Regmi v. Barr

18-2327
Regmi v. Barr
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A206 180 902
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 4th day of November, two thousand twenty.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
8 Chief Judge,
9 DENNY CHIN,
10 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
11 Circuit Judges.
12 _____________________________________
13
14 JIT BAHADUR REGMI,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 18-2327
18 NAC
19 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
20 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, New
25 York, NY.
26
27 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
28 Attorney General; Carl McIntyre,
29 Assistant Director; Brooke Marie
1 Maurer, Trial Attorney, Office of
2 Immigration Litigation, United
3 States Department of Justice,
4 Washington, DC.
5
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
9 is DENIED.
10 Petitioner Jit Bahadur Regmi, a native and citizen of
11 Nepal, seeks review of a July 16 2018, decision of the BIA
12 affirming an August 10, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge
13 (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of
14 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
15 (“CAT”). In re Jit Bahadur Regmi, No. A206 180 902 (B.I.A.
16 Jul. 16, 2018), aff’g No. A206 180 902 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City
17 Aug. 10, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
18 underlying facts and procedural history.
19 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
20 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the
21 internal relocation finding that the BIA did not reach. See
22 Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d
23 Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well
24 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Lecaj v. Holder,
25 616 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2010).
2
1 I. Fundamental Change in Country Conditions
2 It is undisputed that Regmi established that he suffered
3 past persecution in Nepal by members of the Nepal Communist
4 Party-Maoist (“Maoists”) on account of his membership in the
5 rival Nepali Congress Party (“NCP”). Accordingly, he
6 benefits from a presumption of a well-founded fear of future
7 persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). However, the
8 Government may rebut this presumption if a preponderance of
9 the evidence shows that “[t]here has been a fundamental change
10 in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-
11 founded fear of persecution.” 8 C.F.R.
12 § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A), (ii); see also Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t
13 of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 399 (2d Cir. 2005). The agency
14 “must conduct an individualized analysis of how changed
15 conditions would affect the specific petitioner’s situation.”
16 Passi v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal
17 quotation marks omitted). And it must provide a reasoned
18 basis for its finding that the presumption of a well-founded
19 fear of persecution is no longer justified. Niang v.
20 Mukasey, 511 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2007).
21 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion
22 that, at the time of Regmi’s August 2017 hearing, conditions
3
1 in Nepal had fundamentally changed such that he no longer had
2 a well-founded fear of persecution. See 8 U.S.C.
3 § 1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that “the administrative findings
4 of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
5 would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”). The IJ
6 acknowledged that the “transition period” after the end of
7 the Maoist insurgency in 2006 “was not without problems,”
8 including some Maoist violence during elections in 2013. In
9 re Jit Bahadur Regmi, No. A206 180 902 *2 (B.I.A. Jul. 16,
10 2018), aff’g No. A206 180 902 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 10,
11 2017). Nevertheless, the IJ reasonably found that those
12 elections were conducted without major irregularities and the
13 record reflected that apart from a beating in 2010, Regmi had
14 no problems between the end of the insurgency and 2013. Id.
15 Further, the IJ reasonably noted that, after the June 2017
16 elections, the NCP became the largest political party and an
17 NCP official assumed the post of prime minister. Id. The
18 IJ also reasonably relied on a 2015 report of the Canadian
19 Immigration and Refugee Board, which noted a scholarly
20 consensus that violence, kidnapping, and extortion by Maoists
21 had “dramatically decreased.” Id. And, to the extent that
22 Regmi feared violence from a Maoist splinter group known as
4
1 Biplav, the IJ reasonably determined that the country
2 conditions evidence revealed that the authorities were
3 arresting Biplav supporters who committed acts of violence.
4 Id.
5 Regmi argues that the agency’s finding that there has
6 been a fundamental change in country conditions is flawed
7 because Maoists regained control of Nepal in 2018. To the
8 extent that Regmi is asserting that there has been an
9 additional change in conditions, he has not provided any
10 objective evidence of such a change and such evidence should
11 be submitted to the BIA in the first instance in connection
12 with a motion to reopen. See Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494
13 F.3d 260, 271 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The mere opportunity to file
14 a motion to reopen means that regardless of the disposition
15 in this Court, a petitioner has the ability to put additional
16 evidence before the agency, and the agency will consider
17 whether to reopen proceedings in light of that evidence.”).
18 Contrary to Regmi’s position, because his CAT claim
19 rested on the same factual basis as his claims for asylum and
20 withholding of removal, the agency’s determination that
21 country conditions had fundamentally changed is dispositive
22 of his CAT claim as well. See Lecaj, 616 F.3d at 119–20
5
1 (holding that applicant who fails to establish fear of harm
2 required for asylum “necessarily” fails to meet higher
3 standard for withholding of removal and CAT relief); see also
4 Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining
5 that CAT claim may fail if its factual basis is the same as
6 that of an asylum claim that lacks credibility).
7 II. Humanitarian Asylum
8 If an asylum applicant can show either “compelling
9 reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country
10 arising out of the severity of the past persecution” or that
11 he faces “other serious harm” upon his return, an IJ may grant
12 humanitarian asylum in the absence of a well-founded fear of
13 future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). A grant
14 of humanitarian asylum based on severe past persecution “is
15 reserved for atrocious forms of persecution,” Kone v. Holder,
16 596 F.3d 141, 152 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
17 omitted), and an applicant must demonstrate both “severe
18 harm” and “long-lasting physical or mental effects of his
19 persecution,” Jalloh v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 148, 151–52 (2d
20 Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Regmi has waived any challenge to the denial of
22 humanitarian asylum by not arguing the issue in his brief.
6
1 See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998)
2 (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered
3 waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.”). In
4 any event, he does not qualify for humanitarian asylum.
5 First, his past persecution, which consisted of beatings on
6 three occasions, does not, in and of itself, justify
7 humanitarian asylum. See Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d
8 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding denial of humanitarian
9 asylum to petitioner who was beaten and harassed on six
10 occasions); cf. Jalloh, 498 F.3d at 150–52 (having “no reason
11 to doubt” that past persecution was sufficiently severe where
12 a petitioner was beaten, his wife raped, their house burned,
13 and he was held captive for two weeks, during which he was
14 beaten and threatened with death and amputation, but
15 nevertheless upholding the denial of humanitarian asylum
16 because the petitioner provided no evidence of “long-lasting
17 physical or mental effects”). Second, Regmi has not claimed
18 continuing effects of his past persecution. See Jalloh, 498
19 F.3d at 151–52 (“Although we have no reason to doubt the
20 gravity of the dreadful mistreatment that [petitioner]
21 suffered at the hands of his . . . persecutors, [he] provided
22 no evidence of long-lasting physical or mental effects of his
7
1 persecution that would support his insistence that he not be
2 returned . . . .”). Further, he has not established that he
3 will suffer “other serious harm” if returned to Nepal. 8
4 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B).
5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
6 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
7 stays VACATED.
8 FOR THE COURT:
9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
10 Clerk of Court
8