Ramirez v. Garland

20-1753
Ramirez v. Garland
BIA
Auh, IJ
A044 128 896
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 18th day of April, two thousand twenty-
5 three.
6
7 PRESENT:
8 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10 MYRNA PÉREZ,
11 Circuit Judges.
12 _____________________________________
13
14 ROBINSON RAMIREZ,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 20-1753
18 NAC
19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Rohmah A. Javed, Karen L.
25 Murtagh,
26 Prisoners’ Legal Services of New
27 York, Albany, NY.
28
29 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
30 Attorney General; Kiley Kane,
31 Senior Litigation Counsel; Lindsay
32 Corliss, Trial Attorney, Office of
33 Immigration Litigation, United
1 States Department of Justice,
2 Washington, DC.
3
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
7 is DENIED.
8 Robinson Ramirez, a native and citizen of the Dominican
9 Republic, seeks review of a May 6, 2020 decision of the BIA
10 affirming a December 6, 2019 decision of an Immigration Judge
11 (“IJ”), which denied protection under the Convention Against
12 Torture (“CAT”). In re Robinson Ramirez, No. A044 128 896
13 (B.I.A. May 6, 2020), aff’g No. A044 128 896 (Immig. Ct.
14 Fishkill Dec. 6, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity
15 with the underlying facts and procedural history.
16 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.
17 See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528
18 (2d Cir. 2006). We review Ramirez’s factual challenges to
19 the denial of CAT relief under “the substantial-evidence
20 standard.” Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020).
21 “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless
22 any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
23 the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
2
1 With these standards in mind, we conclude that the agency
2 did not err in finding that Ramirez failed to establish a
3 likelihood of torture in the Dominican Republic.
4 An applicant for CAT protection has the burden to
5 establish that he would “more likely than not” be tortured by
6 or with the acquiescence of government officials. 8 C.F.R.
7 §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1); Khouzam v.
8 Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2004). In assessing
9 whether an applicant has satisfied his burden of proof, the
10 agency must consider “all evidence relevant to the
11 possibility of future torture,” including evidence of past
12 torture. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). “[A]n alien will never
13 be able to show that he faces a more likely than not chance
14 of torture if one link in the chain cannot be shown to be
15 more likely than not to occur. It is the likelihood of all
16 necessary events coming together that must more likely than
17 not lead to torture, and a chain of events cannot be more
18 likely than its least likely link.” Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518
19 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re J-F-F-, 23 I. &
20 N. Dec. 912, 918 n.4 (A.G. 2006)). “A private actor’s
21 behavior can constitute torture under the CAT without a
22 government’s specific intent to inflict it if a government
3
1 official is aware of the persecutor’s conduct and intent and
2 acquiesces in violation of the official’s duty to intervene.”
3 Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2007); see
4 also Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 759 (2d Cir.
5 2022).
6 We find no error in the agency’s determination that
7 Ramirez did not suffer torture when he was abused by a private
8 actor as a child. The agency acknowledged that Ramirez was
9 not required to report the abuse to police to establish
10 acquiescence. But in determining that there was no evidence
11 of government acquiescence, the agency was entitled to
12 consider the fact that Ramirez had not reported the abuse to
13 police. See Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 593
14 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that “failure to ask for police help
15 is not enough, by itself, to preclude a finding of
16 acquiescence,” but that the agency was not compelled to find
17 acquiescence where petitioner gave police wrong information
18 and country conditions evidence showed efforts to combat gang
19 violence); see also Pierre, 502 F.3d at 118.
20 Further, the agency reasonably found that Ramirez failed
21 to show a likelihood of torture as an imprisoned or
22 institutionalized mentally ill, criminal deportee in the
4
1 Dominican Republic. Ramirez remained employed while
2 unmedicated for decades in the United States and he does not
3 have a history of violence, so we see no error in the agency’s
4 conclusion that he failed to establish that he will likely
5 come to the attention of police based on his mental health
6 issues even if he cannot obtain medication. See Savchuck,
7 518 F.3d at 123. The agency also reasonably found that
8 limitations on mental health care in the Dominican Republic,
9 as well as harsh conditions and lack of adequate medical care
10 in prisons, are due to a lack of resources rather than a
11 specific intent to torture those suffering from mental health
12 issues. See id.; see also Pierre, 502 F.3d at 121 (“The
13 failure to maintain standards of diet, hygiene, and living
14 space in prison does not constitute torture under the CAT
15 unless the deficits are sufficiently extreme and are
16 inflicted intentionally rather than as a result of poverty,
17 neglect, or incompetence.”). We find no merit in Ramirez’s
18 argument that the IJ ignored his fear of torture based on the
19 nature of his past abuse or conviction, or that the BIA
20 improperly considered those bases in the first instance. The
21 IJ found that Ramirez’s failure to establish a likelihood of
22 being imprisoned was dispositive of his fear of torture due
5
1 to the nature of his conviction and also found that he did
2 not inform anyone in the Dominican Republic of the abuse he
3 suffered. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129
4 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the record
5 . . . [an applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”); see
6 also INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general
7 rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on
8 issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results
9 they reach.”).
10 Because Ramirez failed to establish that he was likely
11 to be singled out for detention or hospitalization or that
12 anyone would specifically intend to torture him, the agency
13 did not err in finding that he failed to satisfy his burden
14 of proof for CAT relief. See Savchuck, 518 F.3d at 123;
15 Pierre, 502 F.3d at 121.
16 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
17 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
18 stays VACATED.
19 FOR THE COURT:
20 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
21 Clerk of Court
6