United States v. Schleede

22-440
United States v. Schleede
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE
A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 15th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.
PRESENT:
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 22-440
TIMOTHY SCHLEEDE,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________
For Defendant-Appellant: JAMES P. EGAN, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Syracuse, NY.
For Appellee: RAJIT S. DOSANJH (Michael D.
Gadarian, Emmet O’Hanlon, on the
brief), Assistant United States
Attorneys, for Carla B. Freedman,
United States Attorney for the
Northern District of New York,
Syracuse, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York (Mae A. D’Agostino, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Timothy Schleede appeals from the judgment of conviction entered by the
district court following his conditional guilty plea to possession with intent to
distribute more than forty grams of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B), and distribution of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C),
for which he was sentenced to seventy months’ imprisonment and four years’
supervised release. On appeal, Schleede challenges the district court’s denial of
his pretrial motion to suppress the drugs seized from his hotel room and storage
unit. In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s
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“legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error.” United States v.
Freeman, 735 F.3d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with
the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we must first consider whether
Schleede has waived his right to file it. A defendant entering a guilty plea may,
with the consent of “the court and the government,” reserve in writing his right to
appeal the denial of a “specified pretrial motion.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). “The
issues preserved for appeal must be framed with precision and stated with
specificity.” United States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United
States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 256 (2d Cir. 1983) (cautioning parties to use “care
and precision in framing the issues to be preserved”). All nonjurisdictional issues
not explicitly preserved for appeal in the conditional plea agreement – including
all Fourth Amendment suppression issues – are deemed waived. See Hayle v.
United States, 815 F.2d 879, 881 (2d Cir. 1987).
Under the terms of his conditional plea, Schleede preserved his right to
appeal only three of the district court’s pretrial suppression rulings – namely, that
“(1) the protective sweep of the defendant’s hotel room was reasonable in both
scope and duration; (2) the evidence seized from the defendant’s hotel room was
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admissible pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine; and (3) the investigating
officers acted in good faith.” App’x at 256. The terms of the plea agreement,
however, do not preserve Schleede’s right to challenge the district court’s
suppression decision with respect to the evidence seized from the storage unit.
Schleede is thus foreclosed from challenging that decision on appeal. See United
States v. Simmons, 763 F.2d 529, 533 (2d Cir. 1985) (“We have repeatedly held that
the entry of a conditional guilty plea preserves only the specifically mentioned
issues and waives all other nonjurisdictional claims.”); see also United States v.
Graham, 51 F.4th 67, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2022) (holding that the defendant had waived
his ineffective-assistance argument even though the government did not mention
waiver in its principal brief). Accordingly, we consider the merits of Schleede’s
Fourth Amendment challenge only with respect to the evidence recovered from
his hotel room.
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. When law enforcement officers violate that
right, courts ordinarily suppress the fruits of the search. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 648 (1961). But not all evidence seized after an unlawful entry is subject
to exclusion. As an exception to the exclusionary rule, the independent-source
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doctrine provides that when a search warrant is obtained after an unlawful entry,
and evidence is seized pursuant to the later warrant-backed search, that evidence
is admissible if the warrant derives from sources independent of the prior
unlawful entry. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537–38 (1988). To
demonstrate the applicability of this exception, the government must demonstrate
that “(1) the warrant [was] supported by probable cause derived from sources
independent of the illegal entry; and (2) the decision to seek the warrant [was] not
. . . prompted by information gleaned from the illegal conduct.” United States v.
Johnson, 994 F.2d 980, 987 (2d Cir. 1993). We are satisfied that both prongs are met
here.
As to the first prong, the affidavit supporting the warrant application
contained ample information from independent, untainted sources to establish
probable cause to believe that Schleede’s room at the Residence Inn Hotel
contained drugs, including fentanyl. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)
(explaining that probable cause exists when, “given all the circumstances set forth
in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place”). The affidavit, to start, explains that members
of the Ulster Regional Gang Enforcement Narcotics Team recruited an informant
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to buy drugs from Schleede. During the controlled buy, they watched someone
matching Schleede’s description walk out of the hotel, approach the informant,
and sell him drugs. The informant turned the drugs over to the officers and
confirmed that Schleede had sold him the drugs. After the buy, officers observed
Schleede return to the hotel and “heard [him] entering a room on the third story
of the structure.” App’x at 33. When Schleede reemerged about an hour later,
officers observed him engage in what appeared to be another hand-to-hand drug
transaction. At that point, officers arrested Schleede and the buyer, recovering
three hotel key cards and $80 in cash from Schleede and six glassine envelopes
containing drugs from the buyer. To tie Schleede’s drug trafficking to a particular
room at the Residence Inn Hotel, the affidavit states that hotel management
confirmed that Schleede was renting Room 304. 1 Based on this untainted
information, we conclude that the affidavit included information sufficient to
1 While Schleede makes much of the fact that the affidavit stated that the three hotel key cards
accessed Room 304 – information Schleede contends was tainted because it was learned from the
purportedly unlawful protective sweep – officers had learned from hotel management that
Schleede was a guest in that room before the protective sweep, and indeed, before the informant
conducted the controlled buy. See United States v. Peeples, 962 F.3d 677, 688 (2d Cir. 2020)
(explaining that “the mere inclusion of tainted evidence in an affidavit does not, by itself, taint
the warrant or the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant” (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted)).
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establish probable cause to search Room 304 at the Residence Inn Hotel. See Gates,
462 U.S. at 238.
As to the second prong, we find that the decision to seek a warrant was not
motivated by what the officers saw during the purportedly unlawful protective
sweep. After the informant purchased drugs from Schleede, officers immediately
began applying for a warrant to search Schleede’s hotel room. See App’x at 104,
129 (Ulster County Sheriff’s Office Investigator Joseph Stock testifying that the
plan was to obtain a search warrant if the controlled buy was successful). The
process of applying for a warrant was thus underway well before the protective
sweep began. To be sure, officers conducted the protective sweep before the
magistrate signed the search warrant. But given that officers had formed the
intent to obtain a search warrant before they commenced the allegedly illegal
search, a decision to suppress the drugs “would put the police in a worse position
than they would have been in if no unlawful conduct had transpired” – precisely
what the Supreme Court has proscribed. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984);
cf. United States v. Whitehorn, 829 F.2d 1225, 1231 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that
discovery of evidence was inevitable where a warrant application to search an
apartment was being prepared before an unlawful search). We therefore
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conclude that the evidence seized from the hotel room was admissible under the
independent-source doctrine, and that we need not address the remaining
arguments raised by Schleede concerning the protective sweep and the officers’
good faith.
We have considered Schleede’s remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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