H.C. v. NYC DOE

21-1582 et al.
H.C. v. NYC DOE, et al.
In the
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
AUGUST TERM 2022
No. 21-1582
H.C., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
J.C., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21-1961
M.D., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
L.D., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21-2130
J.R., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
J.B., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21-2744
M.H., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
M.T., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21-2848
A.G., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
R.P., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-259
D.P., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
S.P., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
2
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-290
S.H., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
K.H., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-315
V.W., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
A.H., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-422
L.L., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
S.L., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
3
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-568
H.W., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
M.W., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-586
H.A., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
M.A., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-772
N.G.B, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
J.B., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
4
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-775
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
YORKTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee,
v.
S.S., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF M.S., A MINOR,
C.S., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF M.S., A MINOR,
Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants.
No. 22-855
A.W., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
E.D., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-977
R.P., INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
5
E.H.P., A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
ARGUED: MAY 1, 2023
DECIDED: JUNE 21, 2023
Before: JACOBS, MENASHI, and MERRIAM, Circuit Judges.
Each appellant in these tandem appeals is a parent of a disabled
child. Arguing that his or her child was entitled to benefits under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i), each parent brought an administrative action against his or
her local education agency and prevailed. Subsequently, each parent
brought a federal action for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(3)(B). In each case, the district court awarded less in
attorneys’ fees than the parent requested, and the parents now appeal.
We hold that a district court awarding attorneys’ fees under the
lodestar approach may consider the complexity of the matter both
when it considers the number of hours reasonably expended and
when it considers the reasonable hourly rate. We also hold that the
IDEA’s fee-shifting provision does not authorize the district court to
award an unreasonable fee when the district court concludes that the
6
education agency has unreasonably protracted proceedings. Finally,
we hold that while a district court does not abuse its discretion when
it adjusts excessive travel costs or fees that an attorney billed to a
client, a district court abuses its discretion when it denies travel-
related fees altogether. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial
of travel-related fees in No. 21-1961 and remand for further
proceedings. We otherwise affirm.
BENJAMIN M. KOPP (Andrew K. Cuddy, on the briefs),
Cuddy Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Auburn, NY, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
REBECCA VISGAITIS (Richard P. Dearing, Clause S.
Platton, Julie Steiner, Jane L. Gordon, Jesse A. Townsend,
MacKenzie Fillow, Kate Fletcher, Devin Slack, Philip W.
Young, on the briefs) for Hon. Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix,
Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York,
NY, for Defendant-Appellee.
BENJAMIN M. KOPP, Cuddy Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Auburn,
NY, for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants.
Mark C. Rushfield, Shaw, Perelson, May & Lambert,
LLP, Poughkeepsie, NY, for Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-
Appellee.
PER CURIAM:
These tandem appeals concern an important issue in our
education law: fee shifting under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i). The general question
presented is whether the district court abused its discretion in
awarding less in attorneys’ fees and costs than requested. For the
7
reasons stated below, we reverse the district court’s denial of travel-
related fees in No. 21-1961, M.D. v. New York City Department of
Education, and remand for further proceedings. See infra Part V. We
otherwise affirm the district courts’ awards of attorneys’ fees and
costs.
BACKGROUND
Each appellant in these cases is the parent of a disabled child.
The appellees are the local education agencies (“LEAs”) that the IDEA
requires to provide services for each child.
In each case, the parent brought an administrative action under
the IDEA against the child’s LEA. The Cuddy Law Firm (“CLF”) was
retained to represent the parent and child in those administrative
actions. Ultimately, CLF’s services were effective: the parents and
children prevailed in each of the proceedings. 1 CLF then sought
compensation for its services. But when the parents and CLF
requested that the LEAs pay CLF’s fees, the LEAs refused on the
ground that the fees requested were unreasonable.
As a result, the parents brought these individual actions in
federal court seeking attorneys’ fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(3)(B). CLF updated the amount requested to include not
only fees and costs related to the administrative proceedings but also
fees and costs related to the federal actions. In each case, the district
court evaluated the evidence presented by the parties and concluded
that CLF’s request was unreasonable. Accordingly, the district court
1 In Board of Education of the Yorktown Central School District v. C.S., the
parent prevailed on appeal to the state review officer. See Affirmation in
Opposition to Application for Attorney Fees and Costs ¶ 23,
No. 17-CV-06542 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2021), ECF. No. 50.
8
calculated a reasonable fee and ordered the LEA to pay that fee. The
parents and CLF appealed.
DISCUSSION
“We review a district court’s award for attorney’s fees,
expenses, and costs for abuse of discretion.” Lilly v. City of New York,
934 F.3d 222, 227 (2d Cir. 2019). Our review is “highly deferential” in
this area because of “the district court’s inherent institutional
advantages” in determining attorneys’ fees. Toussaint v. JJ Weiser, Inc.,
648 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting McDonald ex rel. Prendergast
v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Tr. Fund, 450 F.3d 91, 96 (2d
Cir. 2006)). Fee disputes “essentially are factual matters,” and the
district courts have a “superior understanding of the litigation.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). Moreover, the “essential
goal” of fee shifting “is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing
perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). For these reasons, the
Supreme Court has said that it “can hardly think of a sphere of judicial
decisionmaking in which appellate micromanagement has less to
recommend it.” Id.The IDEA provides that “the court, in its discretion, may award
reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs ... to a prevailing party
who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). The statute specifies that the reasonable fees
awarded “shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in
which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of
services furnished.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(C).
To calculate reasonable attorneys’ fees under the IDEA, courts
apply the “lodestar” method. A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
407 F.3d 65, 79 (2d Cir. 2005). Under the lodestar method, a “fee award
is derived by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended
9
on the litigation [by] a reasonable hourly rate.” G.M. ex rel. R.F. v. New
Britain Bd. of Educ., 173 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In “rare circumstances,” the “district court may
adjust the lodestar when it does not adequately take into account a
factor that may properly be considered in determining a reasonable
fee.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In determining the first component of the lodestar—the
number of hours reasonably expended—the district court may
exclude hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary.” Raja v. Burns, 43 F.4th 80, 87 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). But the district court also “has discretion
simply to deduct a reasonable percentage of the number of hours
claimed as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.”
Id. The other component of the lodestar—the reasonable hourly rate—
“is the rate a paying client would be willing to pay,” Arbor Hill
Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n. v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d
182, 190 (2d Cir. 2008), after “considering all pertinent factors,
including the Johnson factors,” Lilly, 934 F.3d at 230 (referencing
Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)). 2
2 The Johnson factors include: “[t]he time and labor required”; “[t]he
novelty and difficulty of the questions”; “[t]he skill requisite to perform the
legal service properly”; “[t]he preclusion of other employment by the
attorney due to acceptance of the case”; “[t]he customary fee”; “[w]hether
the fee is fixed or contingent”; “[t]ime limits imposed by the client or the
circumstances”; “[t]he amount involved and the results obtained”; the
experience, reputation, and skill of the attorneys; whether the case is
undesirable and may not be “pleasantly received by the community” or the
attorney’s contemporaries; “[t]he nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client”; and “[a]wards in similar cases.” Johnson, 488
F.2d at 717-19.
10
I
Here, we are persuaded that there was no abuse of discretion
in the district courts’ calculation of reasonable attorneys’ fees in each
case. For example, the district court in J.R. cited recent cases from the
Southern District of New York to determine the “prevailing market
rate for experienced, special-education attorneys in the New York
area” as the statute requires. J.R. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 19-CV-11783, 2021 WL 3406370, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2021). The
district court noted that it considered all the Johnson factors, and it
made specific findings as to several of those factors: the case posed
issues that were not “especially novel or difficult,” the subject matter
was not “undesirable,” and the administrative proceedings took—in
total—“less than two hours.” Id. at *4. The district court lowered the
hourly rates for attorneys and paralegals on those grounds. It also
found that the number of hours billed were excessive given that the
matter “lack[ed] … complexity,” so the district court reduced the total
number of hours by twenty percent. Id. at *5. With these reductions,
the district court cut CLF’s total request for attorneys’ fees by a little
more than fifty percent. The district court did not abuse its discretion
in calculating the lodestar in this way.
CLF makes two principal counterarguments on appeal. First,
CLF argues that the district courts erred as a matter of law by
evaluating the complexity of the underlying disputes twice: when
considering the number of hours reasonably expended as well as
when considering the reasonable hourly rate. CLF claims that this
“double deduct[ion],” N.G.B. Br. 56, violated our statement in Millea
that a district court may not “double-count[] … factors.” 658 F.3d at
167. In Millea, we said that a district court “may not adjust the lodestar
based on factors already included in the lodestar calculation itself.”
Id. In other words, the district court may not use a factor both to
11
compute the lodestar and to adjust the lodestar once it has been
computed. The district courts here did something different,
consulting the same factor when evaluating both components of the
lodestar—reasonable hours and reasonable rates. CLF provides no
reason to think that was impermissible. In fact, the complexity of the
underlying dispute affects those two components of the lodestar. One
of the Johnson factors is “[t]he novelty and difficulty of the questions”
presented in the matter, so the complexity of the matter factors into
the reasonable hourly rate. 488 F.2d at 718; see also Lilly, 934 F.3d at
228. If a matter is complex, an attorney will reasonably expend more
hours on it, but a simple matter will be subject to additional
reductions in hours expended. We therefore hold that a district court
does not err when it considers the complexity of the dispute both
when it evaluates the time reasonably expended as well as the
reasonable hourly rate. We see no error in the district courts’ lodestar
calculations in this respect.
Second, CLF argues that it was erroneous to reduce its
requested award at all because the LEAs unreasonably protracted the
proceedings. See, e.g., M.H. Br. 33. CLF’s argument proceeds as
follows. Subparagraph F of the statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(F),
provides that the district court “shall” reduce an award of attorneys’
fees when, as applicable here, “the amount of the attorneys’ fees …
unreasonably exceeds the hourly rate prevailing in the community”
or “the time spent and legal services furnished were excessive
considering the nature of the action or proceeding.” Id.§ 1415(i)(3)(F)(ii)-(iii). But Subparagraph G, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(G),
provides that those mandatory reductions “shall not apply” if the
district court “finds that the State or local educational agency
unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action or
proceeding.” Id.12
CLF’s argument cannot prevail here because none of the district
courts found as a factual matter that the LEAs unreasonably
protracted the proceedings. For example, the district court in H.C.
acknowledged that the LEA “fail[ed] to offer substantive relief at the
resolution session,” “fail[ed] to adopt a consistent position on
whether [it] would defend the case,” and “delay[ed] implementation”
of the hearing officer’s final decision—which means that the LEA
could have hastened the proceedings if it had been better organized.
H.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 20-CV-844, 2021 WL 2471195, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2021). But the LEAs’ apparent disorganization in
these cases does not necessarily establish that the LEA persisted when
“there was absolutely no need to continue litigating,” which would
suggest unreasonable protraction. Gary G. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist.,
632 F.3d 201, 211 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For that reason, we are not left with “a definite and firm conviction
that the district court made a mistake” when it found no unreasonable
protraction here, so we identify no clear error. Gater Assets Ltd. v. AO
Moldovagaz, 2 F.4th 42, 52 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 416
(2d Cir. 2010) (noting that a “clearly erroneous factual finding” is an
abuse of discretion).
Moreover, even if a district court had found that an LEA
unreasonably protracted the proceedings, 3 Subparagraph G would
3 In M.H.’s case, the district court did not determine whether the New York
City Department of Education unreasonably protracted the proceedings.
See M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 20-CV-1923, 2021 WL 4804031, at *25
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2021) (“It is less clear that the Department’s
disorganization and unpreparedness protracted the final resolution in the
sense of making the proceedings ‘prolonged,’ or longer than what would
ordinarily be needed for the conclusion of the proceedings.”). But the
district court concluded that, even if the Department had done so, that
13
not prohibit that district court from reducing the fees requested. That
is because the IDEA authorizes an award only of “reasonable
attorneys’ fees,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (emphasis added), and the
IDEA further provides that those fees must be “based on rates
prevailing in the community,” id. at § 1415(i)(3)(C). If an LEA
unreasonably protracts the proceedings—thereby triggering
Subparagraph G—the mandatory reductions found in Subparagraph
F would not apply, but the district court still would need to ensure
that the fees awarded are reasonable and based on prevailing rates in
accordance with § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) and § 1415(i)(3)(C). The district
court would not be free to award an unreasonable fee that a party
requests. We agree with those circuits that have held that when a
district court finds that the LEA unreasonably protracted proceedings
the statute still requires the district court to conduct a lodestar
calculation. See Somberg ex rel. Somberg v. Utica Cmty. Schs., 908 F.3d
162, 181 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that Subparagraph G “does not
mandate that the district court abandon its discretion to ensure that
fees are reasonable”); accord Williams ex rel. Williams v. Fulton Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 717 F. App’x 913, 917 (11th Cir. 2017).
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court in each
case did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorneys’ fees. We
affirm the judgments—except as noted below with respect to
No. 21-1961, M.D. v. New York City Department of Education.
II
CLF argues on appeal that the district courts should have
awarded prejudgment interest here. But “[i]n a suit to enforce a
“would not entitle CLF to more than a reasonable attorney’s fee” because
“the plain language of the statute” authorizes only reasonable attorneys’
fees. Id.14
federal right, the question of whether or not to award prejudgment
interest is ordinarily left to the discretion of the district court.”
Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 873 (2d Cir. 1998). The district
courts that declined to award prejudgment interest did not abuse
their discretion because “delay[s] in payment” may be remedied by
“application of current rather than historic hourly rates.” Missouri v.
Jenkins ex rel. Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989); see M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Educ., No. 20-CV-1923, 2021 WL 4804031, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13,
2021) (“The Court thus concludes that in IDEA cases, as in other fee-
shifting contexts, the Court should take into account ‘delay’ by using
current rates in calculating a ‘reasonable’ attorneys’ fee.”).
We note that district courts may award prejudgment interest
under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). In interpreting the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Supreme
Court explained that “an enhancement for delay in payment is, where
appropriate, part of a ‘reasonable attorney’s fee’” and that “an
appropriate adjustment for delay in payment—whether by the
application of current rather than historic hourly rates or otherwise—
is within the contemplation of the statute.” Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 282, 284(emphasis added). The same considerations apply to fee awards
under the IDEA.
For these reasons, we will not disturb the district courts’
decisions with respect to prejudgment interest.
III
C.S. and S.S. contend that the district court erred when it failed
to specify an entitlement to post-judgment interest in its judgment
awarding attorney fees. “Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, ‘the award of
post-judgment interest is mandatory on awards in civil cases as of the
date judgment is entered.’” Tru-Art Sign Co. v. Loc. 137 Sheet Metal
15
Workers Int’l Ass’n, 852 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 2017) (alteration omitted)
(quoting Lewis v. Whelan, 99 F.3d 542, 545 (2d Cir. 1996)). For that
reason, we understand the district court’s order to include post-
judgment interest on the awarded fees and costs. We affirm the
judgment based on that understanding.
IV
Separately, M.H. contends that the New York City Department
of Education (“DOE”) violated the impartial hearing officer’s order
and that she was entitled to equitable relief. See M.H. Br. 20. We affirm
the district court’s dismissal of M.H.’s claims for equitable relief
because the DOE has complied with the order: (1) the DOE has paid
the invoices for all applied behavior analysis provided to M.H.; (2) as
required, the DOE developed a new individualized education
program (“IEP”) that placed the student in a non-public school that
provides applied behavior analysis services; (3) there was no
requirement that the IEP reference home-based applied behavior
analysis and it is undisputed that there are no outstanding invoices
for such services; (4) at the time of the complaint, M.H. had not chosen
a provider for the occupational therapy services and the order
requires the DOE to fund such services at the parent’s chosen
provider; and (5) the DOE confirmed that parent counseling and
training services hours were outstanding and that it would pay for
such services once M.H. had chosen a provider.
16
V
Last, CLF claims that the district court erred in denying it fees
for time spent traveling to the administrative hearing for M.D. 4 We
agree.
The district court abused its discretion when it denied any
travel-related fees to M.D.’s counsel. The district court reasoned that
no fee award for time attributable to travel was warranted because it
was “doubtful that a reasonable client would retain an Auburn or
Ithaca attorney over a New York City attorney if it meant paying New
York City rates and an additional five hours in billable time for each
trip.” M.D. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 20-CV-06060, 2021 WL
3030053, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2021) (quoting K.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Educ., No. 10-CV-5465, 2011 WL 3586142, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,
2011)). A district court may permissibly adjust excessive travel costs—
as many did in these cases. But the district court could not
“eliminate[] all of the hours submitted by [CLF] as travel time” by
denying travel-related fees altogether. Cruz v. Loc. Union No. 3 of Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1161 (2d Cir. 1994). We reverse the
denial of travel-related fees, and we remand with instructions to
award attorneys’ fees for two hours of travel time at the hourly rate
the district court otherwise applied of $375, for a total of $750 in
4 CLF also requested $245 in transportation costs for mileage and parking
related to counsel’s attendance at the administrative hearing. The district
court regarded that request as unreasonable because “[l]ocal counsel
attending a hearing in New York City would likely take public transit, some
sort of commuter rail, or a short car ride.” M.D. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 20-CV-06060, 2021 WL 3030053, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2021). The
district court concluded that a “reasonable reimbursement” for such travel
costs is “$50 each way, for a total of $100.” Id. CLF does not challenge that
award on appeal.
17
travel-related fees. M.D., 2021 WL 3030053, at *6; see also J.R., 2021 WL
3406370, at *6 (awarding two hours of travel time); D.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
of Educ., No. 21-CV-27, 2022 WL 103536, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2022)
(same). We otherwise affirm.
* * *
We have considered the appellants’ remaining arguments,
which we conclude are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we
reverse the district court’s denial of travel-related fees in No. 21-1961
and remand for further proceedings. We otherwise affirm the
judgments of the district courts.
18