Coppeta v. Commissioner of Social Security

12-4632-cv
Coppeta v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
2 Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
3 27th day of January, two thousand fourteen.
4
5 PRESENT:
6 DENNIS JACOBS,
7 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
8 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
9 Circuit Judges.
10 _____________________________________
11
12 Christine L. Coppeta,
13
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 v. 12-4632-cv
17
18 Commissioner of Social Security,
19
20 Defendant-Appellee.
21 _____________________________________
22
23
24 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Christine L. Coppeta, pro se, Rochester, NY.
25
26 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Sandra M. Grossfeld, Special Assistant U.S.
27 Attorney (Stephen P. Conte, Regional Chief
28 Counsel - Region II Office of the General Counsel
29 Social Security Administration, on the brief), for
30 William J. Hochul, Jr., United States Attorney for
31 the Western District of New York.
1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
2 New York (Larimer, J.).
3 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
4 DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.
5 Christine L. Coppeta, pro se, appeals from the dismissal of her action against the
6 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) for disability insurance benefits. At her
7 administrative hearing, Coppeta testified that she was unable to work due to back and neck pain,
8 asthma, migraines, carpal tunnel syndrome, stomach problems, and mental health concerns. The
9 administrative law judge (“ALJ”) nonetheless found that Coppeta was not disabled under the
10 Social Security Act. The district court concluded that the ALJ’s decision was supported by
11 substantial evidence and granted the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. We
12 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on
13 appeal.
14 “We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a suit pursuant to a motion for
15 judgment on the pleadings.” Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2006).
16 We do not decide anew, however, whether the claimant is disabled, but rather review the
17 administrative record to determine if there is substantial evidence, considering the record as a
18 whole, to support the Commissioner’s decision. See Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d
19 Cir. 2010).
20 We may therefore “only set aside a determination which is based upon legal error or not
21 supported by substantial evidence.” Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal
22 quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means such
23 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
2
1 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding
2 whether substantial evidence exists, we defer to the Commissioner’s resolution of conflicting
3 record evidence. See Clark v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 143 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1998). If there is
4 substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s findings, those findings are
5 conclusive. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996).
6 We conclude that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence for the
7 reasons stated by the district court. To the extent Coppeta argues that her disability began in
8 2004, or raises arguments concerning her separate November 2006 disability benefits
9 application, we decline to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Singleton
10 v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1976).
11 We have considered all of Coppeta’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are
12 without merit. We also deny Coppetta’s motion for appointment of counsel, filed after the
13 appeal was fully briefed and submitted, as moot. The judgment of the district court is hereby
14 affirmed and the motion for counsel is denied.
15 FOR THE COURT:
16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
17
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