIRIRA
also required non-citizens seeking to immigrate to the United States based on
their family ties6 to obtain affidavits of support, in which a sponsor agrees to
maintain the non-citizen at an income of no less than 125% of the federal poverty
5
The majority of the public benefits to which the Rule applies are means-tested
benefits, that is, there are income and asset limits for eligibility. However, the
housing programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development are not considered means-tested benefits and there is thus no five-
year waiting period before LPRs can access these services. See Eligibility
Restrictions on Noncitizens: Inapplicability of Welfare Reform Act Restrictions on
Federal Means-Tested Public Benefits, 65 Fed. Reg. 49,994 (Aug. 16, 2000).
6
Persons seeking to immigrate to the United States are eligible for admission as
immigrants on various bases, including having certain familial relationships to
United States citizens or LPRs.
12
guidelines (“FPG”), and instructed adjudicators to consider those affidavits as a
discretionary sixth factor in their analysis. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(4)(c), 1183a(a)(1).
After the passage of PRWORA and IIRIRA, INS observed widespread
“confusion about the relationship between the receipt of federal, state, [and] local
public benefits and the meaning of ‘public charge’ under the immigration laws.”
64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689. Concerned that this confusion was “deterr[ing] eligible
aliens and their families, including U.S. citizen children, from seeking important
health and nutrition benefits that they [we]re legally entitled to receive,” INS
issued the 1999 Guidance, thus for the first time publishing its interpretation of
“public charge” in the Federal Register.7 Id. at 28,692.
The 1999 Guidance defined “public charge” to mean a person who is
“primarily dependent on the government for subsistence, as demonstrated by
either (i) the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance or (ii)
7
The 1999 Guidance was not a final rule, but was published in the Federal
Register as an interim measure to establish the agency’s “public charge”
definition while INS went through the rulemaking process. 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689.
The Guidance was a reproduction of INS’s field guidance, making public the
internal directive of the agency to its officials tasked with applying the “public
charge” standard. INS did publish a proposed rule alongside the 1999 Guidance,
but it was never finalized. See Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge
Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,676 (May 26, 1999). The 1999 Guidance remained the
operative agency interpretation until 2019.
13
institutionalization for long-term care at government expense.” Id. at 28,689
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Guidance identified four public benefits
that could be taken as evidence of primary dependence: Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”), which “guarantees a minimum level of income” for older adults
and people who are blind or disabled; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(“TANF”), which provides cash assistance to families living in poverty;8 state and
local cash assistance programs, often called “General Assistance” programs; and
any program (including Medicaid) supporting people institutionalized for long-
term care. Id. at 28,692, 28,687; see 45 C.F.R. § 260.20.
INS explained that the nature of these benefits suggested that recipients
may be dependent on the government for subsistence, explicitly distinguishing
non-cash benefits that are “by their nature supplemental and do not, alone or in
combination, provide sufficient resources to support an individual or family.” 64
Fed. Reg. at 28,692.9 The Guidance instructed that the ultimate determination as
8
TANF also funds various forms of non-cash assistance, e.g., subsidized child
care. These additional forms of support were excluded from consideration under
the Guidance. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,692 n.17.
9
The 1999 Guidance explicitly stated that adjudicators “should not place any
weight on the receipt of non-cash public benefits (other than institutionalization)
or the receipt of cash benefits for purposes other than for income maintenance.”
14
to whether a non-citizen was primarily dependent on the government was to be
made by considering the totality of the circumstances: neither current nor past
“receipt of cash income-maintenance benefits . . . automatically ma[de] an alien
inadmissible as likely to become a public charge.” Id. at 28,690.
II. 2019 Public Charge Rule
A. The Proposed Rule
Nearly two decades after INS issued its 1999 interpretation of “public
charge,” DHS published a notice of proposed rulemaking (“the Proposed Rule”)
announcing its intention to change the agency’s interpretation of the public
charge ground. See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg.
51,114 (Oct. 10, 2018). Among other provisions, the Proposed Rule suggested
redefining “public charge” to mean “an alien who receives one or more public
benefit” at certain defined usage thresholds, and listed a broader set of benefits as
relevant to the public charge definition. Id. at 51,289-90.10
64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689.
10
Technically, the Proposed Rule defined public charge to mean any non-citizen
who received any “public benefit,” but then further defined “public benefit” to
mean one of the listed benefits if usage exceeded the prescribed threshold level,
as described in the next paragraph.
15
The Proposed Rule divided its list of relevant benefits into two groups –
monetizable and non-monetizable – and set usage thresholds for each. The
monetizable benefits (e.g., SSI) were to be considered in the public charge
analysis if the cumulative value of the benefits received in one year exceeded 15%
of FPG for a household of one. Id. The non-monetizable benefits (e.g., Medicaid)
were counted if the non-citizen received the benefit “for more than 12 months in
the aggregate within a 36 month period.” Id. at 51,290. The Proposed Rule
garnered 266,077 comments during the notice and comment period, “the vast
majority of which opposed the rule.”11 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,297.
B. Revised Definition and Relevant Public Benefits
In August 2019, DHS published its Final Rule, which made a number of
changes from the Proposed Rule. Most relevant for our purposes, the Rule enacts
a different definition of “public charge,” interpreting the term as a person “who
receives one or more public benefits, as defined in [a subsequent] section, for
11
We note that these appeals have also generated significant public interest and
acknowledge with appreciation the contributions of the amici curiae appearing
before us. The twenty amicus briefs we received (nineteen of which support the
Plaintiffs, and one of which supports the government) represent the views of a
diverse collection of more than four hundred organizations, businesses, and
scholars and provided helpful nuance on many aspects of the complex questions
before us.
16
more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-month period (such that, for
instance, receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months).” Id. at
41,501. While the Final Rule incorporates the same expanded list of relevant
public benefits as the Proposed Rule, it did away with the categorization of
“monetizable” versus “non-monetizable” benefits, eliminated the 15% of FPG
threshold requirement for monetizable benefits, and elevated the 12-month
threshold requirement for non-monetizable benefits into the definition of public
charge itself, thus making it the usage threshold for all of the listed benefits. Id. at
41,501-02.
With respect to the relevant benefits, the Final Rule retains those benefits
INS made relevant to the public charge determination in 1999 – SSI, TANF, and
state or local cash assistance programs – and adds a number of other benefits:
Medicaid;12 the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”),
commonly referred to as food stamps; the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher
12
The 1999 Guidance identified Medicaid as a relevant public benefit only when
it was used to fund long-term institutionalization, but the Rule broadens the
consideration to include Medicaid used to fund most forms of routine healthcare.
The Rule does not count Medicaid benefits only when they are used for
emergency medical conditions, for services provided under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, for school-based services, and by children or pregnant
and newly postpartum women. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,501.
17
Program; Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance; and public housing. Id. at
41,501. Thus, under the Final Rule, use of any quantity of one of these benefits in
a given month counts as one month towards the 12-months-within-36 months
limit beyond which one is considered a public charge. And because the definition
aggregates benefits usage, use of two benefits in a single month counts as two
months (and three benefits in a single month counts as three months, etc.), with
the result that a person could reach the 12-month threshold in six months or
fewer. The 12-month threshold is thus deceptive: an industrious, self-sufficient
person who, by reason of a temporary injury or illness, used three benefits per
month for four months would thereby be conclusively established as a public
charge.
The Rule’s public charge definition would be complex to apply even to
assess past or current benefits usage. But lest we forget the context in which the
Rule operates, we highlight that the vast majority of non-citizens will not have
been eligible to receive any of the relevant public benefits (and therefore
presumably will not have received such benefits) at the time the Rule is applied
18
and their likelihood of becoming a public charge is assessed.13 Recall that the Rule
applies primarily to non-citizens seeking to adjust status to become LPRs but that,
in general, non-citizens are not eligible to receive the relevant public benefits
until five years after they obtain LPR status. Accordingly, very few non-citizens
will have a history of public benefits usage at the time the forward-looking public
charge ground is applied. Under the revised public charge definition, the Rule
thus requires adjudicators to predict whether, five years or more into the future,
the non-citizen is likely to use one of the enumerated benefits for more than
twelve months, or to use two of the enumerated benefits for more than six
months, and so on, within a thirty-six-month period. Id. at 41,502.
C. Adjudicative Framework
To support adjudicators in making what might seem an impracticable
prediction about future benefits usage, the Rule lays out an adjudicative
framework. This framework fleshes out the five factors adjudicators are
13
We note that PRWORA allows states flexibility to determine non-citizen
eligibility for state-funded benefits programs and some states have chosen to
fund benefits for those who do not yet have LPR status. See 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,131;
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). However, as counsel for the government
acknowledged at oral argument, it would be the rare exception if a non-citizen
received benefits prior to the public charge determination. Oral Argument at
32:00-33:30.
19
statutorily required to consider – age, health, family status, finances, and
education – and explains how each should be analyzed to decide whether a non-
citizen is a likely future user of public benefits. The Rule further instructs
adjudicators how to assess the sixth, discretionary factor – the affidavit of
support – and adds a seventh factor for consideration, the immigration status
sought. As laid out below, the framework identifies the particular characteristics
adjudicators should look for with each factor and, for some, lists the forms of
evidence the non-citizen must submit.
Age. Adjudicators are to assess whether a non-citizen’s age affects his
ability to work. The Rule suggests that preference be given to non-citizens
between eighteen and sixty-one years of age. Being under eighteen or over sixty-
one is treated as making it more likely that the applicant will become a public
charge. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,502.
Health. Adjudicators are to be on the lookout for non-citizens with medical
conditions that are “likely to require extensive medical treatment or
institutionalization or that will interfere with the alien’s ability to provide and
care for himself or herself, to attend school, or to work.” Id.
20
 Family Status. Adjudicators are to assess whether a non-citizen’s household
size makes him more likely to utilize the listed benefits. Large families are thus
more suspect. Id.
Assets, Resources, and Financial Status. Adjudicators are to consider whether
the non-citizen’s household has a gross income above 125% of FPG or has
significant assets, whether the household assets and resources would cover any
reasonably foreseeable medical costs, any outstanding financial liabilities, and
whether the non-citizen has ever in the past applied for or received any of the
enumerated public benefits. Id. at 41,502-03. Non-citizens are to evidence this
factor by submitting, inter alia, their tax returns, bank statements, credit history
and score, and proof of private health insurance. Id. at 41,503.
Education and Skills. Adjudicators are to consider whether the non-citizen
has adequate education and skills to obtain lawful employment with an income
sufficient to avoid becoming a public charge. Id. Non-citizens are directed to
evidence this factor by submitting, inter alia, their employment history, tax
returns, proof of degrees or licenses, and proof of proficiency in English or any
other languages. Id. at 41,503-04.
21
 Affidavit of Support. For those non-citizens who must obtain an affidavit of
support, the Rule directs adjudicators to consider “the likelihood that the sponsor
would actually provide the statutorily-required amount of financial support,”
which is to be evidenced by proof of the sponsor’s income and assets, the
relationship between the non-citizen and sponsor, and the number of other non-
citizens for whom the sponsor has executed affidavits of support. Id. at 41,504.
Desired Immigration Status. The Rule newly requires adjudicators to
consider the immigration status sought by the non-citizen, “as it relates to the
alien’s ability to financially support[ ] himself or herself during the duration of
the alien’s stay.” Id. After the publication of the Rule, USCIS updated its policy
manual to clarify that it would generally treat seeking LPR status as a negative
factor, given that LPRs are eligible for public benefits after the five-year waiting
period has elapsed. See USCIS, POLICY MANUAL vol. 8, pt. G, ch. 12 (2020). We
note that the vast majority of non-citizens who are subject to the Rule are being
assessed precisely because they are seeking LPR status; this provision therefore
would appear to automatically assign a negative factor to any applicant for
lawful immigration to the United States.
22
After addressing these factors, the Rule concludes by identifying a number
of heavily weighted negative and positive circumstances that adjudicators should
consider in deciding a case. While cautioning that no single factor is dispositive,
the Rule directs adjudicators to give particular emphasis to four heavily weighted
negative factors: (1) lacking a current or recent employment history, (2) receiving
a relevant public benefit for more than twelve months in the preceding three
years, (3) lacking health insurance while having a diagnosed medical condition
likely to require extensive treatment or institutionalization, and (4) having been
found inadmissible or removable on public charge grounds in the past. 84 Fed.
Reg. at 41,504. In contrast, the Rule also identifies the following heavily weighted
positive factors: (1) having a household income that exceeds 250% of FPG, (2)
being employed with an income exceeding 250% of FPG, and (3) having private
health insurance that was not purchased using Affordable Care Act premium tax
credits. Id.
III. Procedural Posture
Shortly after DHS issued the Final Rule in August 2019, the two cases at
issue in these appeals were filed in the Southern District of New York. New York,
Vermont, Connecticut, and New York City (collectively “the States”) filed suit
23
first, followed a few days later by Make the Road New York, African Services
Committee, Asian American Federation, Catholic Charities Community Services
(Archdiocese of New York), and Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.
(collectively, “the Organizations”). The two groups of plaintiffs (collectively, “the
Plaintiffs”) raise largely similar challenges to the Rule, arguing that it is invalid
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) as well as the Fifth
Amendment’s due process clause. The Organizations also challenge the Rule
under the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. Both the States and
the Organizations moved for a preliminary injunction, and the district court
heard combined oral argument.
On October 11, 2019, four days before the Rule was scheduled to take
effect, the district court granted both motions for preliminary injunctions in
largely identical decisions and orders. After concluding that both the States and
the Organizations had standing to challenge the Rule, the district court found
that they had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims
that the Rule was contrary to law as well as arbitrary and capricious, and that the
24
other preliminary injunction factors supported injunctive relief. The district court
thus enjoined DHS from enforcing the Rule nationwide.14
DHS timely appealed the district court’s grant of the preliminary
injunctions and moved for a stay pending appeal. A motions panel of this Court
denied DHS’s motion to stay. DHS then filed an application for a stay with the
Supreme Court, requesting that the preliminary injunctions be stayed through
the resolution of the merits of this appeal and the disposition of any petition for a
writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the application in January 2020.
DHS v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020). With the district court’s preliminary
injunctions thus stayed, the Rule went into effect nationwide on February 24,
2020.15
14
The district court also ordered that the effective date of the Rule be stayed
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 705.
15
Five similar cases challenging the Rule were brought in the District of
Maryland, the Northern District of Illinois, the Northern District of California,
and the Eastern District of Washington. See CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, No.
19-cv-2715 (D. Md.); Cook Cty. v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-6334 (N.D. Ill.); City and Cty. of
San Francisco v. USCIS, No. 19-cv-4717 (N.D. Cal.); California v. DHS, No. 19-cv-
4975 (N.D. Cal.); Washington v. DHS, No. 19-cv-5210 (E.D. Wash.). All five district
courts granted plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunctions. DHS appealed in
all cases and, as here, requested that the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits stay
the district courts’ preliminary injunctions pending appeal. The Fourth and a
divided panel of the Ninth Circuit granted DHS’s motions to stay, the Ninth
25
DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction for
abuse of discretion, examining the legal conclusions underpinning the decision
de novo and the factual conclusions for clear error. Cty. of Nassau v. Leavitt, 524
F.3d 408, 414 (2d Cir. 2008). The scope of the injunctive relief ordered by the
district court is evaluated for abuse of discretion. Id.
These appeals fall under the preliminary injunction framework laid out in
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Winter instructs
that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely
to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. Where, as here, the government is a
party to the suit, the final two factors merge. Cf. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435
Circuit doing so in a lengthy published opinion. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v.
USCIS, 944 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2019). The Seventh Circuit denied DHS’s motion to
stay, but DHS successfully sought a stay from the Supreme Court for the
preliminary injunction at issue in that case, which was limited in scope to the
state of Illinois. See Wolf v. Cook Cty., 140 S. Ct. 681 (2020). The Seventh Circuit has
since decided the merits of the case before it, holding that plaintiffs were likely to
succeed on the merits of their challenge to the Rule and affirming the preliminary
injunction entered by the Northern District of Illinois. See Cook Cty. v. Wolf, 962
F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 2020).
26
(2009); see California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018). Before we turn to the
merits of these appeals, however, we address two threshold arguments raised by
DHS.
I. Threshold Arguments
DHS first argues that neither the States nor the Organizations meet the
“irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” and thus cannot be permitted
to challenge the Rule. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). DHS
further argues that the Plaintiffs may not bring suit because they do not fall
within the zone of interests protected by the public charge statute. See Lexmark
Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014). We disagree
with DHS on both counts.
A. Standing
At the preliminary injunction stage, “a plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate
standing will normally be no less than that required on a motion for summary
judgment. Accordingly, to establish standing for a preliminary injunction, a
plaintiff cannot rest on . . . mere allegations . . . but must set forth by affidavit or
other evidence specific facts” that establish the “three familiar elements of
standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc.,
27
638 F.3d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, DHS argues that the States and Organizations have failed to establish
injury in fact, which requires the Plaintiffs to show they have suffered “an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The States allege that they are injured because the Rule will cause many of
their residents to forgo use of public benefits programs, thereby decreasing
federal transfer payments to the states, reducing Medicaid revenue, increasing
overall healthcare costs, and causing general economic harm. DHS argues that
these projected harms do not suffice to show injury in fact because the facts
asserted by the States at most establish a possible, rather than imminent, future
injury, and because any economic losses will be offset by the money saved by not
providing public benefits to those who disenroll. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
We are satisfied that the States have sufficiently established actual
imminent harms. DHS itself anticipates that a significant number of non-citizens
will disenroll from public benefits as a result of the Rule’s enactment, including
28
many who are not in fact subject to the Rule but who would be fearful of its
consequences nonetheless. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,300-01, 41,463. When an agency
action has a “predictable effect . . . on the decisions of third parties,” the
consequences of those third party decisions may suffice to establish standing,
even when the decisions are illogical or unnecessary. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New
York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566 (2019). Contrary to its disparagement before us of the
likelihood of harm to the States from disenrollment, DHS acknowledged in its
own explication of the costs and benefits considered in adopting the Rule that
expected disenrollment will result in decreased federal funding to states, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 41,485, decreased revenue for healthcare providers, id. at 41,486, and an
increase in uncompensated care, id. at 41,384.
DHS’s own predictions thus align with declarations submitted by the
States documenting the Rule’s chilling effect on non-citizen use of public benefits
– which began even prior to the Rule taking effect – and its anticipated economic
impacts.16 Where the agency itself forecasts the injuries claimed by the States, we
16
For example, the Commissioner of Health of the State of New York stated that
“even before the Final Rule has gone into effect, consumers have been calling . . .
[and] inquiring about canceling their Medicaid or other health insurance
coverage because of the Final Rule.” New York (“N.Y.”) J. App. 512. The
Commissioner further notes that “[i]ndividuals without coverage will still need
29
agree with the Ninth Circuit that it is “disingenuous” for DHS to claim that the
injury is not sufficiently imminent. San Francisco, 944 F.3d at 787 (finding state
and local governments had standing to challenge the Rule).
We are also unpersuaded by DHS’s argument that the States cannot
establish injury in fact because any losses in funding will be offset by the savings
accrued as fewer people seek public assistance. “[T]he fact that an injury may be
outweighed by other benefits . . . does not negate standing.”17 Denney v. Deutsche
and receive care” but without insurance “those costs will be borne by the
healthcare delivery system.” Id. The President and CEO of New York City Health
and Hospitals Corporation provided specific examples of patients refusing care
or requesting disenrollment because of the Rule, and estimated that in the best-
case scenario, the Rule could result in a loss of $50 million in the first year for the
municipal hospital system. See N.Y. J. App. 266-69; see also N.Y. J. App. 183
(Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services providing
statistics evidencing a “striking and dramatic drop in non-citizen SNAP cases”
since the public charge rule began to get media coverage); N.Y. J. App. 227, 233-
34 (Commissioner-Designate of Connecticut Department of Social Services
estimating economic harms and increased healthcare costs); N.Y. J. App. 385-86
(Acting Secretary of the Agency of Human Services in Vermont predicting
increased use of state-funded services).
17
For largely the same reason, we are not persuaded by DHS’s argument that the
States’ losses will be offset by their continued receipt of Emergency Medicaid
funds, a benefit not impacted by the Rule. We further note that Emergency
Medicaid is limited to care provided after a “sudden onset of a medical condition
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity” if immediate medical
care is necessary to prevent serious health consequences. 42 C.F.R. §
440.255(b)(1), (c). That narrow definition is far from a blanket assurance that all or
30
Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 2006). In any event, this simplistic argument
fails to account for the fact that the States allege injuries that extend well beyond
reduced Medicaid revenue and federal funding to the States, including an overall
increase in healthcare costs that will be borne by public hospitals and general
economic harms. See, e.g., N.Y. J. App. 185 (explaining that “the SNAP program
has a direct economic multiplier effect: for every one dollar in SNAP benefits
received, there is an approximate $1.79 in increased economic activity”); N.Y. J.
App. 512-13. Again, DHS itself identified these same broader harms as likely
outcomes of the Rule. See, e.g., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, INADMISSIBILITY ON
PUBLIC CHARGE GROUNDS, RIN 1615-AA22, at 105-06 (2019) (calculating that
reduced use of SNAP caused by the Rule will result in an estimated annual
decrease of approximately $550 million in economic activity). We are satisfied
that the States’ alleged economic harms are sufficiently concrete and imminent to
constitute injury in fact.
The Organizations allege injury on the grounds that the Rule has
necessitated significant and costly changes in their programmatic work and
caused increased demand on their social service programs. DHS contends that
even most services rendered in an emergency-room setting will be covered.
31
the Organizations have only shown harm to their “abstract social interests” and
that increased costs of representing clients after the Rule is not sufficient to confer
standing. Appellants’ Br. at 23 (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.
363, 379 (1982)).
An organization need only show a “perceptible impairment” of its
activities in order to establish injury in fact. Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate
Co., 6 F.3d 898, 905 (2d Cir. 1993). Contrary to DHS’s assertion that the
Organizations have merely altered the subject matter of their existing outreach
work, the declarations submitted by the Organizations make clear that the Rule
has required significant diversion of resources. For example, over the course of
three months Make the Road New York conducted almost forty workshops for
community members devoted exclusively to the Rule, necessitating the hiring of
two part-time staff members. See Make the Road (“M.T.R.”) J. App. 319-20, 323.
The complexities of the Rule required Catholic Charities to change its educational
outreach from group sessions to time-intensive individual meetings and to
institute a series of evening phone banks. See M.T.R. J. App. 344, 349-51. The
African Services Committee is funding a campaign of radio-based public service
announcements to disseminate information about the Rule and has documented
32
an increased demand on its social service programs, as clients turn away from
public benefits programs.18 See M.T.R. J. App. 466-67, 470.
“[A] nonprofit organization establishes an injury-in-fact if, as here, it
establishes that it spent money to combat activity that harms its . . . core
activities.” Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay,
868 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Organizations are dedicated to providing an array of legal and social services to
non-citizens and they have expended significant resources to mitigate the Rule’s
impact on those they serve. In so doing, they have diverted resources that would
otherwise have been available for other programming, a “perceptible
opportunity cost” that suffices to confer standing. Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 157
(2d Cir. 2011).
The Rule will also impede the Organizations’ abilities to carry out their
responsibilities in a variety of ways. Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d at 110 (finding standing
18
Similarly, the Asian American Federation has devoted resources to a press
conference and media-based outreach campaign and plans to reallocate staff to
implement new programmatic priorities in light of the Rule. See M.T.R. J. App.
487, 490-91. And the Catholic Legal Immigration Network has seen a three-fold
increase in the volume of inquiries related to the public charge ground and
anticipates redirecting staff currently assigned to other projects to respond to the
Rule. See M.T.R. J. App. 502-04.
33
where an organization “face[d] increased difficulty in meeting with and
organizing [day] laborers”). For example, the Asian American Federation, which
“support[s] culturally appropriate health and human services for Asian
American immigrants[,]” is preparing to establish a network of social service
providers that will not ask for immigration status information in order to provide
alternatives for non-citizens who will not access public benefits because of the
Rule. M.T.R. J. App. 485-86, 490. And while Catholic Charities was previously
able to assign adjustment of status cases to paralegals working under the
supervision of accredited representatives or attorneys, it anticipates that most of
the adjustment cases for its predominantly low-income clients will now need to
be handled by an attorney and require in-person representation at adjustment
interviews. M.T.R. J. App. 346-48.
These injuries constitute “far more than simply a setback to the
[Organizations’] abstract social interests.” Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 379. Even
before its entry into force, the Rule has caused a “perceptible impairment” of the
Organizations’ activities and further harms are imminent. Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d at
110 (internal quotation marks omitted). As with the States, we conclude that the
injuries alleged by the Organizations suffice to confer Article III standing.
34
B. Zone of Interests
DHS also argues that neither group of Plaintiffs falls within the zone of
interests of the public charge statute. The zone-of-interests test restricts the ability
to bring suit to those plaintiffs whose interests are “arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute that [they] say[] was
violated.” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567
U.S. 209, 224 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Congress
intended to make agency action presumptively reviewable under the APA, that
test is not especially demanding in the context of APA claims and may be
satisfied even if there is no “indication of congressional purpose to benefit the
would-be plaintiff.” Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987). A
plaintiff is precluded from bringing suit only where its “interests are so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that
it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Id. at
399. Here, DHS argues that the Plaintiffs’ interests fall outside the zone of
interests of the statute because the Plaintiffs seek to facilitate greater use of public
benefits by non-citizens, which it views as inconsistent with the purpose of the
public charge ground.
35
This argument mischaracterizes both the purpose of the public charge
statute and the Plaintiffs’ interests. DHS assumes the merits of its own argument
when it identifies the purpose of the public charge ground as ensuring that non-
citizens do not use public benefits. As we conclude infra in Section II.B.6,
Congress enacted the public charge ground to refuse admission to non-citizens
who will likely be unable to support themselves in the United States, which is not
tantamount to ensuring that non-citizens do not access any public benefits.
Moreover, when we consider the role of the public charge ground within
the broader context of the INA, a fuller picture of the interests implicated in the
statute emerges. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498
U.S. 517, 529 (1991) (explaining the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Clarke that, in
the context of the National Bank Act “the zone-of-interests test was to be applied
not merely in the light of § 36, which was the basis of the plaintiffs’ claim on the
merits, but also in the light of § 81, to which § 36 was an exception”). The public
charge statute delineates a category of persons who are to be denied adjustment
of status (or another form of admission) to which they would otherwise have a
claim. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (detailing requirements for adjustment of status).
The grounds of inadmissibility are the fulcrum on which Congress balances its
36
interest in allowing admission where it advances goals of family unity and
economic competitiveness against its interest in preventing certain categories of
persons from entering the country. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,306. DHS suggests that
only those parties advocating increasingly harsher interpretations of the grounds
of inadmissibility could fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute.
That is too narrow a read of both the zone-of-interests test itself and the interests
protected by the public charge ground. Understood in context, its purpose is to
exclude where appropriate and to not exclude where exclusion would be
inappropriate. See Patchak, 567 U.S. at 225-26.
As with the interests protected by the statute, DHS mischaracterizes the
Plaintiffs’ interests when it claims they seek only increased non-citizen
enrollment in public benefits. The States actually seek to protect the economic
benefits that result from healthy, productive, and engaged immigrant
communities. And the Organizations’ interests stem from their assorted missions
to increase non-citizen well-being and status, which they express in their work to
provide legal and social services to non-citizens. An overbroad interpretation of
the public charge ground, tipping the balance too far in the direction of exclusion
at the expense of admission in the interest of family unity and economic vitality,
37
imperils both these interests. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399 n.14 (finding zone of
interests could apply to “those whose interests are directly affected by a broad or
narrow interpretation of the [statute]” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Plaintiffs are among “those who in practice can be expected to police
the interests that the statute protects[,]” namely, the admission of non-citizens
who will be self-sufficient and the exclusion of those who will not. Fed. Defs. of
N.Y., Inc. v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 954 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296,
1304 (2017). We conclude that the States and the Organizations have Article III
standing to challenge the Rule and that they fall within the zone of interests of
the public charge statute. We thus turn to the merits of these appeals.
II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
We begin by considering whether the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the
merits of their claims, the first preliminary injunction factor. See Winter, 555 U.S.
at 20. The Plaintiffs challenge the Rule under the APA, which declares unlawful
any agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Though the
Plaintiffs contend that the Rule violates the APA for several reasons, we focus on
38
the arguments that the Rule is unlawful because it is contrary to the INA and
because it is arbitrary and capricious.
A. Legal Framework
“We evaluate challenges to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it
administers within the two-step Chevron deference framework.” Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 507 (2d Cir. 2017).
At the first step of Chevron, we consider “whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Accordingly, we start our analysis
below by considering whether Congress has spoken to its intended meaning of
the statutory term “public charge” and conclude that it has done so. Because the
intent of Congress is clear, “Chevron leaves the stage” and we proceed to the
central question of whether DHS’s interpretation of “public charge” is consistent
with this intent. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the Rule is contrary to the INA and
39
that the Plaintiffs have thus demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of
this claim. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
We then move to the Plaintiffs’ second argument, that the Rule is unlawful
for the further reason that it is procedurally arbitrary and capricious. See id. We
consider this argument under the familiar rubric laid out in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), which asks whether the agency has “articulate[d]
a satisfactory explanation for its action.”19 Id. at 43. We conclude that DHS failed
to provide a reasoned explanation for its changed definition and the expanded
list of relevant public benefits and that the Plaintiffs are thus also likely to
19
As we noted in Catskill Mountains, there has been “[m]uch confusion” about the
relationship between Chevron and the State Farm frameworks. 846 F.3d at 522. We
distinguished the two, however, on the grounds that “State Farm is used to
evaluate whether a rule is procedurally defective as a result of flaws in the
agency’s decisionmaking process” while Chevron “is generally used to evaluate
whether the conclusion reached as a result of that process . . . is reasonable.” Id. at
521. On appeal, the Plaintiffs primarily raise procedural challenges to the Rule.
We thus consider these arguments under the State Farm framework. See also Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 961 F.3d 160, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2020).
40
succeed on the merits of their claim that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).20
Accordingly, because the Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on
these two arguments, they have established the first preliminary injunction factor
in their favor.
B. The Rule is Contrary to the INA.
“In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language
of the statute[.]” Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992). “If
the statutory text is ambiguous, we also examine canons of statutory
construction” to identify congressional intent. Catskill Mountains, 846 F.3d at 512;
see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. Here, the Plaintiffs do not argue that “public
charge” is unambiguous on its face, relying instead on the ratification canon to
ascertain the clear intent of Congress.
The ratification canon provides that “Congress is presumed to be aware of
an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that
20
Because we find the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their two
primary arguments, we need not address their additional argument that the Rule
is contrary to the Rehabilitation Act or the Organizations’ argument that the Rule
violates equal protection.
41
interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 580 (1978). The Plaintiffs argue that Congress ratified the settled judicial
and administrative interpretations of “public charge” as it repeatedly reenacted
the public charge ground over the course of more than a century – most recently
in 1996 – such that the current public charge statute unambiguously forecloses
the Rule’s new interpretation of the term. In response, DHS argues that its
interpretation is not precluded by the historical interpretations of “public charge”
and that other provisions of the INA show that the Rule is consistent with
Congress’s intended meaning of “public charge.” Proper application of the
ratification canon requires a thorough understanding of the evolution of the
public charge statute, from its inception in 1882 to its enactment in its current
form in 1996, as well as the accompanying body of administrative and judicial
decisions interpreting the term. Accordingly, we begin with a historical review.
1. Origins of the Public Charge Ground
The public charge ground has its roots in concerns that arose in the late
nineteenth century that foreign nations were addressing poverty within their
own borders by funding passage to the United States for their poorer citizens. See
13 CONG. REC. 5,109 (1882). As one of the primary immigrant-receiving states,
42
New York in particular was concerned that, upon arrival, these non-citizens
“bec[a]me at once a public charge . . . get[ting] into our poor-houses and alms-
houses.” Id. In response to the costs of supporting new arrivals and other
expenditures associated with its role overseeing the immigration process, New
York attempted to impose various taxes and bonds on arriving immigrants, as
well as the shipping companies providing their transport. See id. at 5,107. The
Supreme Court, however, repeatedly struck down these state statutes as
unconstitutional, on the grounds that the Constitution vested the power to
“regulate commerce with foreign nations,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, in
Congress. See, e.g., Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1875).
New York thus turned to Congress for assistance, lobbying for the
enactment of two provisions that ultimately became law with the Immigration
Act of 1882: the public charge ground of exclusion and the immigrant fund. The
inaugural public charge statute directs immigration inspectors to board arriving
ships and refuse permission to land to any passenger who is “unable to take care
of himself or herself without becoming a public charge[.]” Immigration Act of
1882, Pub. L. No. 47-376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214. While denying entry to those who
could not care for themselves, the Act simultaneously established an “immigrant
43
fund,” which was to be used, inter alia, “for the care of immigrants arriving in the
United States, [and] for the relief of such as are in distress.” Id. § 1. By these
provisions, the Act established a scheme that distinguished between those
arriving immigrants who were “unable to take care of [themselves]” and those
who were merely “in distress.” Id. §§ 1, 2. The former were to be excluded; the
latter provided with financial support. Representatives from New York spoke in
favor of this two-part design, applauding the effort to exclude those who would
depend on public assistance while offering words of praise for the immigrants
who may arrive in need of some aid but ultimately go on to “learn our language,
adapt themselves readily to our institutions, and become a valuable component
part of the body-politic.”13 CONG. REC. 5,108 (statement of Rep. Van Voorhis).
Early interpretations of the term “public charge” from this era come
principally from state courts and treat the term as somewhat interchangeable
with “pauper,” distinguishable from those who were simply poor by the
permanence of the condition. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
explained that a bond could be required for arriving immigrants who had “been
paupers in a foreign land; that is, for those who have been a public charge in
another country; and not merely destitute persons, who, on their arrival here,
44
have no visible means of support[.]” City of Boston v. Capen, 61 Mass. 116, 121
(Mass. 1851). The court affirmed that the bond was necessary only from “those
who, by reason of some permanent disability, are unable to maintain themselves”
and who “might become a heavy and long continued charge to the city, town, or
state, in this country[.]” Id. at 122; see also State v. The S.S. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578,
582 (Cal. 1872); City of Alton v. Cty. of Madison, 21 Ill. 115, 116 (Ill. 1859).
Congress amended the immigration laws in 1891, making slight revisions
to the public charge ground of exclusion while adding for the first time a public
charge ground of deportation. See Immigration Act of 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-551,
§§ 1, 11, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084, 1086. Under the terms of the 1891 Act, “[a]ll idiots,
insane persons, [and] paupers or persons likely to become a public charge” were
to be excluded from admission, id. § 1, while a non-citizen who became “a public
charge within one year after his arrival in the United States” could be deported,
id. § 11.
In 1907, Congress again made modest revisions to the public charge
ground, amending the law to exclude “paupers; persons likely to become a
public charge; [and] professional beggars[.]” Immigration Act of 1907, Pub. L.
No. 59-96, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 899. A few years after the 1907 Act, the Supreme Court
45
weighed in on the meaning of “public charge” in its first and (as of yet) only
interpretation of the term. In Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915), the Court
considered the case of two Russian immigrants who had been found likely to
become public charges because they arrived with little money; were bound for
Portland, Oregon, where work was scarce; and had no one legally obligated to
support them. Id. at 8. In its analysis, the Court emphasized that “public charge”
was listed alongside “paupers” and “professional beggars” in the statute,
reasoning that the term should “be read as generically similar to the others
mentioned before and after.” Id. at 10. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a
“public charge,” like the other categories of persons mentioned, must be defined
by some kind of “permanent personal objections.” Id. Because the Russian
immigrants had been deemed likely public charges based on the Portland labor
market, rather than on any intrinsic and problematic characteristics of their own,
the Court reversed the determination.
Citing Gegiow, we declared ourselves “convinced” in a subsequent decision
that “Congress meant [public charge] to exclude persons who were likely to
become occupants of almshouses for want of means with which to support
themselves in the future.” Howe v. United States ex rel. Savitsky, 247 F. 292, 294 (2d
46
Cir. 1917). The Ninth Circuit adopted our interpretation in Ng Fung Ho v. White,
266 F. 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1920), rev’d in part on other grounds, 259 U.S. 276, 285
(1922). Other circuits adopted a somewhat broader interpretation of the term as
encompassing “not only those persons who through misfortune cannot be self-
supporting, but also those who will not undertake honest pursuits, and who are
likely to become periodically the inmates of prisons[,]” Lam Fung Yen v. Frick, 233
F. 393, 396 (6th Cir. 1916) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States ex
rel. Medich v. Burmaster, 24 F.2d 57, 59 (8th Cir. 1928). But those interpretations as
well emphasized the habitual and persistent nature of the dependency that
would render one a public charge.
2. The Immigration Act of 1917
In the wake of Gegiow, Congress sought to “overcome” the line of cases
that “limit[] the meaning of [public charge] because of its position between other
descriptions conceived to be of the same general and generical nature.” S. COMM.
ON IMMIGRATION , 64TH CONG ., REP. ON H.R. 10384, at 5 (1916). Thus, in the
Immigration Act of 1917, Congress relocated the public charge ground within the
list of excludable persons so that it no longer appeared between paupers and
47
professional beggars, but rather between contract laborers and people who had
been deported previously. See Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 876.
Notwithstanding Congress’s efforts, “[s]everal courts promptly questioned
the efficacy of the [1917] amendment and affirmed the interpretation that a
‘person who is likely to become a public charge’ is one who for some cause is
about to be supported at public expense[.]” Matter of Harutunian, 14 I. & N. Dec.
583, 587 (B.I.A. 1974). The Ninth Circuit was the first to hold that “this change of
location of the words does not change the meaning that should be given them,
and that it is still to be held that a person ‘likely to become a public charge’ is one
who, by reason of poverty, insanity, or disease or disability, will probably
become a charge on the public.” Ex parte Hosaye Sakaguchi, 277 F. 913, 916 (9th Cir.
1922). A few years later, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that the public charge ground
still “intended to refer to . . . a condition of dependence on the public for
support.” Coykendall v. Skrmetta, 22 F.2d 120, 121 (5th Cir. 1927). And in United
States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1929), we agreed that the change did
not require overruling the interpretation we had previously adopted in Howe,
noting that “[t]he language itself, ‘public charge,’ suggests . . . dependency.” Id. at
922.
48
 As the courts of appeals applied the public charge ground in this era, the
inquiry usually turned on whether the non-citizen could earn a living, frequently
out of a concern that a health condition might prevent the person from working.21
Conversely, courts routinely found a non-citizen’s ability and willingness to
work sufficient to defeat a public charge finding.22 Administrative interpretations
21
See, e.g., Tod v. Waldman, 266 U.S. 113, 120 (1924) (remanding based on “the
absence from the record of any finding by the department on appeal as to the
issue [of] whether the lameness of Zenia, one of the children, affected her ability
to earn a living or made her likely to become a public charge”); United States ex
rel. Minuto v. Reimer, 83 F.2d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 1936) (affirming public charge
determination where non-citizen “was a woman seventy years old with an
increasing chance of becoming dependent, disabled, and sick [and] [n]o one was
under any obligation to support her”); Tullman v. Tod, 294 F. 87, 88 (2d Cir. 1923)
(affirming public charge determination where the non-citizen “was found to be
affected with deaf mutism, which, as was certified, might affect his ability to earn
a living”); Wallis v. United States ex rel. Mannara, 273 F. 509, 511 (2d Cir. 1921) (“A
person likely to become a public charge is one whom it may be necessary to
support at public expense by reason of poverty, insanity and poverty, disease
and poverty, idiocy and poverty. We think that the finding by the administrative
authorities, showing a physical defect of a nature that may affect the ability of the
relator and appellee to earn a living, is sufficient ground for exclusion [as a likely
public charge]” (internal citation omitted)); see also “Italia” Societa Anonima Di
Navigazione v. Durning, 115 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1940).
22
See, e.g., Ex parte Sturgess, 13 F.2d 624, 625 (6th Cir. 1926) (reversing public
charge determination where non-citizen was “39 years of age, in good health, a
skilled carpenter, and had in his possession about $75 in money”); Nocchi v.
Johnson, 6 F.2d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 1925) (reversing public charge determination where
there was “no clear showing that the boy is so feeble-minded that he is not able to
earn his own living” and his parents were wealthy); United States ex rel. Mantler v.
49
issued in the early days of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) also
focused on non-citizens’ abilities to work and sustain themselves.23
In the context of the public charge ground of deportation, this era also saw
growing consensus among the courts that non-citizens who had been
institutionalized were deportable as public charges.24 The BIA weighed in on the
matter in one of its first published decisions to address either of the public charge
Comm’r of Immigration, 3 F.2d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 1924) (reversing public charge
determination where non-citizen “is 23 years of age, has been in the country now
for 4 years, is in good physical condition, and by industry and frugality has saved
a substantial portion of her earnings”); Sakaguchi, 277 F. at 916 (reversing public
charge determination where there was no evidence “of mental or physical
disability or any fact tending to show that the burden of supporting the appellant
is likely to be cast upon the public” and the non-citizen was “an able-bodied
woman of the age of 25 years, with a fair education . . . [and] a disposition to
work and support herself”); see also Thack v. Zurbrick, 51 F.2d 634, 635 (6th Cir.
1931); United States ex rel. De Sousa v. Day, 22 F.2d 472, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1927);
Lisotta v. United States, 3 F.2d 108, 111 (5th Cir. 1924).
23
See, e.g., Matter of C-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 96, 97 (B.I.A. 1947) (“In this case there is no
likelihood that the beneficiary will become a public charge. . . . [H]e is in good
health and is able and willing to go to work.”); Matter of V-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 78, 81
(B.I.A. 1944) (reversing public charge determination where the respondent was
employed and “has always been self-supporting” other than during a period of
hospitalization).
24
See, e.g., Canciamilla v. Haff, 64 F.2d 875, 876 (9th Cir. 1933); Fernandez v. Nagle,
58 F.2d 950, 950 (9th Cir. 1932); United States ex rel. Casimano v. Comm’r of
Immigration, 15 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir. 1926); United States ex rel. La Reddola v. Tod,
299 F. 592, 593 (2d Cir. 1924).
50
grounds. In Matter of B-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 323 (B.I.A. 1948), the BIA considered the
case of a non-citizen who was institutionalized in a psychiatric hospital run by
the state of Illinois. The BIA held that a non-citizen who had become a public
charge could not be deported on that basis unless the state had a law imposing a
charge for the services rendered, a demand for repayment had been made, and
the non-citizen had failed to reimburse the state. Id. at 326. These procedural
safeguards persist to this day in the public charge ground of deportation, which
considers benefits received, but are not applied in the predictive public charge
ground of inadmissibility. See Harutunian, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 589.
3. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
Shortly after the Matter of B- decision, the Senate initiated “a full and
complete investigation of [the] entire immigration system[,]” the results of which
were released in a Senate Judiciary Committee Report published in 1950. SENATE
JUDICIARY COMM ., THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SYSTEMS OF THE
UNITED STATES, S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 1 (1950). The investigation and report
resulted in a proposed omnibus bill to overhaul the “patchwork” of the then-
existing immigration and naturalization systems. Id. at 4. Thus was enacted the
51
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the foundation of our current
immigration system.
The Judiciary Committee report devotes several pages to a review of the
public charge ground. The report notes that “courts have given varied definitions
of the phrase ‘likely to become a public charge,’” but summarizes the caselaw as
focusing on four characteristics that indicate non-citizens are likely to become
public charges: (1) impending or current imprisonment in a federal prison; (2)
limited finances; (3) a weakened physical condition “as it relate[s] to his ability
and capacity for employment[;]” and (4) traveling to the United States on a ticket
paid for by someone else. Id. at 347-48. The Judiciary Committee recommended
that the public charge ground be re-enacted in the forthcoming INA and further
recommended that the term not be defined in the statute since “the elements
constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge are varied.” Id. at 349.
Congress took both recommendations, listing “[a]liens who, in the opinion
of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the
Attorney General at the time of application for admission, are likely at any time
to become public charges” as one of the INA’s grounds of inadmissibility. See
Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(15), 66 Stat. 163, 183 (1952). The INA also retained the
52
corresponding ground of deportation for any non-citizen who “in the opinion of
the Attorney General, has within five years after entry become a public charge
from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen after entry.” Id. § 241(a)(8).
Administrative interpretations of “public charge” after the enactment of
the INA largely align with the pre-1952 interpretations. In 1964, the Attorney
General noted that the term had been the subject of “extensive judicial
interpretation” and that the “general tenor” of the caselaw understood “public
charge” to require “[s]ome specific circumstance, such as mental or physical
disability, advanced age, or other fact reasonably tending to show that the
burden of supporting the alien is likely to be cast on the public[.]” Matter of
Martinez-Lopez, 10 I. & N. Dec. 409, 421 (A.G. 1964).
The BIA subsequently affirmed that “while economic factors should be
taken into account, the alien’s physical and mental condition, as it affects ability
to earn a living, is of major significance.” Harutunian, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 588. The
BIA concluded that “[e]verything in the statutes, the legislative comments and
the decisions points to one conclusion[:]” that Congress intended to exclude as a
likely public charge a non-citizen who was not self-supporting. Id. at 589; see also
Matter of Vindman, 16 I. & N. Dec. 131, 132 (B.I.A. 1977).
53
As the BIA applied this interpretation in subsequent decisions, it focused
on the non-citizen’s capacity for work, reversing decisions that put too much
weight on temporary setbacks and affirming those where a non-citizen had no
prospects for employment by virtue of age or disability.25 And in Matter of Perez,
15 I. & N. Dec. 136, 137 (B.I.A. 1974), the BIA explicitly held that “[t]he fact that
an alien has been on welfare does not, by itself, establish that he or she is likely to
become a public charge.”
4. The Current Public Charge Ground
It was against this backdrop of judicial and administrative interpretations
that Congress enacted PRWORA and IIRIRA in 1996, creating the public charge
ground as it exists today. While leaving the principal statutory language intact –
rendering inadmissible any non-citizen who is “likely at any time to become a
public charge” – IIRIRA amended the ground to require consideration of the non-
25
See, e.g., Matter of A-, 19 I. & N. Dec. 867, 870 (B.I.A. 1988) (“There may be
circumstances beyond the control of the alien which temporarily prevent an alien
from joining the work force. . . . [T]he director placed undue weight on [the
family’s financial circumstances], thereby overshadowing the more important
factors; namely, that the applicant has now joined the work force, that she is
young, and that she has no physical or mental defects which might affect her
earning capacity.”); Vindman, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 132 (affirming public charge
finding where respondents were older adults and had no employment
prospects); cf. Matter of Kowalski, 10 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1963).
54
citizen’s age, health, family status, financial status, and education. See IIRIRA
§ 531(a). IIRIRA also required certain non-citizens to obtain affidavits of support,
id. § 551(a), building on PRWORA’s requirement that such affidavits of support
be legally enforceable against the sponsor, see PRWORA § 423.
Congress considered, and nearly enacted, a more sweeping set of changes
to the public charge ground with IIRIRA. The conference report of the bill
included a statutory definition of public charge, which would have defined the
term to cover “any alien who receives [means-tested public benefits] for an
aggregate period of at least 12 months[.]” CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. 104-828,
at 138 (1996). While the House passed the conference report containing this
language, it was ultimately dropped under threat of presidential veto. See 142
CONG. REC. S11,882 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kyl); cf. Statement
on Senate Action on the “Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act
of 1996,” 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 783 (May 2, 1996) (President Clinton
critiquing prior version of the bill for “go[ing] too far in denying legal
immigrants access to vital safety net programs which could jeopardize public
health and safety”).
55
We end our historical review back where we started this opinion, with
INS’s release of the 1999 Guidance to counteract public confusion after IIRIRA
and PRWORA. We have already explored in some detail INS’s 1999
interpretation, which defines “public charge” as one who is “primarily
dependent on the Government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either the
receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance or institutionalization
for long-term care at Government expense.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,677. We simply
note here that INS concluded that its interpretation was warranted by “the plain
meaning of the word ‘charge,’ the historical context of public dependency when
the public charge immigration provisions were first enacted more than a century
ago, . . . the expertise of the benefit-granting agencies that deal with subsistence
issues[, and the] factual situations presented in the public charge case law.” Id.
5. The Settled Meaning of “Public Charge”
With this understanding of the history of the public charge ground, we
turn to the applicability of the ratification canon. We first examine whether
Congress changed the statutory language as it amended the ground over the
years, so as to render the canon inapposite. See Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566
U.S. 583, 593 (2012). We then determine whether the caselaw interpretations of
56
the term produced a sufficiently consistent and settled meaning of the term, such
that we may presume Congress ratified that understanding when it created the
current public charge statute in 1996. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986).
We quickly dispose of the first question. There can be no dispute that, since
its origins in the Immigration Act of 1882, Congress reenacted the public charge
ground without pertinent change in 1891, 1907, 1917, 1952, and 1996. We note
that Congress made minor alterations to the ground over the course of its history.
For example, the 1882 public charge ground excluded anyone who was “unable
to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge” at their time
of arrival in the United States while subsequent acts established the forward-
looking likelihood standard. Compare Immigration Act of 1882 § 2 with
Immigration Act of 1891 § 1. And with IIRIRA, Congress added the list of
mandatory factors to consider when applying the ground. See IIRIRA § 531(a).
But Congress has unwaveringly described the fundamental characteristic at issue
as being a “public charge” since 1882. We easily conclude that Congress
“adopt[ed] the language used in [its] earlier act[s]” in its most recent reenactment
of the public charge ground in 1996. See Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 153 (1924).
57
With respect to the second question, our review of the historical
administrative and judicial interpretations of the ground over the years leaves us
convinced that there was a settled meaning of “public charge” well before
Congress enacted IIRIRA. The absolute bulk of the caselaw, from the Supreme
Court, the circuit courts, and the BIA interprets “public charge” to mean a person
who is unable to support herself, either through work, savings, or family ties. See,
e.g., Day, 34 F.2d at 922; Harutunian, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 588-89. Indeed, we think
this interpretation was established early enough that it was ratified by Congress
in the INA of 1952. But the subsequent and consistent administrative
interpretations of the term from the 1960s and 1970s remove any doubt that it
was adopted by Congress in IIRIRA. See United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 158,
173 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that “Congress’s repeated amendment of the relevant
provisions of the statute without expressing any disapproval” of the BIA’s
interpretation is “persuasive evidence that the [Agency’s] interpretation is the
one intended by Congress” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We find particularly significant the Attorney General’s decision from 1962,
which summarizes the “extensive judicial interpretation” of the term as requiring
a particular circumstance, like disability or age, that shows that “the burden of
58
supporting the alien is likely to be cast on the public[.]” Martinez-Lopez, 10 I. & N.
Dec. at 421. Accordingly, the Attorney General held that “[a] healthy person in
the prime of life cannot ordinarily be considered likely to become a public
charge[.]” Id. The BIA came to a similar conclusion after its own review of the
public charge caselaw and legislative history, holding that “any alien who is
incapable of earning a livelihood, who does not have sufficient funds in the
United States for his support, and [who] has no person in the United States
willing and able to assure that he will not need public support is excludable as
likely to become a public charge[.]” Harutunian, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 589-90.
Subsequent administrative decisions affirmed that the public charge
determination must be made based on the totality of the circumstances and
rejected the notion that receipt of public benefits categorically renders one a
public charge. See Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 137; Vindman, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 132; A-,
19 I. & N. Dec. at 870.
The scope and consistency of these administrative decisions warrants the
application of the ratification canon. These published decisions are nationally
binding, issued under the agency’s mandate to “provide clear and uniform
guidance to [other components of the government] and the general public on the
59
proper interpretation and administration of the [INA].” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1).
The broad principles articulated in the decisions are grounded in comprehensive
reviews of public charge history and offer a consistent understanding of the term
as they carry that history forward. While we may not derive a settled rule from
isolated or contradictory decisions, see Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, 543
U.S. 335, 350-52 (2005), that is not the case here. For more than twenty years prior
to IIRIRA, the agency interpreted “public charge” to mean a person not capable
of supporting himself. In the face of this consistent agency interpretation – which
itself aligns with the earlier judicial interpretations – we conclude that when
Congress reenacted the public charge ground in 1996 it ratified this settled
construction of the term. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
157 (2000) (concluding that Congress ratified agency interpretation that had been
its “unwavering position since its inception” and that was consistent “with the
position that its predecessor agency had first taken”).
Our conclusion finds further support in the legislative history of IIRIRA.
“Although we are generally reluctant to employ legislative history at step one of
Chevron” it may be helpful “when the interpretive clues speak almost
unanimously, making Congress’s intent clear beyond reasonable doubt.” Catskill
60
Mountains, 846 F.3d at 515 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). We
thus look to the legislative history only to confirm what we have already
concluded.
As noted above, Congress very nearly included a statutory definition of
“public charge” in IIRIRA that would have redefined the term to mean receipt of
any form of means-tested public benefits for more than twelve months. See
CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 138. That proposed definition was
intended to overcome the BIA’s Matter of B- decision, which interpreted the
public charge ground of deportation, but it was deleted from the final enactment
under threat of presidential veto.26 See 142 CONG. REC. S4,408-09 (daily ed. April
30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simpson); 142 CONG. REC. S11,882 (statement of Sen.
26
The definition was proposed as part of the public charge ground of
deportation. CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 138. We nevertheless
think it reasonable to look to this language as we interpret the public charge
ground of inadmissibility on the principle that a term appearing in multiple
places within a statute is “generally read the same way each time it appears.”
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994). And while the definition was
proposed to overcome Matter of B-’s procedural safeguards for public charge
deportation, the definition is confined to identifying the relevant benefits and
time period of use that made one a “public charge” and could have easily been
transposed to the inadmissibility context. Cf. Harutunian, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 589.
61
Kyl). In effect, an effort was made to change the prior administrative and judicial
consensus as to the meaning of public charge, but that effort failed.
While we agree with DHS that failed legislative proposals are, as a general
matter, unreliable sources of legislative history because bills may fail for any
number of reasons, here we know exactly why the definition was removed from
IIRIRA and find it directly relevant to our analysis. See Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 169-70 (2001). We read this
legislative history as further evidence that Congress was aware of prevailing
administrative interpretations of “public charge” when it enacted IIRIRA. See
Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 782-83 (1985) (applying ratification
canon where legislative history demonstrated Congress was aware of
interpretation). Congress’s abandonment of its efforts to change the meaning of
the term further suggests that it ratified the existing interpretation of “public
charge” in 1996. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600-01 (1983).
DHS urges us to conclude that Congress did not ratify any interpretation of
“public charge” because the term has never had a fixed definition. To support its
contention, DHS points to the 1950 Senate Judiciary Committee report, which
observed that “the elements constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge
62
are varied[.]” S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 349. Consequently, the report recommends
that the term not be defined in the statute and that the determination of whether
a given non-citizen is likely to become a public charge should “rest[] within the
discretion of the [agency].” Id.; see id. at 347 (noting the term has been given
“varied definitions” by the courts).
Rather than suggesting that the core meaning of “public charge” is unclear,
the language on which DHS relies refers to the fact there are a variety of personal
circumstances that may be relied on to show the likelihood that a would-be
immigrant would fall within that category. As described above, the report distills
from the caselaw four circumstances that indicate a non-citizen is likely to
become a public charge. Id. at 348. It thereby recognizes that there are many paths
to dependency, and that administrative flexibility in determining whether a non-
citizen is likely to be dependent is desirable. But the fact that many and varied
circumstances may show that one is likely to become a public charge does not
mean that the underlying term is undefined or lacks a core meaning. And while
DHS makes much of the fact that it retains discretion to decide whether the
ground applies in a given case, the allowance of discretion in individual cases
63
does not mean that the term itself is standardless or without a core, established
meaning.
We recognize that our conclusion that Congress ratified the settled
meaning of “public charge” in 1996 conflicts with decisions from the only two
circuits to have addressed this argument to date. See City and Cty. of San Francisco
v. USCIS, 944 F.3d 773, 798 (9th Cir. 2019); Cook Cty. v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 208, 226 (7th
Cir. 2020). In the context of granting DHS’s motion to stay the injunctions against
the enforcement of the Rule entered by district courts in California and
Washington, the Ninth Circuit decided that “public charge” had been subjected
to “varying historical interpretations” by 1996, such that the ratification canon
did not apply. San Francisco, 944 F.3d at 797. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
there was no consistent interpretation because
[i]nitially, the likelihood of being housed in a government
or charitable institution was most important. Then, the
focus shifted in 1948 to whether public benefits received
by an immigrant could be monetized, and the immigrant
refused to pay for them. In 1974, it shifted again to
whether the immigrant was employable and self-
sufficient. That was subsequently narrowed in 1987 to
64
whether the immigrant had received public cash
assistance, which excluded in-kind benefits. 27
Id. at 796. We think the Ninth Circuit goes astray in pinning the definition of
“public charge” on the form of public care provided to the dependent non-citizen.
That the face of our welfare system has changed over time does not mean that the
fundamental inquiry of the public charge ground – whether the non-citizen is
likely to depend on that system – has also changed. The settled meaning of
“public charge,” as the plain meaning of the term already suggests, is
dependency: being a persistent “charge” on the public purse. And as we explain
further below, the mere receipt of benefits from the government does not
constitute such dependency.
We are similarly unpersuaded by the Seventh Circuit’s “admittedly
incomplete” historical review and its conclusion that plaintiffs in that case had
failed to establish that Congress ratified the settled meaning of the term. See Cook
Cty., 962 F.3d at 226. The Seventh Circuit focuses almost exclusively on the state
of the law prior to 1927 and enactments post-dating Congress’s 1996 amendment
27
We explain below our further disagreement with these characterizations of the
1948 Matter of B- decision and the 1987 public charge provision established in the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which only applied to those non-
citizens participating in an ad hoc legalization program.
65
to the public charge ground, the point at which any existing interpretation would
have been ratified. Id. at 222-26. Critically, this limited analysis omits the
administrative interpretations of the 1960s and 1970s that established uniform
and nationally binding interpretations of the public charge ground, a key
component of our determination that Congress ratified the prevailing
interpretation of the term in 1996. See id. at 225.
In light of the judicial, administrative, and legislative treatments of the
public charge ground from 1882 to 1996, we hold that Congress ratified the
settled meaning of “public charge” when it enacted IIRIRA. Congress intended
the public charge ground of inadmissibility to apply to those non-citizens who
were likely to be unable to support themselves in the future and to rely on the
government for subsistence. “[D]eference is not due unless a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, is left with an unresolved ambiguity.”
Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1630 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, because the
ratification canon reveals the intent of Congress “on the precise question at issue,
that intention is the law and must be given effect.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
We thus owe no deference to the Rule and consider only whether it comports
with congressional intent.
66
6. The Rule’s Inconsistency with the Settled Meaning
“No matter how it is framed, the question a court faces when confronted
with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply,
whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.” City
of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013) (emphasis omitted). Having marked
out the interpretive boundaries of “public charge,” we now consider whether the
Rule’s interpretation falls within the ambit of congressional intent. DHS
repeatedly claims that the Rule aligns with the intent of Congress because it
excludes those non-citizens who lack “self-sufficiency and . . . need to rely on the
government for support.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,317; see, e.g., id. at 41,295, 41,306,
41,318, 41,320, 41,348. As we have just concluded, Congress did indeed ratify a
consistent and long-standing judicial and administrative understanding of
“public charge” as focused on non-citizens’ abilities to support themselves. But
DHS’s generalized assurance that it shares Congress’s interest in self-sufficiency
is belied by the Rule’s actual definition of “public charge,” which reveals that
DHS and Congress have dramatically different notions of the term.
The prevailing administrative and judicial interpretation of “public
charge” ratified by Congress understood the term to mean a non-citizen who
67
cannot support himself, in the sense that he “is incapable of earning a livelihood,
. . . does not have sufficient funds in the United States for his support, and has no
person in the United States willing and able to assure that he will not need public
support[.]” Harutunian, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 589. Moreover, under that
interpretation the “determination of whether an alien is likely to become a public
charge . . . is a prediction based upon the totality of the alien’s circumstances . . . .
The fact that an alien has been on welfare does not, by itself, establish that he or
she is likely to become a public charge.” Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 137. In contrast,
the Rule categorically renders non-citizens public charges – i.e., not self-sufficient
– if they are likely to access any quantity of the enumerated benefits for a limited
number of months. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,349. We think it plain on the face of
these different interpretations that the Rule falls outside the statutory bounds
marked out by Congress. Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that many of the
benefits newly considered by the Rule have relatively generous eligibility criteria
and are designed to provide supplemental assistance to those living well above
the poverty level, as we discuss in greater detail below.28 See infra Section II.C.2.
28
DHS assumes that receipt of SNAP, Medicaid, or housing assistance shows that
a non-citizen is per se unable to meet basic needs. See, e.g., 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,349.
Because DHS primarily invokes this assumption as a justification for its changed
68
To be sure, we do not find the intent of Congress evidenced by the
ratification canon to be so precise as to support only one interpretation. On the
contrary, the principles at issue are broad enough that they may support a variety
of agency interpretations. But while an agency may “give authoritative meaning
to the statute within the bounds of th[e] uncertainty” implicit in congressional
intent, “the presence of some uncertainty” does not prevent us from “discern[ing]
the outer limits of [a statutory] term[.]” Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, LLC, 557
U.S. 519, 525 (2009). When the meaning of a statutory term is unclear, federal
agencies specialized in the area receive deference from courts in assigning
meaning to the uncertain language. But the deference is not unlimited. If
Congress passed a statute leaving it unclear whether a term of the statute means
A, B, or C, an appropriate federal agency will receive deference in
concluding that the proper meaning is any one of A, B, or C. But it does not
follow that, because the statutory term could mean either A, B, or C, the
agency will receive deference in interpreting it to mean X or Y or Z, because
interpretation, we address (and reject) it in our analysis of the Plaintiffs’ arbitrary
and capricious challenge. We note it here because the fact that the Rule
incorporates public benefits with broader programmatic aims than basic
subsistence evidences the Rule’s inconsistency with congressional intent.
69
such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the meaning of the
statute.
Whatever gray area may exist at the margins, we need only decide today
whether Congress “has unambiguously foreclosed the [specific] statutory
interpretation” at issue. Catawba Cty. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2009). And
we conclude that Congress’s intended meaning of “public charge”
unambiguously forecloses the Rule’s expansive interpretation. We are not
persuaded by DHS’s efforts to argue otherwise.
DHS first attempts to argue that its definition of “public charge” is
consistent with the historical caselaw interpretations of the term. DHS points to
two district court cases from the 1920s to claim that Congress ratified a definition
of “public charge” that encompasses minimal and temporary public benefits
usage. The first, Guimond v. Howes, 9 F.2d 412 (D. Me. 1925), held that members of
an immigrant family were likely to become public charges when the husband
was a bootlegger who had been incarcerated for two periods of sixty and ninety
days, respectively. Id. at 413. Because the family had been “supported” by the
town while he was imprisoned, and because the husband’s occupation made it
likely he would return to jail in the future, the district court found the family
70
likely public charges. Id. at 413-14. The second case, Ex parte Turner, 10 F.2d 816,
817 (S.D. Cal. 1926), also found that members of a family were likely public
charges because the husband was “predisposed to physical infirmity” and would
“likely be incapacitated from performing any work or earning support for
himself and [his] family” when his ailments flared up in the future. Because his
wife and children had received charitable aid during his previous two-month
hospitalization, the court anticipated they would do so again when he became
sick in the future and found the family to be likely public charges. Id.
In both cases, the district court did look at previous, short-term receipt of
public benefits in making the public charge determination. But neither case
suggests that this receipt alone rendered the immigrant a public charge. Rather,
the district courts found it significant that the families were likely to repeatedly
become dependent on the public in the future, as the breadwinners of the families
were unlikely to stop bootlegging or to overcome physical infirmity. Guimond, 9
F.2d at 414; Turner, 10 F.2d at 817. These cases thus do not suggest that courts
have historically considered the temporary receipt of benefits as sufficient to
enter a public charge finding. To the contrary, both Guimond and Turner rest on
71
the finding that the benefits usage was not merely temporary but was likely to
regularly reoccur.29
The only other case on which DHS relies is Matter of B-, 3 I. & N. Dec. at
323. DHS argues that Matter of B- shows that a non-citizen is deportable as a
public charge if she fails to reimburse the government for the benefits used, even
if the non-citizen was not primarily dependent on the benefits. DHS reads far too
much into the case. In Matter of B-, the non-citizen was institutionalized, the
paradigmatic example of a public charge. Id. at 324. The only issue in the case
was whether she could escape deportation by reimbursing the state for the
services received. Id. at 326. The BIA held that a non-citizen is not deportable as a
public charge unless the state has asked for reimbursement and the non-citizen or
her relatives have failed to pay. Id. at 325. Rather than broadening the definition
of the public charge ground of inadmissibility – or saying anything that casts
doubt on other cases suggesting that a “public charge” must be persistently and
primarily dependent on the government – Matter of B- held that even an
29
In any event, even if these cases could be read to support DHS’s proposition,
they would not outweigh the prior or subsequent caselaw – particularly the
agency decisions from the 1960s and 1970s setting out nationally binding public
charge standards – endorsing a different interpretation of “public charge.”
72
immigrant who had been institutionalized at public expense because she was
unable to care for herself and was likely to require permanent hospitalization, still
was not categorically a public charge if the state had not sought payment and
been unable to collect.
Matter of B- thus offers a procedural escape hatch to those who need
government services but have money to pay. While the decision alters the
mechanics of deportation as a public charge, it hardly presents a new
interpretation of the term “public charge” itself.30 It seems particularly odd to cite
this somewhat unusual case, with its generous treatment of a non-citizen who
might well seem to fall within the established meaning of “public charge,” in
support of a sweeping expansion of that category.
DHS next argues that a series of policy statements enacted as part of
PRWORA show that the Rule’s interpretation is consistent with congressional
30
Moreover, in Matter of Harutunian, the BIA held that the Matter of B- test is
limited to the public charge ground of deportation and should not be read into
the public charge ground of inadmissibility. 14 I. & N. Dec. at 589-90. This
distinction between the public charge grounds of inadmissibility and deportation
was affirmed by INS in its 1999 Guidance, where it explained that while “the
definition of public charge is the same for both admission/adjustment and
deportation, the standards applied to public charge adjudications in each context
are significantly different.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689.
73
intent regarding the meaning of “public charge.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (describing
the “national policy with respect to welfare and immigration”). In the policy
statements, which lay out the rationale for enacting restrictions on non-citizen
eligibility for public benefits, Congress emphasized that “[s]elf-sufficiency has
been a basic principle of United States immigration law since this country’s
earliest immigration statutes” and affirmed that
[i]t continues to be the immigration policy of the United
States that (A) aliens within the Nation’s borders not
depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather
rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their
families, their sponsors, and private organizations, and (B)
the availability of public benefits not constitute an
incentive for immigration to the United States.
Id. § 1601(1), (2). The policy statements further explain that PRWORA creates
“new rules for eligibility and sponsorship agreements in order to assure that
aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national immigration policy.” Id.
§ 1601(5). The policy statements conclude by noting that any state adopting the
federal benefits eligibility scheme laid out in PRWORA “shall be considered to
have chosen the least restrictive means available for achieving the compelling
governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with
national immigration policy.” Id. § 1601(7).
74
 DHS reads these policy statements to mean that “Congress expressly
equated a lack of ‘self-sufficiency’ with the receipt of ‘public benefits’” and that
Congress intended “public charge” to mean “individuals who rely on taxpayer-
funded benefits to meet their basic needs.” Appellants’ Br. at 30-31. We are
thoroughly unpersuaded by this argument. PRWORA implemented Congress’s
goal of self-sufficiency by restricting non-citizen eligibility for benefits, including
the establishment of the five-year waiting period for LPRs. PRWORA did not
eliminate non-citizen eligibility for benefits nor does it suggest that such drastic
action is necessary. Still less does it indicate any congressional intention that non-
citizens who receive the benefits for which Congress did not render them
ineligible risk being considered “public charges.” On the contrary, the policy
statements specifically proclaim that the new eligibility restrictions sufficiently
“achiev[ed] the compelling governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-
reliant in accordance with national immigration policy.” Id. § 1601(7) (emphasis
added). Clearly, Congress decided that the benefits it preserved for non-citizens
after PRWORA did not interfere with its interest in assuring non-citizen self-
sufficiency. Rather than supporting DHS’s expanded interpretation, both the
policy statements, taken as a whole, and the actual implementation of those
75
policy goals in the substantive provisions of PRWORA, are in considerable
tension with the Rule’s new interpretation of “public charge,” which penalizes
non-citizens for the possibility that they will access the very benefits PRWORA
preserved for them.31
DHS attempts to salvage this argument by pointing out that the 1999
Guidance made various cash benefits relevant to the public charge analysis,
notwithstanding that PRWORA also preserved non-citizen eligibility for those
benefits. DHS argues that this shows that Congress did not intend to preclude the
agency from considering the receipt of PRWORA-approved benefits in the public
charge determination. DHS is correct that the 1999 Guidance makes “receipt of
public cash assistance for income maintenance” one of two ways “primary
dependence” on the government could be shown. 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689. But the
Guidance was also clear that receipt of such benefits alone was insufficient to
establish dependency, and that any such receipt needed to be weighed in the
31
We note that in its decision on DHS’s motion to stay the preliminary
injunctions, the Ninth Circuit accepted DHS’s argument on this point. San
Francisco, 944 F.3d at 799. The Ninth Circuit based its analysis on the first two
policy statements but did not consider the impact of the subsequent statements in
which Congress explained that the PRWORA eligibility scheme satisfied its
notions of self-sufficiency. Id.
76
context of the non-citizen’s overall circumstances. The Guidance explicitly noted
that “an alien receiving a small amount of cash for income maintenance purposes
could be determined not likely to become a public charge due to other positive
factors under the totality of the circumstances test.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,690. While
the 1999 Guidance permissibly looked at receipt of cash benefits as one factor
indicating dependence on the government, the Rule elevates receipt of any
quantity of a broad list of benefits to be the very definition of “public charge.” See
84 Fed. Reg. at 41,295.
The question under consideration is whether the Rule’s understanding of
the term “public charge” goes beyond the bounds of the settled meaning of the
term. The Plaintiffs do not argue, and we do not hold, that the receipt of various
kinds of public benefits is irrelevant to the determination of whether a non-
citizen is likely to become a public charge. But defining public charge to mean the
receipt, even for a limited period, of any of a wide range of public benefits –
particularly, as we discuss below, ones that are designed to supplement an
individual’s or family’s efforts to support themselves, rather than to deal with
their likely permanent inability to do so – is inconsistent with the traditional
77
understanding of what it means to be a “public charge,” which was well-
established by 1996.
Finally, DHS points to three other statutory provisions to support its
argument that the Rule is consistent with the intent of Congress. First, DHS
points to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(s), which exempts from the public charge analysis “any
benefits” received by a non-citizen who qualified for such benefits as a survivor
of domestic violence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c). DHS argues that because § 1182(s)
excuses any benefits received, Congress understood that past receipt of even non-
cash benefits would otherwise generally be relevant to a public charge
determination. But 8 U.S.C. § 1182(s) was added in 2000, shortly after INS issued
its 1999 Guidance in which it clarified that benefits like TANF and SSI would be
relevant for the public charge determination. See Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1505(f), 114 Stat. 1464,
1526. Without § 1182(s), survivors of domestic violence could thus have had their
receipt of cash benefits used against them. By far the most natural reading of
§ 1182(s) is that Congress was preventing domestic violence victims from being
penalized under the then-existing framework. In any event, the statute concerns
what is relevant to the determination, and gives no indication that Congress
78
somehow understood that the receipt of the benefits covered by the 1999
Guidance, let alone a broader set of benefits, could categorically render non-
citizens who were not domestic violence survivors “public charges.” Once again,
what is impermissible in DHS’s interpretation is not that it renders receipt of
supplemental non-cash benefits relevant to a non-citizen’s classification as a
public charge, but rather that it makes the receipt of such benefits determinative.
Second, DHS argues that the provisions requiring affidavits of support for
family-based immigrants and allowing the government to seek reimbursement
from the sponsor for any means-tested public benefit used by the non-citizen
support its interpretation. DHS contends that these provisions show that
Congress considered any non-citizen who might receive an unreimbursed public
benefit in the future a likely public charge. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(4)(c)(ii),
1183a(b)(1)(A). We are not convinced that the affidavit reimbursement
mechanism shows congressional intent to broaden the meaning of “public
charge.” For one thing, not all immigrants have to provide affidavits of support;
the requirement is limited to family-based immigrants and we see no reason it
79
should be taken to alter the underlying terms that apply to all non-citizens.32 We
also note that the statute includes a corollary, allowing the non-citizen herself to
take the sponsor to court if the sponsor fails to support the non-citizen as
promised. See id. § 1183a(a)(1)(B). The reimbursement provision thus serves
primarily as a mechanism to get sponsors to take their commitments seriously by
making them legally enforceable, a longstanding point of concern. See S. REP. NO.
81-1515, at 347 (Senate Judiciary Committee Report from 1950 critiquing the
affidavit of support as an unenforceable document that “at most, appears to be
merely a moral obligation upon the affiant”).
Third and last, DHS looks to the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
(“IRCA”) to support its claim that the Rule is consistent with congressional
intent. IRCA established an ad hoc legalization program for undocumented
immigrants. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a. To qualify for legalization, applicants needed to
prove that most of the grounds of inadmissibility did not apply to them,
including the public charge ground. See id. § 1255a(a)(4), (d)(2). However, IRCA
established a “special rule” with respect to the public charge inquiry, under
32
The affidavit of support requirement is also applied to a small subset of
employment-based immigrants, where the non-citizen’s prospective employer is
a relative or an entity owned in large part by a relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(D).
80
which a non-citizen would not be deemed a likely public charge “if the alien
demonstrates a history of employment in the United States evidencing self-
support without receipt of public cash assistance.” Id. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(iii). DHS
argues that because the IRCA special rule specifically incorporates only cash
assistance, the generic ground in § 1182(a)(4) must necessarily have a broader
reach.
The implementing regulations of IRCA, however, suggest that, rather than
refining the benefits relevant to the public charge inquiry, the special rule
allowed a non-citizen who may otherwise be deemed a likely public charge
because of his limited financial resources an additional manner of showing self-
sufficiency. The relevant regulations provide that a non-citizen “who has a
consistent employment history which shows the ability to support himself or
herself even though his or her income may be below the poverty level, may be
admissible.” 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(k)(4). Accordingly, even if an applicant was
“determined likely to become a public charge[,]” adjudicators were to find a non-
citizen inadmissible on this ground only if he was “unable to overcome this
determination after application of the special rule” and consideration of his
employment history. Id. § 245a.2(d)(4). The BIA applied the IRCA special rule in
81
Matter of A-, reversing a public charge finding that put too much weight on the
applicant’s “financial circumstances” in the face of “the more important factors;
namely, that the applicant has now joined the work force, . . . is young, and . . .
has no physical or mental defects which might affect her earning capacity.” 19 I.
& N. Dec. at 870. In other words, the BIA read the IRCA special rule as fully
consistent with the long-standing view that the ultimate issue in defining a
“public charge” is the non-citizen’s anticipated ability, over a protracted period,
to be able to work to support himself or herself. IRCA and its implementing
regulations thus show that Congress continued to emphasize capacity for work
as a core element of the public charge ground.
All three of these statutory arguments share a common flaw. DHS attempts
to justify a sweeping redefinition of “public charge” by pointing to tangential
details within the extensive patchwork that makes up American immigration law
– none of which express any intention by Congress to revise or depart from the
settled meaning of the term “public charge.” DHS’s argument that these statutory
provisions are “consistent” with its interpretation is of no relevance. The question
is whether, by passing these statutes, Congress undertook to change the
long-established meaning of public charge. While the statutes to which DHS
82
points may be “consistent” with the meaning DHS has assigned to public charge,
they are no less consistent with the long established meaning of public charge
that DHS seeks to overturn. These enactments do nothing to demonstrate that
Congress changed the meaning of public charge. The arguments thus “run[ ]
afoul of the usual rule that Congress does not alter the fundamental details of a
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions – it does not, one might
say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1626-27 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success
on the merits of their argument that the Rule is contrary to the INA. In reenacting
the public charge ground in 1996, Congress endorsed the settled administrative
and judicial interpretation of that ground as requiring a holistic examination of a
non-citizen’s self-sufficiency focused on ability to work and eschewing any idea
that simply receiving welfare benefits made one a public charge. The Rule makes
receipt of a broad range of public benefits on even a short-term basis the very
definition of “public charge.” That exceedingly broad definition is not in
accordance with the law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
83
C. The Rule is Arbitrary and Capricious.
We next consider whether the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits
of their argument that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious. See id. “The scope of
review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. But
“[t]his is not to suggest that judicial review of agency action is merely
perfunctory. To the contrary, within the prescribed narrow sphere, judicial
inquiry must be searching and careful.” Islander E. Pipeline Co., LLC v. McCarthy,
525 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“When an administrative agency sets policy, it must provide a reasoned
explanation for its action. This is not a high bar, but it is an unwavering one.”
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45 (2011). The Plaintiffs argue that the Rule is
arbitrary and capricious because DHS has not provided a reasoned explanation
for its changed definition of “public charge” or the Rule’s expanded list of
relevant benefits. DHS contends that it has adequately explained its action,
stating that it adopted its new public charge definition to “improve upon” the
1999 Guidance by “aligning public charge policy with the self-sufficiency
principles set forth in [PRWORA].” 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,123; see also 84 Fed. Reg. at
84
41,319-20. DHS further explains that it expanded the list of relevant benefits
because the 1999 Guidance relied on an “artificial distinction between cash and
non-cash benefits” that is not warranted under DHS’s new definition. 83 Fed.
Reg. at 51,123; see 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689. For the reasons laid out below, we agree
with the district court that the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of
their claim that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious because neither rationale is a
“satisfactory explanation” for DHS’s actions.33 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
1. Explanation for Changed Definition
DHS justifies its revised definition of “public charge” – one who uses a
relevant public benefit for more than twelve months in the aggregate – as a
“superior interpretation of the statute to the 1999 Interim Field Guidance”
because it “furthers congressional intent behind both the public charge
inadmissibility statute and PRWORA in ensuring that aliens . . . be self-sufficient
and not reliant on public resources.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,319. “In fact, DHS believes
it would be contrary to congressional intent to promulgate regulations that . . .
33
Because we find the Plaintiffs likely to succeed on this basis, we do not address
the Plaintiffs’ additional contentions that we could find the Rule arbitrary and
capricious based on its aggregation principle, selection of factors indicative of
future benefits use, or cost-benefit analysis.
85
ignore the[] receipt” of the benefits listed in the Rule “as this would be contrary
to Congress’s intent in ensuring that aliens within the United States are self-
sufficient.” Id. at 41,318 (citing the PRWORA policy statements at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1601(2)(A)); see, e.g., id. at 41,295, 41,305, 41,308. In short, DHS justifies its
changed interpretation as necessary to implement Congress’s view that “the
receipt of any public benefits, including noncash benefits, [is] indicative of a lack
of self-sufficiency.” Appellants’ Br. at 43.
This explanation fails for the same reasons as DHS’s related argument that
the PRWORA policy statements show that the Rule is consistent with Congress’s
intended meaning of “public charge.” See supra Section II.B.6. As we discussed
above, the PRWORA policy statements do show a congressional interest in
ensuring non-citizen self-sufficiency. See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1), (2). But the statements
also show that, contrary to DHS’s belief, Congress’s vision of self-sufficiency does
not anticipate abstention from all benefits use. See Cook Cty., 962 F.3d at 232
(rejecting DHS’s “absolutist sense of self-sufficiency that no person in a modern
society could satisfy”). Rather, Congress realized its notion of self-sufficiency
with a new benefits eligibility scheme that greatly reduced – but did not
eliminate – non-citizen eligibility for public benefits. See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7)
86
(describing the PRWORA eligibility scheme as “achieving the compelling
governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with
national immigration policy”). “The Supreme Court and [other] court[s] have
consistently reminded agencies that they are bound, not only by the ultimate
purposes Congress has selected, but by the means it has deemed appropriate,
and prescribed, for the pursuit of those purposes.” Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93,
101 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Had Congress thought that any benefits use was incompatible with self-
sufficiency, it could have said so, either by making non-citizens ineligible for all
such benefits or by making those who did receive them inadmissible. But it did
not. We are thus left with an agency justification that is unmoored from the
nuanced views of Congress. See Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Leavitt, 470 F.3d 71, 85-86
(2d Cir. 2006) (finding agency failed to provide reasoned explanation as to “how
adoption of a per se coverage standard comports with congressional purposes in
enacting the Medicare Act,” which prioritized individualized care
determinations). As the Supreme Court has explained,
no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding
what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the
achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of
87
legislative choice – and it frustrates rather than effectuates
legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever
furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (emphasis omitted).
DHS’s misconception of the PRWORA policy statements and Congress’s
intended notion of self-sufficiency is its principal justification for its revised
definition; it identifies no other “deficienc[y]” in the 1999 Guidance, apart from
its limited list of relevant benefits, discussed below. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,319; see
also id. at 41,349 (describing the Guidance’s interpretation as “suboptimal when
considered in relation to the goals of the INA and PRWORA”).
To be sure, we do not suggest that DHS must, as a general matter, show
that the Guidance was deficient or that the Rule is necessarily a better
interpretation than the prior policy reflected in the Guidance to avoid being
found arbitrary and capricious. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.
502, 515 (2009) (clarifying that agencies are not required to show “that the reasons
for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one”). Nor do we suggest
that, when an agency offers a statutory interpretation as part of its reason for
adopting a policy, and a reviewing court later rejects the agency’s statutory
interpretation, that the policy is per se arbitrary and capricious. But where, as
88
here, DHS anchors its decision to change its interpretation in the perceived
shortcomings of the prior interpretation, and then fails to identify any actual
defect, it has not provided a “reasoned explanation” for its actions – particularly
when it bases its changed position on its reading of a statute, and it is the new
Rule, rather than the old Guidance, that strays from congressional intent. Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016).
2. Explanation for Expanded List of Benefits
This brings us to DHS’s rationale for expanding the list of benefits relevant
to the public charge determination. DHS explains that it included a broader
group of benefits in the Rule because the distinction made in the 1999 Guidance
between cash and non-cash benefits was no longer appropriate in light of the
more restrictive notions of self-sufficiency DHS enacted with the changed
definition. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,356; see also id. at 41,349, 41,351, 41,375; 83 Fed.
Reg. at 51,123. Though this explanation is in some ways subsidiary to DHS’s
explanation for the changed definition, DHS argues this as an additional
justification and we thus address its additional shortcomings. See Appellants’ Br.
at 43.
89
In the 1999 Guidance, INS explained that “[a]fter extensive consultation
with benefit-granting agencies” it “determined that the best evidence of whether
an alien is primarily dependent on the government for subsistence is . . . the
receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,692;
see 83 Fed. Reg. 51,133. The Guidance consequently excluded non-cash benefits
(e.g., SNAP, housing assistance, and Medicaid) from consideration because those
benefits were “increasingly being made available to families with incomes far
above the poverty level, reflecting broad public policy decisions about improving
general public health and nutrition.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,692. In other words,
“participation in [those] programs [was] not evidence of poverty or dependence”
because they are “by their nature supplemental and do not, alone or in
combination, provide sufficient resources to support an individual or family.” Id.;
see id. at 28,678.
In justifying its decision to include these non-cash benefits in the Rule,
DHS explains that they are relevant to its revamped public charge definition
because they “bear directly on self-sufficiency.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,366. DHS
reasons that because “[f]ood, shelter, and necessary medical treatment are basic
necessities of life[, a] person who needs the public’s assistance to provide for
90
these basic necessities is not self-sufficient.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,159. Thus, the Rule
includes these benefits as relevant to the public charge determination to ensure
that all benefits bearing on self-sufficiency are considered. Id.; see 84 Fed. Reg. at
41,356.
The fundamental flaw of this justification is that while DHS repeatedly
contends that the non-citizens using these programs would be unable to provide
for their basic necessities without governmental support, it does not provide any
factual basis for this belief. See, e.g., 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,159; 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,354,
41,366, 41,375, 41,381, 41,389. While the 1999 Guidance was developed in
consultation with the benefits-granting agencies, DHS does not claim that their
expertise again informed its decision that people who use non-cash benefits
would be otherwise unable to meet their basic needs.34 Of course, DHS is free to
change its interpretation and we do not suggest it is under any obligation to
consult with its sister agencies in so doing. But what DHS may not do is rest its
changed interpretation on unsupported speculation, particularly when its
categorical assumptions run counter to the realities of the non-cash benefits at
34
In response to a comment directly asking whether any such consultation took
place, DHS invoked the deliberative process privilege. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,460.
91
issue. The goals and eligibility criteria of these benefits programs belie DHS’s
assumption and show that these programs are designed to provide supplemental
support, rather than subsistence, to a broad swath of the population – as INS
recognized in 1999.
Take, for example, SNAP – the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
– which was born of a desire to “raise levels of nutrition among low-income
households.” Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 2, 78 Stat. 703, 703.
SNAP benefits are intended for all those whose “financial resources . . . are
determined to be a substantial limiting factor in permitting them to obtain a more
nutritious diet.” Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, § 1301, 91
Stat. 913, 962 (emphasis added); see 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(a). Because SNAP is not
intended only for those who might otherwise face starvation, the program is
open to households with incomes exceeding the federal poverty guideline, 7
C.F.R. § 273.9(a)(1), and its supplemental nature is underscored by the fact that
the average SNAP recipient receives only $127 a month in benefits, see House of
Representatives Amicus Br. at 19 (citing 2018 statistics). Large numbers of SNAP
92
recipients, far from being incapable of productive employment, work for some of
America’s largest corporations.35
The housing benefits included in the Rule have a similar aim, intended to
ensure “a decent home and a suitable living environment for all persons, but
principally those of low and moderate income.” Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 101(c)(3), 88 Stat. 633, 634
(emphasis added). Indeed, while the majority of those using housing programs
are low-income families, benefits remain available to those earning up to 80% of
the area median income – $85,350 for a family of four in New York City in 2019.
M.T.R. J. App. 164; see 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2)(A). It makes little sense to treat the
mere receipt of housing benefits as proof of inability to survive by one’s own
efforts when the program is intended for, among others, people who can and do
earn moderate incomes. In contrast, TANF – one of the three benefits listed in the
35
See Public Justice Center Amicus Br. at 12 (citing Senate report concluding that
SNAP beneficiaries are “‘far more’ likely to be employed than to rely on cash
assistance” (quoting S. Rep. No. 11-220, at 8 (2007)); see also Dennis Green, Data
From States Shows Thousands of Amazon Employees Are on Food Stamps, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2018) (discussing SNAP usage by Amazon, Walmart, and
McDonald’s employees).
93
1999 Guidance – is generally only available to families with incomes well below
the federal poverty guideline.36
While the Rule declares non-citizens dependent for using Medicaid instead
of private health insurance, it cannot be ignored that in this country, access to
private healthcare depends for many people on whether an employer offers
coverage. See National Housing Law Project Amicus Br. at 22 (noting that
roughly 40% of employed Medicaid beneficiaries work for small businesses,
many of which are not legally required to provide health insurance). Considering
that access to insurance is often determined by factors beyond an individual’s
control, we are dubious of DHS’s unsupported claim that using public health
insurance shows a lack of self-sufficiency.37 To the contrary, studies show that
36
The TANF earnings thresholds for new applicants vary by state and range from
approximately 16% of FPG in Alabama to 91% of FPG in Nevada. See CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., TANF: ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT AMOUNTS IN STATE TANF CASH
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS at 3 (2014). In the majority of states, however, TANF was
only available to those earning less than 50% of FPG, which means an annual
income of less than $13,100 for a family of four in 2020. Id.; see Annual Update of
the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 85 Fed. Reg. 3,060, 30,060 (Jan. 17, 2020).
37
DHS also suggests that Medicaid is included because “the total Federal
expenditure for the Medicaid program overall is by far larger than any other
program for low-income people,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,379, which DHS takes as
evidence that it is “a more significant form of public support” for individuals
than other benefits, Appellants’ Br. at 43; see 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,160. We are not
94
more than 60% of Medicaid beneficiaries who are not children, older adults, or
people with disabilities are employed. See Public Justice Center Amicus Br. at 20
(citing RACHEL GARFIELD ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., UNDERSTANDING THE
INTERSECTION OF MEDICAID AND WORK: WHAT DOES THE DATA SAY? 2 (2019)). To
be sure, it is easier for individuals to purchase private coverage in the wake of the
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), but the Rule implies that even using ACA tax
credits to purchase health insurance evidences an inability to meet one’s needs
without government support. 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,299.
Of course, SNAP and housing benefits may very well be all that stands
between some non-citizens and hunger or homelessness. Some families may
actually fail to meet these basic needs without government support. But these
programs sweep more broadly than just families on the margin, encompassing
those who would no doubt keep their families fed and housed without
persuaded that the difference in dollars expended is an appropriate indicator of a
non-citizen’s level of self-sufficiency; rather, it seems plain to us that the
difference is due to the high cost of providing healthcare in the United States. Cf.
Public Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39, 58 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The notion that
‘cheapest is best’ is contrary to State Farm.”). The size of the government
expenditure on Medicaid may be relevant to a policy debate about the costs and
benefits of the program, but it has little bearing on whether Medicaid recipients
should be considered “public charges.”
95
government support but are able to do so in a healthier and safer way because
they receive supplemental assistance. See Cook Cty., 962 F.3d at 232 (noting that
the benefits covered by the Rule “are largely supplemental” and that “[m]any
recipients could get by without them” (emphasis omitted)). Accepting help that is
offered to elevate one to a higher standard of living, help that was created by
Congress for that precise purpose, does not mean a person is not self-sufficient –
particularly when such programs are available not just to persons living in abject
poverty but to a broad swath of low- and moderate-income Americans, including
those who are productively employed. DHS goes too far in assuming that all
those who participate in non-cash benefits programs would be otherwise unable
to meet their needs and that they can thus be categorically considered “public
charges.” Its unsupported and conclusory claim that receipt of such benefits
indicates an inability to support oneself does not satisfy DHS’s obligation to
explain its actions. See Gen. Chem. Corp. v. United States, 817 F.2d 844, 855 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (rejecting agency’s “conclusory” explanation and noting that “[s]uch
intuitional forms of decisionmaking . . . fall somewhere on the distant side of
arbitrary” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51.
96
“Agencies are free to change their existing policies as long as they provide
a reasoned explanation for the change. When an agency changes its existing
position, it need not always provide a more detailed justification than what
would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate. But the agency must at
least . . . show that there are good reasons for the new policy.” Encino Motorcars,
136 S. Ct. at 2125-26 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). DHS has
failed to do so here. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have shown they are likely to
succeed on the merits of their claim that DHS’s failure to provide a reasoned
explanation renders the Rule arbitrary and capricious.
III. Irreparable Harm to the Plaintiffs
The second preliminary injunction factor under Winter requires the
Plaintiffs to show they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
injunctive relief. 555 U.S. at 20. “Irreparable harm is injury that is neither remote
nor speculative, but actual and imminent and that cannot be remedied by an
award of monetary damages.” New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787
F.3d 638, 660 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have already
discussed the Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries in evaluating their standing to challenge
the Rule and both the States and Organizations point to largely similar harms to
97
establish this injunctive factor. See League of Women Voters of the United States v.
Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (looking to same injuries to establish
standing and irreparable harm).
The States contend that the implementation of the Rule will result in
reduced Medicaid revenue and federal funding and a greater number of
uninsured patients seeking care, putting public hospitals that are already
insufficiently funded at risk of closure. See, e.g., N.Y. J. App. 512-13. Additionally,
as the administrators of the benefits programs at issue, the States allege that they
will be required to undertake costly revisions to their eligibility systems to ensure
that non-citizens are not automatically made eligible for or enrolled in benefits
they may no longer wish to receive after the Rule’s implementation. See, e.g., N.Y.
J. App. 236, 381-82. The Organizations point to the economic harms of expending
funds to mitigate the impact of the Rule on the communities they serve. See, e.g.,
M.T.R. J. App. 466-67. As noted, DHS predicted that the Rule would have
economic harms, and the Rule has already had a chilling effect on non-citizen use
of public benefits. See supra Section I.A. These injuries claimed by the States and
the Organizations are actual and imminent. Moreover, because money damages
are prohibited in APA actions, they are irreparable. See 5 U.S.C. § 702; Ward v.
98
Brown, 22 F.3d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1994). We thus conclude that the Plaintiffs have
established the second factor of the preliminary injunction standard.38
IV. Balance of Equities and the Public Interest
The final inquiry in our preliminary injunction analysis requires us to
consider whether the balance of equities tips in favor of granting the injunction
and whether that injunction is in the public interest, the third and fourth Winter
factors. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Azar, 911 F.3d at 575 (considering the final two
factors together where the government is a party). DHS argues that it would be
harmed by a preliminary injunction because an injunction would force the
agency to retain its prior policy, which grants status to some non-citizens that
DHS believes should be denied under a proper interpretation of the public
charge ground. Because there is no apparent means by which DHS could revisit
adjustment determinations made while the Rule is enjoined, this harm is
irreparable.
38
We note that our precedents suggest that the Plaintiffs may be able to show that
a preliminary injunction is warranted on the strength of these first two factors
alone. See Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627, 636, 640-41 (2d Cir. 2019),
rev’d on other grounds, – U.S. – 2020 WL 3848061 (July 9, 2020). Notwithstanding
this possibility, we consider the balance of equities and the public interest, as
discussed in Winter.
99
While DHS has a valid interest in applying its preferred immigration
policy, we think the balance of equities clearly tips in favor of the Plaintiffs. For
one, DHS’s claimed harm is, to some extent, inevitable in the preliminary
injunction context. Any time the government is subject to a preliminary
injunction, it necessarily suffers the injury of being prevented from enacting its
preferred policy. Without additional considerations at play – for example,
national security implications, Winter, 555 U.S. at 26, or the need to correct a
previous policy that had been deemed unlawful – we do not think DHS’s
inability to implement a standard that is as strict as it would like outweighs the
wide-ranging economic harms that await the States and Organizations upon the
implementation of the Rule.
The public interest also favors a preliminary injunction. DHS itself
acknowledges that the Rule will likely result in “[w]orse health outcomes,
including increased prevalence of obesity and malnutrition, . . . [i]ncreased
prevalence of communicable diseases, . . . [i]ncreased rates of poverty and
housing instability[,] and [r]educed productivity and educational attainment.” 83
Fed. Reg. at 51,270. To say the least, the public interest does not favor the
immediate implementation of the Rule.
100
Thus, the Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that a preliminary
injunction is warranted in these cases. Accordingly, we affirm the district court
orders granting such relief in these cases.
V. Scope of Injunction
While we hold that the district court properly granted the Plaintiffs’
preliminary injunction motions, there remains one final issue for our
consideration: whether the district court abused its discretion by entering a
nationwide injunction, rather than a geographically limited measure. DHS argues
that a national injunction is insufficiently tailored to the Plaintiffs’ particular
injuries and allows the decision of a single district court to override contrary
decisions of other courts, an outcome not warranted by the need for uniform
application of immigration law. The Plaintiffs respond that the scope of relief is
determined by the extent of the violation and that the APA authorizes the broad
relief issued here.
The issuance of nationwide injunctions has been the subject of increasing
scrutiny in recent years, a topic that has already touched these cases on their brief
foray to the Supreme Court. See New York, 140 S. Ct. at 599-601 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in the grant of stay); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424-29
101
(2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). The difficult questions implicated in this debate
are evidenced by the fact that both DHS and the Plaintiffs marshal persuasive
points to support their arguments. As the Plaintiffs point out, courts have long
held that when an agency action is found unlawful under the APA, “the ordinary
result is that the rules are vacated – not that their application to the individual
petitioners is proscribed.” Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145
F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). This aligns
with the general principle that “the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the
extent of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff
class.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). Moreover, courts have
recognized that nationwide injunctions may be particularly appropriate in the
immigration context, given the interest in a uniform immigration policy. See
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187-88 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Hawaii v. Trump,
878 F.3d 662, 701 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
On the other hand, we share DHS’s concern that a district judge issuing a
nationwide injunction may in effect override contrary decisions from co-equal
and appellate courts, imposing its view of the law within the geographic
jurisdiction of courts that have reached contrary conclusions. That result may
102
well be more unseemly than the application of inconsistent interpretations of
immigration law across the circuits – a situation that is hardly unusual, and may
well persist without injustice or intolerable disruption. See, e.g., Orellana-Monson
v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing circuit variance in a
substantive asylum standard).
We have no doubt that the law, as it stands today, permits district courts to
enter nationwide injunctions, and agree that such injunctions may be an
appropriate remedy in certain circumstances – for example, where only a single
case challenges the action or where multiple courts have spoken unanimously on
the issue. The issuance of unqualified nationwide injunctions is a less desirable
practice where, as here, numerous challenges to the same agency action are being
litigated simultaneously in district and circuit courts across the country. It is not
clear to us that, where contrary views could be or have been taken by courts of
parallel or superior authority, entitled to determine the law within their own
geographical jurisdictions, the court that imposes the most sweeping injunction
should control the nationwide legal landscape.
When confronted with such a volatile litigation landscape, we encourage
district courts to consider crafting preliminary injunctions that anticipate the
103
possibility of conflict with other courts and provide for such a contingency. Such
approaches could take the form of limiting language providing that the
injunction would not supersede contrary rulings of other courts, an invitation to
the parties to return and request modification as the situation changes, or the
limitation of the injunction to the situation of particular plaintiffs or to similarly
situated persons within the geographic jurisdiction of the court.
We need not decide whether the able district judge in these cases abused
his discretion in entering nationwide injunctions. Instead, we exercise our own
discretion, in light of the divergent decisions that have emerged in our sister
circuits since the district court entered its orders, to modify the injunction,
limiting it to the states of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont. Cf. Smith v.
Woosley, 399 F.3d 428, 436 (2d Cir. 2005). As modified, the injunction covers the
State plaintiffs and the vast majority of the Organizations’ operations. We see no
need for a broader injunction at this point, particularly in light of the somewhat
unusual posture of this case, namely that the preliminary injunction has already
been stayed by the Supreme Court, not only through our disposition of the case,
but also through the disposition of DHS’s petition for a writ of certiorari, should
DHS seek review of this decision. See New York, 140 S. Ct. at 599.
104
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we agree with the district court that a
preliminary injunction is warranted in these cases but modify the scope of the
injunctions to cover only the states of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont. The
orders of the district court are therefore AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
105
Appendix A
Amici Curiae in New York v. DHS Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J.
and Make the Road v. Cuccinelli Gorod, Dayna J. Zolle, Constitutional
Accountability Center, Washington,
Maureen P. Alger, Priyamvada DC, for Amici Curiae Immigration
Arora, Cooley LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for History Scholars, in support of
Amici Curiae American Academy of Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Pediatrics, American Medical
Association, American College of Johanna Dennehy, Steptoe & Johnson
Physicians, American College of LLP, Washington, DC, for Amici
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Curiae Immigration Law Professors,
New York State American Academy in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.
of Pediatrics, American Academy of
Pediatrics – Vermont Chapter, and Richard L. Revesz, Jack Lienke, Max
Medical Society of the State of New Sarinsky, Institute for Policy Integrity
York, in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees. at New York University School of
Law, New York, NY, for Amicus
Emily Tomoko Kuwahara, Crowell & Curiae Institute for Policy Integrity at
Moring LLP, Los Angeles, CA, New York University School of Law,
Austin Sutta, Crowell & Moring LLP, in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.
San Francisco, CA, for Amici Curiae
Asian Americans Advancing Justice| Russell L. Hirschhorn, Proskauer
AAJC, Asian American Legal Rose LLP, New York, NY, for Amici
Defense and Education Fund, Curiae Justice in Aging, American
National Women’s Law Center, and Society on Aging, Caring Across
40 Other Organizations, in support of Generations, Jewish Family Service
Plaintiffs-Appellees. of Los Angeles, Jewish Federations of
North America, National Asian
Hillary Schneller, Center for Pacific Center on Aging, National
Reproductive Rights, New York, NY, Council on Aging, National Hispanic
for Amicus Curiae Center for Council on Aging, MAZON, PHI,
Reproductive Rights, in support of and Center for Medicare Advocacy,
Plaintiffs-Appellees. in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.
106
Nilda Isidro, Goodwin Procter LLP, McDermott Will & Emery LLP,
New York, NY, for Amici Curiae Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae 105
Members of Congressional Black Businesses and Organizations, in
Caucus, Congressional Hispanic support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Caucus, and Congressional Asian
Pacific American Caucus, in support
of Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Stuart Rossman, National Consumer
Law Center, Boston, MA, for Amici
Curiae National Consumer Law
Center, Legal Aid Justice Center,
Public Citizen, Inc., Consumer
Action, Equal Justice Society, Impact
Fund, Secure Justice, Media Alliance,
Americans for Financial Reform
Education Fund, and New Economy
Project, in support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees.
Paul J. Lawrence, Alanna E. Peterson,
Pacifica Law Group LLP, Seattle,
WA, for Amici Curiae Nonprofit Anti-
Domestic Violence and Sexual
Assault Organizations, in support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Debra Gardner, Public Justice Center,
Baltimore, MD, for Amicus Curiae
Public Justice Center, in support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Paul W. Hughes, Michael B.
Kimberly, Matthew A. Waring,
107
Amici Curiae in New York v. DHS Jacqueline Chávez, Foley Hoag LLP,
Boston, MA, Justin Lowe, Wendy
Sarah M. Ray, Kyle A. Virgien, Diana Parmet, Health Law Advocates, Inc.,
A. Aguilar, Charles F. Sprague, Boston, MA, for Amici Curiae Health
Latham & Watkins LLP, San Law Advocates, Inc. and Other
Francisco, CA, Tyce R. Walters, Organizations Interested in Public
Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, Health, in support of Plaintiffs-
DC, for Amici Curiae American Civil Appellees.
Liberties Union, Center for Public
Representation, American R. Adam Lauridsen, Chessie Thacher,
Association of People with Victor H. Yu, Nicholas R. Green,
Disabilities, Association of University Keker, Van Nest & Peters LLP, San
Centers on Disabilities, Autistic Self Francisco, CA, for Amici Curiae
Advocacy Network, Civil Rights National Housing Law Project, Food
Education and Enforcement Center, Research & Action Center, Center for
Coelho Center for Disability Law, Law & Social Policy, National
Policy, and Innovation, Disability Education Association, Service
Rights Advocates, Disability Rights Employees International Union,
Education and Defense Fund, California League of United Latin
Disability Rights New York, Judge American Citizens, California Food
David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Policy Advocates, Center for the
Health Law, Little Lobbyists, Mental Study of Social Policy, Children’s
Health America, National HealthWatch, Comunidades
Association of Councils on Unidas/Communities United, First
Developmental Disabilities, National Focus on Children, Los Angeles
Council on Independent Living, Regional Food Bank, Mississippi
National Disability Rights Network, Center for Justice, National WIC
National Federation of the Blind, Association, National Low Income
New York Civil Liberties Union, The Housing Coalition, Prevention
Arc of the United States, and United Institute, Sant La Haitian
Spinal Association, in support of Neighborhood Center, South
Plaintiffs-Appellees. Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice
Center, Virginia Poverty Law Center,
Lisa C. Wood, Kristyn DeFilipp, in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Andrew London, Emily Nash, E.
108
Matthew S. Freedus, Edward T. City of Houston, TX, Howard Phillip
Waters, Phillip A. Escoriaza, Schneiderman, King County, WA,
Amanda N. Pervine, Feldesman Michael P. May, City of Madison, WI,
Tucker Leifer Fidell LLP, Brian E. Washington, Marin County,
Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae CA, Erik Nilsson, City of
Public Health, Health Policy, Minneapolis, MN, Leslie J. Girard,
Medicine, and Nursing Deans, William M. Litt, Anne K. Brereton,
Chairs, and Scholars, American Marina S. Pantchenko, Monterey
Public Health Association, American County, CA, Kathryn E. Doi, Rachael
Academy of Nursing, and Public E. Blucher, Natalie M. Smith, Hanson
Health Solutions, in support of Bridgett LLP, Sacramento, CA,
Plaintiffs-Appellees. Susana Alcala Wood, City of
Sacramento, CA, John C. Beiers,
Danielle L. Goldstein, Michael David A. Silberman, Ilana Parmer
Dundas, Office of the Los Angeles Mandelbaum, San Mateo County,
City Attorney, Barbara J. Parker, Erin CA, Peter S. Holmes, City of Seattle,
Bernstein, Office of the Oakland City WA, Francis X. Wright, Jr., City of
Attorney, Margaret L. Carter, Daniel Somerville, MA, Michael Rankin,
R. Suvor, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, City of Tucson, AZ, Michael Jenkins,
Los Angeles, CA, Vince Ryan, Robert City of West Hollywood, CA, for
Hazeltine-Shedd, Harris County, TX, Amici Curiae 26 Cities and Counties,
Donna R. Ziegler, Alameda County, in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.
CA, Esteban A. Aguilar, Jr., City of
Albuquerque, NM, Anne L. Morgan,
City of Austin, TX, Andre M. Davis,
City of Baltimore, MD, Mark A.
Flessner, Benna Ruth Solomon, City
of Chicago, IL, Christopher J. Caso,
City of Dallas, TX, Kristin M.
Bronson, City and County of Denver,
CO, Lawrence Garcia, Eli Savit, City
of Detroit, MI, Rodney Pol, Jr., City of
Gary, IN, Crystal Barnes, City of
Holyoke, MA, Ronald C. Lewis,
Judith L. Ramsey, Collyn Peddie,
109
Amici Curiae in Make the Road v.
Cuccinelli
Sadik Huseny, Brittany N. Lovejoy,
Joseph C. Hansen, Tess L. Curet,
Alexandra B. Plutshack, Latham &
Watkins LLP, San Francisco, CA, for
Amici Curiae Fiscal Policy Institute,
Presidents’ Alliance on Higher
Education and Immigration,
National Center for Law and
Economic Justice, American
Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, California
Immigrant Policy Center, Child Care
Law Center, Colorado Fiscal
Institute, Community Action Marin,
Kids Forward, Michigan Immigrant
Rights Center, Oasis Legal Services,
Economic Progress Institute, United
African Organization, and Virginia
Interfaith Center for Public Policy, in
support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Lawrence J. Joseph, Law Office of
Lawrence J. Joseph, Washington, DC,
for Amicus Curiae Immigration
Reform Law Institute, in support of
Defendants-Appellants.
110