Ying Lin v. United States Department of Homeland Security

17-923-cv
Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
York, on the 19th day of October, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
REENA RAGGI,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
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YING LIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 17-923-cv
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, JOHN F. KELLY, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY, UNITED STATES
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
DIRECTOR USCIS LEON RODRIGUEZ, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR, DISTRICT
DIRECTOR PHYLLIS COVEN, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE NEW YORK
DISTRICT OFFICE,
Defendants-Appellees.
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APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: EDWARD J. CUCCIA, Cuccia & Campise,
PLLC, New York, New York.
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APPEARING FOR APPELLEES: ELLIOT M. SCHACHNER, Assistant United
States Attorney (Varuni Nelson, Assistant
United States Attorney, on the brief), for
Bridget M. Rohde, Acting United States
Attorney for the Eastern District of New York,
Brooklyn, New York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York (Pamela K. Chen, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment entered on March 1, 2017, is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff Ying Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, sues
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., and
Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2201, for review of the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services’s (“USCIS’s”) denial of her application to adjust
her status to lawful permanent resident. She here appeals from the dismissal of her
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
On such an appeal, “we review factual findings for clear error and legal
conclusions de novo.” Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721, 727 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted). While we must “accept[] all material facts alleged in the
complaint as true and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,” we do so
mindful that “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[i]t
is well settled that this Court may affirm on any basis for which there is sufficient support
in the record, including grounds not relied on by the district court.” Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai
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Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 413 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In applying these standards here, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the
facts and procedural history of this case, which we reference only as necessary to explain
our decision to affirm.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq., precluded
the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction here. It states in relevant part that,
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), . . .
no court shall have jurisdiction to review[:] (i) any judgment regarding the
granting of relief under section . . . 1255 of this title [(relating to adjustment
of status)], or (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or
the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified
under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the
Secretary of Homeland Security. . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). Subparagraph (D) provides a limited exception to this
jurisdictional bar for “constitutional claims or questions of law.” Id. at § 1252(a)(2)(D).
Lin’s complaint does not fall within this exception because, although she challenges the
adverse statutory eligibility determination informing the adjustment of status denial, the
USCIS also denied Lin’s adjustment application on discretionary grounds, which Lin
does not challenge. Those grounds included more than one justification independent of
those pertaining to the statutory ineligibility determination, for example, Lin’s failure to
appear in immigration court or to surrender to United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement custody, her failure to comply with the Removal Order, and her false
statements. In these circumstances, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars judicial review of both the
statutory and discretionary determinations. See Ling Yang v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 278,
279-80 (2d Cir. 2008).
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That Lin’s complaint is nominally brought under the APA and the DJA compels
no different result. First, judicial review of agency action is not available under the APA
where such review is limited by another statute—here, the INA. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(1); Delgado v. Quarantillo, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011). Second, the
“declaratory judgment statute does not confer jurisdiction on a district court”
independently. See Fleet Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 160 F.3d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1998).
Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Lin’s complaint.
In light of that conclusion, we decline to reach the issue of jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general
rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which
is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
We have considered Lin’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are
without merit. Accordingly, the dismissal of her complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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