Khan v. Yale Univ.

21-95
Khan v. Yale Univ.
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
AUGUST TERM 2021
No. 21-95-cv
SAIFULLAH KHAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
YALE UNIVERSITY, PETER SALOVEY, JONATHON HALLOWAY, MARVIN
CHUN, JOE GORDON, DAVID POST, MARK SOLOMON, ANN KUHLMAN,
LYNN COOLEY, PAUL GENECIN, STEPHANIE SPANGLER, SARAH DEMERS,
CAROLE GOLDBERG, UNKNOWN PERSONS,
Defendants,
&
JANE DOE,
Defendant-Appellee. *
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut
__________
ARGUED: OCTOBER 29, 2021
DECIDED: OCTOBER 25, 2023
__________
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption
as set forth above.
Before: LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, KEARSE, and RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
________________
Plaintiff appeals from a partial final judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Dooley, J.)
dismissing his Connecticut state law claims for defamation and
tortious interference with contract against defendant, who accused
plaintiff of sexual assault in 2015 while the two were students at Yale
University. Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in finding
(1) defendant to enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity for
statements made at the 2018 Yale disciplinary hearing that resulted in
plaintiff’s expulsion from the university, and (2) plaintiff’s tortious
interference claims based on defendant’s original 2015 accusations to
be untimely. On preliminary review, this court was unable to
determine whether Connecticut would recognize the Yale
disciplinary hearing at issue as a quasi-judicial proceeding
supporting absolute immunity in this case. Accordingly, we certified
questions pertinent to that determination to the Connecticut Supreme
Court. See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th 805, 833–34 (2d Cir. 2022). That
court has now responded that absolute immunity does not apply in
this case because Yale’s disciplinary hearing was not a quasi-judicial
proceeding in that it lacked procedural safeguards—e.g., an oath
requirement, cross-examination, the ability to call witnesses,
meaningful assistance of counsel, an adequate record for appeal—
associated with judicial proceedings. See Khan v. Yale Univ., 347 Conn.
1, 295 A.3d 855 (2023). While the Connecticut Supreme Court
recognized the possibility for participants in such a hearing to be
shielded by qualified immunity, the Court concluded that defendant
is not presently entitled to dismissal on that ground because plaintiff’s
complaint sufficiently pleads the malice necessary to defeat such
immunity. With this guidance as to Connecticut law, we conclude on
2
this appeal that plaintiff’s complaint should not have been dismissed
against defendant except as to his tortious interference claim based on
2015 statements, which is untimely.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
CAMERON LEE ATKINSON (Norman A. Pattis,
on the brief), The Pattis Law Firm, LLC, New
Haven, CT, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
JAMES M. SCONZO (Brendan N. Gooley, on
the brief), Carlton Fields, P.A., Hartford, CT,
for Defendant-Appellee.
REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Saifullah Khan, formerly a student at Yale University,
sues Yale, various of its named employees, and former Yale student
“Jane Doe” under federal and state law for injuries sustained as a
result of actions taken by Yale—including suspension and,
eventually, expulsion—after Doe accused Khan of on-campus rape in
2015. 1 Khan now appeals from a February 9, 2021 partial final
judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut (Kari A. Dooley, Judge), which dismissed his Connecticut
state law claims against Doe for defamation and tortious interference
with his education contract with Yale. Khan’s dismissed claims are
based on Doe’s initial 2015 rape accusations and on her 2018
1While Doe’s real name is known to the parties, for reasons stated earlier by this
panel, we refer to her pseudonymously in this opinion. See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27
F.4th 805, 809 n.1 (2d Cir. 2022).
3
repetition of those accusations at a Yale disciplinary hearing
conducted by five members of Yale’s University-Wide Committee on
Sexual Misconduct (“UWC”).2 The district court concluded that
absolute immunity shields Doe from liability based on her 2018
statements because Yale’s UWC hearing was a quasi-judicial
proceeding. See Khan v. Yale Univ., 511 F. Supp. 3d 213, 219–26
(D. Conn. 2021). It concluded that claims based on Doe’s 2015
statements are untimely. See id. at 226–28. Khan argues that the
district court erred (1) in affording Doe absolute immunity for
statements made in a non-governmental proceeding, and (2) in failing
to recognize that his tortious interference claim stated a timely
continuing violation. 3
On initial review, this court determined that both Khan’s
challenges depend on whether Doe was correctly afforded absolute
judicial immunity for her 2018 statements at the Yale UWC hearing.
See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th 805 (2d Cir. 2022). The answer to that
question turns on Connecticut law, which we found not to speak
clearly on the matter. See id. at 818–28. Accordingly, we certified
2See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th at 814–16 (discussing Yale’s Sexual Misconduct
Policy).
3 Khan does not—and cannot—argue that the continuing course of conduct
doctrine permits him to sue Doe for defamation based on her 2015 statements. See
Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Jane Doe Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 5 (disavowing such
argument), Khan v. Yale Univ., No. 19-cv-1966 (D. Conn. June 2, 2020), Dkt. No. 31;
Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chem. Co., 267 Conn. 210, 224, 837 A.2d 759 (2004) (ruling that
statute of limitations for defamation claim begins on “date of publication” and
“new cause of action arises with each publication”); Watson v. Wheeler Clinic, Inc.,
No. 21-cv-503, 2022 WL 2916825, at *13 (D. Conn. July 25, 2022) (“Because each
alleged defamatory statement constitutes a separate cause of action, Connecticut
courts have declined to apply the continuing course of conduct doctrine to
defamation claims.” (brackets and citation omitted)).
4
pertinent questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court. See id. at 833–
34. 4
4 Our certified questions asked as follows:
1. Under Connecticut law, can a proceeding before a non-government
entity ever be deemed quasi-judicial for purposes of affording
absolute immunity to proceeding participants?
2. If the answer to the first question is “yes,” what requirements must
be satisfied for a non-government proceeding to be recognized as
quasi-judicial? Specifically,
a. Must an entity apply controlling law, and not simply its
own rules, to facts at issue in the proceeding? See Petyan v.
Ellis, 200 Conn. [243,] 246, 510 A.2d 1337 [(1986)]; see also
W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser &
Keeton on Law of Torts § 114, at 818–19 (5th ed. 1984).
b. How, if at all, do the “power” factors enumerated in Kelley
v. Bonney, 221 Conn. [549], 567, 606 A.2d 693 [(1992)], and
Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. [78], 85, 856
A.2d 372 [(2004)], apply to the identification of a non-
government entity as quasi-judicial; and, if they do apply,
are these factors “in addition” to, id., or independent of, a
preliminary law-to-fact requirement?
c. How, if at all, does public policy inform the identification of
a non-government entity as quasi-judicial and, if it does, is
this consideration in addition to, or independent of, a law-
to-fact requirement and the enumerated Kelley/Craig
factors?
d. How, if at all, do procedures usually associated with
traditional judicial proceedings—such as notice and the
opportunity to be heard; the ability to be physically present
throughout a proceeding; an oath requirement; the ability
to call, examine, confront, and cross-examine witnesses; the
ability to be represented by counsel—inform the
identification of a proceeding as quasi-judicial? See Craig v.
5
Accepting certification, the Connecticut Supreme Court has
now responded to our queries. See Khan v. Yale Univ., 347 Conn. 1,
295 A.3d 855 (2023). In a carefully reasoned and thorough opinion,
the Connecticut Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the Yale
UWC hearing at issue is not a quasi-judicial proceeding because it
lacked a significant number of procedural safeguards—e.g., an oath
requirement, cross-examination, the ability to call witnesses,
meaningful assistance of counsel, an adequate record for appeal—
that in judicial proceedings ensure reliability and promote
fundamental fairness. See id. at 36–48. Thus, the Court held that
absolute quasi-judicial immunity does not shield Doe in this action.
See id. at 48. While the Court recognized the possibility of qualified
immunity for participants in the sort of hearing here at issue, it
concluded that Doe is not presently entitled to dismissal on that
ground because Khan’s complaint sufficiently pleads the malice
necessary to defeat qualified immunity. See id. at 48–57.
With the benefit of this clarification of Connecticut law, we can
now resolve this appeal. Because Doe’s 2018 statements are not
Stafford Const., Inc., 271 Conn. at 87–88, 856 A.2d 372; Kelley
v. Bonney, 221 Conn. at 568–70, 606 A.2d 693.
3. If it is possible under Connecticut law to identify a non-government
proceeding as quasi-judicial, then, in light of responses to the above
questions, was the 2018 Yale University UWC proceeding at issue
on this appeal properly recognized as quasi-judicial?
4. If the answer to Question 3 is “yes,” would Connecticut extend
absolute quasi-judicial immunity to defendant Jane Doe for her
statements in that UWC proceeding?
5. If the answer to Question 3 is “no,” would Connecticut afford
defendant Jane Doe qualified immunity or no immunity at all?
Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th at 833–34.
6
shielded at the pleading stage by either absolute or qualified
immunity, we vacate the judgment of dismissal insofar as Khan’s
defamation and tortious interference claims are based on these
statements. Insofar as Khan’s tortious interference claim is based on
Doe’s 2015 statements, we affirm based on timeliness. In explaining
these decisions, we assume familiarity with the facts and procedural
history detailed in our certification opinion.
DISCUSSION
I. Neither Absolute nor Qualified Immunity Warrants
Dismissal of Khan’s Claims Based on Doe’s 2018 Statements
at Yale’s UWC Hearing
The Connecticut Supreme Court’s Responses to Our
Certified Questions
Our certified questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court
sought guidance as to whether that state’s law would afford Doe
immunity—absolute or qualified—for claims based on her 2018
statements at Yale’s UWC hearing. See supra Note 4. In certifying
questions of state law to a state’s highest court, we routinely afford
that court considerable discretion in construing and responding to
our questions. Consistent with this practice, our certification opinion
in this case states that “the Connecticut Supreme Court may modify
or expand these certified questions or address any other issues of
Connecticut law pertinent to this appeal.” Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th
at 834. Thus, the Connecticut Supreme Court deemed it sufficient to
answer only the second, third, and fifth of our questions, with some
7
modifications. We agree that these responses suffice for us to decide
this appeal. 5
Before addressing our particular questions, the Connecticut
Supreme Court identified two public policy interests informing all its
responses. It is useful to identify these at the outset. The first policy
is solicitous of sexual assault victims:
[T]he public policy of this state, established through
General Statutes § 10a-55m, demonstrates that sexual
assault at institutions of higher education must be
addressed by encouraging and supporting alleged
victims of sexual assault to speak out, to vindicate their
rights, and to bring the perpetrators to justice if the
allegations are proven. Likewise, the remedial powers of
our judicial system must not be used as a means of
intimidation to enable the perpetrators of sexual assault
to silence their accusers by using the threat of civil
litigation and liability for damages.
Khan v. Yale Univ., 347 Conn. at 9 (footnote omitted). The second
policy seeks to ensure “fundamental fairness” to “those accused of
crimes, especially as serious a crime as sexual assault.” Id. The
Connecticut Supreme Court explained as follows:
Statements made in sexual misconduct disciplinary
proceedings that are offered and accepted without
5The Court’s negative response to our third question rendered the fourth question
moot. And, as the Connecticut Supreme Court observed, answering the first
question directly is “unnecessary . . . to resolve whether Yale’s UWC proceeding
was quasi-judicial.” Khan v. Yale Univ., 347 Conn. at 18–19. Rather, that Court
appears to have concluded that, even assuming an affirmative answer to our first
question, i.e., even if some non-governmental proceedings might be deemed quasi-
judicial for purposes of affording absolute immunity to proceeding participants,
no such conclusion obtains for the Yale UWC hearing here at issue.
8
adequate procedural safeguards carry too great a risk of
unfair or unreliable outcomes. There is no benefit to
society or the administration of fair and impartial
disciplinary hearings in granting absolute immunity to
those who make intentionally false and malicious
accusations of sexual assault. Those accused of sexual
assault in the higher education context often face life
altering and stigmatizing consequences, including
suspension or expulsion, criminal referrals, lack or
revocation of employment offers, loss of future academic
opportunity, and deportation. In the face of these
consequences, we must acknowledge that the accused’s
right to fundamental fairness is no less important than
the right of the accuser or the larger community to
achieve justice. Disciplinary proceedings that lack
fundamental procedural safeguards do not adequately
protect a critical public policy undergirding the doctrine
of absolute immunity—to encourage robust
participation in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings
while providing some deterrent against malicious
falsehoods.
Id. at 9–10 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
1. The Second and Third Certified Questions
Striving “[t]o balance and protect both of the aforementioned
interests,” id. at 10, the Connecticut Supreme Court provided the
following general response to our multi-layered second question. 6 A
proceeding is quasi-judicial “only” when it satisfies four
requirements: the proceeding (1) “is specifically authorized by law,”
6 Our second question generally asked the Connecticut Supreme Court, “what
requirements must be satisfied for a non-government proceeding to be recognized
as quasi-judicial,” before asking about a series of possible requirements. See supra
Note 4.
9
(2) “applies law to fact in an adjudicatory manner,” (3) “contains
adequate procedural safeguards,” and (4) “is supported by a public
policy encouraging absolute immunity for proceeding participants.”
Id. The Court then proceeded to expand on these requirements and,
in response to our third certified question, to rule as to whether the
Yale UWC hearing at issue satisfied them. 7
a. The “Authorized by Law” Requirement
As to the threshold requirement that a quasi-judicial
proceeding be “specifically authorized by law,” the Connecticut
Supreme Court explained that this requires the proceeding to be
“governed by or conducted pursuant to a state or federal statute.” Id.
at 21. This requirement is consistent with the public purpose
underlying absolute immunity, which “is intended to be a public
benefit and a societal necessity,” rather than an individual right. Id.
at 22. The Court concluded that the Yale UWC hearing at issue “was
specifically authorized” by Connecticut General Statutes § 10a-55m,
which “requires each Connecticut institution of higher education to
adopt policies regarding sexual assault,” including “investigation
and disciplinary proceedings” conducted according to “procedures
and substantive requirements . . . governed by state law.” Id. at 36–
37. 8 Having found Yale’s UWC hearing specifically authorized by
7See supra Note 4 (asking whether, in light of responses to our requirements
question, “the 2018 Yale University UWC proceeding at issue on this appeal [was]
properly recognized as quasi-judicial”).
8 See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th at 813–14 (taking judicial notice of § 10a-55m).
10
state law, the Court deemed it unnecessary to decide whether the
hearing was also authorized by federal law. See id. at 37 n.27. 9
b. The “Application of Law to Fact in an
Adjudicatory Manner” Requirement
The Connecticut Supreme Court then linked the first and
second requirements, stating that “the entity conducting a quasi-
judicial proceeding must apply public law—whether it be
constitutional, statutory, administrative, municipal, or common
law—to facts for the purpose of rendering an adjudicatory decision.“
Id. at 26. An entity that “creates and applies only its internal policies
lacks the necessary components of public participation and approval
to be considered quasi-judicial for the purpose of affording
participants absolute immunity.” Id. 10
In applying this requirement to the Yale UWC hearing at issue,
the Connecticut Supreme Court noted the parties’ disagreement as to
whether the hearing panel applied public law, or only university
policies, in making its expulsion recommendation. See id. at 38 n.28.
It also expressed its own “doubts” as to the UWC panel’s “power to
apply law to fact” or to “function[] in an adjudicatory manner.” Id.
(noting panel’s authority to recommend sanction, but not to make
final decision). The Court found it unnecessary to pursue these
matters, however, explaining that “even if” it were to find the second
requirement satisfied, the Yale UWC hearing could not be deemed
9See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th at 812–13 & n.7, 822–23 & n.23 (outlining changing
Title IX guidance in and around 2018 and discussing manner in which Title IX
might authorize Yale UWC proceeding).
10This effectively answered our certified question 2.a. in the affirmative. See supra
Note 4 (“Must an entity apply controlling law, and not simply its own rules, to
facts at issue in the proceeding [for the proceeding to be deemed quasi-judicial]?”).
11
quasi-judicial because it lacked the “adequate procedural safeguards”
demanded by the third requirement. Id. at 38.
c. The “Procedural Safeguards”
Requirement
The Connecticut Supreme Court devoted the longest part of its
opinion to discussing the procedural-safeguards requirement for a
quasi-judicial proceeding and to explaining why the Yale UWC
hearing failed this requirement. 11 Citing its recent decision in Priore
v. Haig, 344 Conn. 636, 280 A.3d 402 (2022)—decided soon after our
certification opinion—the Connecticut Supreme Court reiterated that
for a proceeding to be recognized as quasi-judicial, “there must be
sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure reliability and to promote
fundamental fairness.” Khan v. Yale Univ., 347 Conn. at 27–30, 33. The
Court identified the following safeguards as significant to this
purpose: (1) a requirement for declarants to make “statements under
oath or otherwise certify that the information is true and correct,” id.
at 28 (emphasis added); (2) “the opportunity for parties to
meaningfully challenge the veracity of participants’ statements,
whether through cross-examination or other comparable means,” id. at
29 (emphasis added); (3) “notice to the accused,” id. at 30 (emphasis
added); (4) “the opportunity for parties to call witnesses or otherwise
have them subpoenaed,” id. at 31 (emphasis added); (5) “the
11This responded to our certified question 2.d, see supra Note 4 (“How, if at all, do
procedures usually associated with judicial proceedings—such as notice and the
opportunity to be heard; the ability to be physically present throughout a
proceeding; an oath requirement; the ability to call, examine, confront, and cross-
examine witnesses; the ability to be represented by counsel—inform the
identification of a proceeding as quasi-judicial?”), and to certified question 3, see
id. (asking whether, in light of responses to our requirements question, “the 2018
Yale University UWC proceeding at issue on this appeal [was] properly
recognized as quasi-judicial”).
12
opportunity for counsel to be present and meaningfully assist their
client during the proceeding,” id. at 31–32 (emphases added); and
(6) the “right to appeal the adjudicator’s decision,” which “requires
that an adequate record of the proceeding be available,” id. at 32–33
(emphases added). The Court did “not maintain that all of these
procedural features are required for . . . recognition of a quasi-judicial
proceeding”; rather, it held that “the collective absence of such
features militates against a determination that the proceeding had
adequate safeguards to ensure reliability and promote fundamental
fairness” as necessary for a proceeding to be deemed quasi-judicial.
Id. at 39.
Finding that Yale’s UWC hearing lacked five of the six
identified procedural safeguards—i.e., all but notice—the Court
concluded that the “proceeding . . . did not qualify as quasi-judicial
for purposes of absolute immunity.” Id. at 46. 12
(1) Oath Requirement
With particular reference to an oath (or certification)
requirement, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated that “it is
important for any declarant receiving absolute immunity to make the
statements under oath or otherwise certify that the information is true
12In reaching this conclusion, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered Khan’s
“complaint and all the documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in
the complaint by reference, including the UWC procedures.” Khan v. Yale Univ.,
347 Conn. at 38. Further, “in light of the procedural posture in which this case
reache[d] [it]”—i.e., on a motion to dismiss Khan’s complaint—the Court
acknowledged its “oblig[ation] to accept the factual allegations as true and to draw
all inferences in Khan’s favor.” Id. This court similarly views the record on appeal.
See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th at 810 (stating our obligation to accept as true facts
drawn from Khan’s complaint, documents incorporated therein, and materials
subject to judicial notice, but evincing “no views” as to whether such facts are
actually true (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13
and correct because, without doing so, there is no judicial remedy
available to deter a witness from giving false information.” Id. at 28
(citing Priore v. Haig, 344 Conn. at 655). The Court explained that
“[b]ecause absolute immunity removes the threat of private
defamation actions in order to incentivize witnesses to participate
candidly and willingly in the proceeding, it is crucial that there be
some strong deterrent, such as the threat of a perjury prosecution,
against abuse of the privilege by the giving of untruthful testimony.”
Id. at 28–29.
The Court found the Yale UWC hearing at issue to have lacked
such a deterrent. Yale’s UWC procedures did not require hearing
participants to “testify under oath, provide sworn statements, or
certify to the truth of their statements.” Id. at 39. Rather, the “only
protection” against false statements in UWC proceedings was “the
threat” of “a more severe [UWC] penalty or a referral for [university]
discipline.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court
noted, Doe presumably could not have been subjected to such
consequences because she had graduated from Yale by the time the
UWC hearing took place. See id. 13 The Court concluded that “[t]he
failure of the UWC to place Doe under oath or otherwise have her
certify to the truth of her statements, subject to a penalty for
untruthfulness, undermined the reliability of [her] statements,”
which, in turn, “significantly weaken[ed] Doe’s contention that the
UWC proceeding is quasi-judicial.” Id. at 39–40.
This court had raised similar concerns with respect to this aspect of the Yale
13
UWC hearing. See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th at 823.
14
(2) Meaningful Cross-Examination
The Connecticut Supreme Court similarly characterized “[t]he
opportunity to meaningfully cross-examine adverse witnesses [a]s
vitally important to the truth seeking function” and “necessary if a
university’s disciplinary proceeding is to be considered quasi-
judicial.” Id. at 41. See generally id. at 29 (observing that “[f]or two
centuries, common-law judges and lawyers have regarded the
opportunity of cross-examination as an essential safeguard of the
accuracy and completeness of testimony” (brackets and citation
omitted)). The Court explained that “[m]eaningful cross-examination
allows for witness testimony to be challenged in real time, whether in
person or through advanced video technology that allows for instant
two-way communication and follow-up questions.” Id. at 42. In so
holding, the Court acknowledged that “[a]llowing for confrontation
of an accuser while still preventing abusive questioning is no doubt a
difficult balance to strike.” Id. Nevertheless, it ruled that
“fundamental fairness requires some measure of meaningful cross-
examination” to deem a proceeding quasi-judicial. Id. at 42–43.
The Connecticut Supreme Court determined that Yale’s UWC
procedures did not afford Khan or his attorney an opportunity to
engage in “live, real-time cross-examination of witnesses.” Id. at 40.
Instead, these procedures required that Khan and his attorney be
excluded from the hearing room when Doe appeared (on video) and
allowed them only “to submit questions,” which the UWC panel
could pose or not in its “sole discretion.” Id. at 40, 42. 14 The Court
held that such procedures “hampered Khan’s ability to ask legitimate
14This court had also expressed concern with these aspects of Yale’s UWC hearing.
See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th at 823.
15
questions or to sequence questions in a way he believed would test
the veracity of Doe’s testimony at the hearing,” and thereby “denied
[him] a fundamental procedural protection essential to quasi-judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 42–43.
(3) Ability To Call Witnesses
Collecting precedent, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated
that “the ability of the entity conducting the proceeding to subpoena
witnesses, or procedures that allow parties to call their own witnesses
to testify, are procedural safeguards common to quasi-judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 31 (citation omitted). The Court noted that this
“basic tenet of procedural fairness” found support in the Connecticut
law authorizing Yale’s sexual assault disciplinary proceedings. Id. at
43; see id. at 43–44 (quoting Connecticut General Statutes § 10a-
55m(b)(6)(C)(ii) as requiring institutions of higher learning to adopt
procedures that, among other things, clearly state that students
responding to sexual assault report “shall have the opportunity to present
evidence and witnesses on their behalf during any disciplinary
proceeding” (emphasis added by the Connecticut Supreme Court)).
Nevertheless, the Court determined that Yale’s UWC procedures “did
not provide the parties a reasonable opportunity to call witnesses.”
Id. at 43. Insofar as these procedures “allowed parties to request that
the UWC hearing panel call witnesses to testify, [they] provided no
standards regarding whether the panel would in fact call or interview
them.” Id. The Court concluded that by not allowing counsel to call
witnesses and by affording the UWC hearing panel “sole discretion”
to “reject witnesses recommended by Khan,” Yale had “deprived
Khan of a fair opportunity to present a defense,” which did “not
comport with the protections typical of quasi-judicial proceedings.”
Id. at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16
(4) Assistance of Counsel
The Connecticut Supreme Court recognized “the opportunity
for counsel to be present and meaningfully assist their client” during
a proceeding as “an important safeguard that helps to identify” the
proceeding as “quasi-judicial.” Id. at 31–32; see id. at 45 (emphasizing
importance of “active” assistance of counsel “during a quasi-judicial
proceeding . . . to ensure the procedural and evidentiary fairness of a
judicial proceeding”). The Court explained that the active assistance
of counsel “serves to protect the parties from unfair or improper
procedures and provides a means by which parties may effectively
defend themselves.” Id. at 32. The Court deemed such “active
assistance . . . especially important” in settings like Yale’s UWC
hearing, where “the accused or accuser may lack experience with self-
advocacy or representing his or her interests in an adversarial process
that involves significant consequences for the individual parties.” Id.
at 45. Thus, it ruled that “[l]imitations on counsel’s assistance”
properly “bear on whether the proceeding is quasi-judicial.” Id.
The Court found that Yale’s UWC procedures “materially
limited the assistance of counsel throughout the hearing” at issue. Id.
at 44. While those procedures permitted Khan to be “accompanied
by an adviser” at the UWC hearing—in this case, an attorney—they
prohibited counsel “from speaking on Khan’s behalf [at the hearing],
objecting to evidence, examining Khan’s accusers, and submitting
documents to the UWC panel.” Id. at 44–45 (internal quotation marks
omitted). 15 The Court ruled that such “restrictions . . . on counsel’s
15See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th at 823 (noting similar concerns with Yale’s UWC
hearing process).
17
participation in the proceeding support the conclusion that the
proceeding was not quasi-judicial.” Id. at 45.
(5) Adequate Record for Appeal
The Connecticut Supreme Court observed that “a party’s right
to a meaningful appeal, which requires an adequate record of the
proceeding,” is “an important procedural safeguard to ensure that
facts were properly found and that law was appropriately applied.”
Id. at 33. Thus, in deciding “whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial in
nature,” a court properly considers the availability of both a right to
appeal and a record adequate to the meaningful exercise of that right.
Id.; see id. at 46 (stating that “maintenance of a transcript or record is
critical and a key feature of any quasi-judicial proceeding”).
When it did so here, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded
that Yale’s UWC procedures “limited a party’s ability to seek review
of the UWC panel’s decision because it failed to establish an adequate
record of the proceedings.” Id. at 45. While procedures require the
UWC secretary to “keep minutes” of its meeting and “a record of all
the actions and reports filed,” those same procedures “explicitly
provide that the minutes do not record statements, testimony, or
questions.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, “[t]he UWC panel specifically denied Khan’s request that it
make a transcript or other electronic recording of the hearing for the
purpose of further review.” Id. at 45–46. 16 Thus, the Court concluded
that “Khan’s ability to appeal was severely constrained by the absence
of any transcript or recording of statements, testimony, or questions
raised during the UWC hearing.” Id. at 46. Indeed, the Court found
16See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th at 816 n.13 (noting no transcript prepared as part
of UWC hearing process).
18
the restriction “especially prejudicial” when considered together with
counsel’s inability to voice objections during the hearing. Id.
In sum, because the Yale UWC hearing at issue “lacked
adequate procedural safeguards to ensure the reliability of the
statements made,” as would be employed at a judicial proceeding, the
Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the hearing “did not qualify as
quasi-judicial for purposes of absolute immunity.” Id. 17
d. The Kelley Factors
Before discussing the final public-policy requirement for a
quasi-judicial proceeding, the Connecticut Supreme Court provided
a brief response to our certified question 2.b. about how factors
enumerated in Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. at 567, properly inform the
identification of a proceeding as quasi-judicial. 18 The Court held that
the Kelley factors “are in addition to, not in lieu of“ the identified
17 While the Court’s decision was grounded in state law, it noted that its
procedural-safeguards requirement for a quasi-judicial proceeding was not
unique to that law. Rather, the requirement also found “support in the decisions
of other courts.” Id. at 46–48 (collecting cases).
18See supra Note 4 (“How, if at all, do the ‘power’ factors enumerated in Kelley v.
Bonney, 221 Conn. at 567, 606 A.2d 693, and Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271
Conn. at 85, 856 A.2d 372, apply to the identification of a non-government entity
as quasi-judicial; and if they do apply, are these factors ‘in addition’ to, id., or
independent of, a preliminary law-to-fact requirement?”). The Kelley factors ask
whether the body conducting the proceedings at issue had the power to
“(1) exercise judgment and discretion; (2) hear and determine or . . . ascertain facts
and decide; (3) make binding orders and judgments; (4) affect the personal or
property rights of private persons; (5) examine witnesses and hear the litigation of
the issues on a hearing; and (6) enforce decisions or impose penalties.” Khan v.
Yale Univ., 347 Conn. at 34 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)
(summarizing Kelley factors).
19
requirements for a quasi-judicial proceeding. Khan v. Yale Univ., 347
Conn. at 34. Thus, “a court should consider the Kelley factors but need
not conclude that they are dispositive.” Id. Because the factors did
not play a role in the Connecticut Supreme Court’s determination that
the Yale UWC hearing at issue was not a quasi-judicial proceeding,
we do not discuss them further.
e. The “Public Policy” Requirement
As for its final requirement for a quasi-judicial proceeding
affording absolute immunity, the Connecticut Supreme Court
reiterated what it had recently said in Priore: “courts must always
carefully scrutinize whether there is a sound public policy
justification for the application of absolute immunity in any particular
context.” Id. at 35 (quoting Priore v. Haig, 344 Conn. at 653). 19 That
task generally requires balancing “the public interest of encouraging
public participation and candor, on the one hand, and the private
interest of protecting individuals from false and malicious statements,
on the other.” Id. (quoting Priore v. Haig, 344 Conn. at 652). In doing
so, however, a court must be mindful that absolute immunity is
“strong medicine.” Id. (quoting Priore v. Haig, 344 Conn. at 652). Thus,
it is properly “reserved for those situations in which the public
interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of
expression without inquiry into a speaker’s motives.” Id. (brackets
omitted) (quoting Priore v. Haig, 344 Conn. at 663).
The Court did not pursue this point, however, because, as it
further explained, public policy support is always necessary, but not
19This responded to our certified question 2.c. See supra Note 4 (“How, if at all,
does public policy inform the identification of a non-government entity as quasi-
judicial and, if it does, is this consideration in addition to, or independent of, a law-
to-fact requirement and the enumerated Kelley/Craig factors?”).
20
by itself sufficient, for identifying a proceeding as quasi-judicial so as
to afford absolute immunity. In making this point, the Court stated:
Even if an entity applies law to facts in a proceeding with
adequate procedural safeguards, the proceeding is not
quasi-judicial if there is no discernable public policy
supporting absolute immunity for proceeding
participants. Likewise, public policy alone will not
justify affording absolute immunity to proceeding
participants if the proceeding is devoid of the basic,
fundamental procedural protections inherent in judicial
and quasi-judicial proceedings. Rather, a proceeding is
quasi-judicial if, in addition to satisfying the indicia of an
official judicial proceeding [as reflected in the three
requirements discussed earlier in the opinion] public
policy favors providing absolute immunity for
proceeding participants.
Id. at 35–36.
Thus, the Connecticut Supreme Court did not need to decide
conclusively whether a sufficiently strong public policy supported
affording absolute immunity to participants in Yale’s UWC hearing
because, in any event, and for reasons discussed supra at 12–19, the
Court had held that hearing to fail the procedural-safeguards
requirement for a quasi-judicial proceeding.
2. The Fifth Certified Question
In our fifth certified question, we asked the Connecticut
Supreme Court whether, absent absolute immunity, Doe might be
21
afforded qualified immunity in this case. 20 In response to this
question—apparently one of first impression under Connecticut
law—the Court held that qualified immunity could shield
participants in university or college sexual misconduct hearings.
Nevertheless, it concluded that Doe was not entitled to such a shield
at the pleading stage of this action because Khan had satisfactorily
pleaded malice. See id. at 49–57.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court explained that “[u]nlike
absolute immunity, which provides a blanket protection for a
speaker’s false statements, a qualified privilege protects only those
allegedly defamatory statements that are not made maliciously.” Id.
at 49. In general, “a qualified privilege is appropriate when the
legitimate public or private interest underlying the publication of the
statements [at issue] outweighs the important reputational interests
of the individual” about whom the statements are made. Id. at 50; see
id. at 52 (noting precedent providing “qualified privilege to
individuals reporting crimes to the police”).
In calibrating that balance here, the Court expanded on its
earlier discussion of the competing interests of victim and accused in
college and university sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings.
See supra at 8–9. Specifically, the Court located in various Connecticut
laws “a strong public commitment” to encouraging “victims of sexual
assault on college and university campuses . . . to report claims of
sexual violence.” Id. at 54 (citing provisions of Connecticut law). It
observed that the ”fear of retaliation” that made some victims hesitant
to report sexual assaults “would undoubtedly be compounded if
20See supra Note 4 (asking, if the Yale UWC hearing at issue was not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, “would Connecticut afford defendant Jane Doe qualified immunity
or no immunity at all?”).
22
victims had to worry that any report they made could also be the
subject of a defamation suit.” Id. at 52. Thus, the Court concluded
that qualified immunity was well suited to this context because at the
same time that it “encourages victims of sexual assault to speak
candidly with university officials and to report abuse by immunizing
their good-faith reports,” it provides plaintiffs accused of such
assaults “with an opportunity to overcome the privilege” by showing
that “a report is made, not in good faith, but rather with malice.” Id.
at 54 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 55 n.41
(explaining that “malice” required to overcome qualified privilege is
either (1) “actual malice,” which “requires that the statement, when
made, be made with actual knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard [for its truth]”; or (2) “malice in fact,” which “is
sufficiently shown by proof the statement was made with improper
and unjustifiable motives” (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Having thus recognized the availability of qualified immunity
to participants in university or college sexual misconduct hearings,
the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Doe was not now
entitled to dismissal of Khan’s action on the basis of such immunity.
Reiterating that the case was “[a]t the motion to dismiss stage,” when
a “court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true
and must draw inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,” the Court
concluded that Khan had sufficiently alleged the malice necessary to
defeat the privilege by pleading “that Doe made false accusations [of
23
rape] for the sake of trying to expel Khan as part of a larger political
movement and personal vendetta.” Id. at 55–56. 21
In sum, the Connecticut Supreme Court has responded to our
certified questions by stating that, under Connecticut law, neither
absolute nor qualified immunity at this time warrants dismissal of
Khan’s claims insofar as they are based on Doe’s 2018 statements at
the Yale UWC hearing at issue.
Applying the Connecticut Supreme Court’s Responses
to this Appeal
1. Absolute Immunity
Upon receipt of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s responses to
our certified questions, this court afforded the parties the opportunity
for supplemental briefing. In their submissions, Khan and Doe agree
that the challenged judgment of dismissal should be vacated insofar
as it afforded Doe absolute immunity for her 2018 statements at Yale’s
UWC hearing. See Appellant’s Suppl. Ltr. Br. (July 14, 2023) 7;
Appellee’s Suppl. Ltr. Br. (July 18, 2023) 3–4. We agree that such
vacatur and remand is compelled by the Connecticut Supreme
Court’s responses to our certified questions, which we have just
detailed.
Accordingly, to the extent the district court—ruling without the
benefit of the aforementioned guidance from the Connecticut
21See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 112, 113, 115 (alleging that Doe and Khan had engaged in
consensual sex on October 13, 2015, but that Doe, “[i]n an attempt to explain her
failure to rendezvous with friends” that night, “fabricated a claim of ‘rape,’ a claim
she was later encouraged to pursue and publicize to campus officials, police
officers, and others,” and that “[i]nspired by shame and rage, Ms. Doe persisted in
her false and defamatory claims in an effort to obtain the expulsion of Mr. Khan
from Yale, a vendetta at which she succeeded”).
24
Supreme Court—found the Yale UWC hearing to be quasi-judicial
and relied on absolute immunity to dismiss Khan’s claims against
Doe based on her 2018 hearing statements, we now vacate that
dismissal.
2. Qualified Immunity
Our fifth certified question raised the possibility of dismissal of
Khan’s 2018-based claims being affirmed on the ground of qualified,
if not absolute, immunity. See supra Note 4. In response, the
Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the state’s public policy
supported qualified immunity for participants in university or college
sexual assault disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, it concluded
that such immunity did not now support dismissal of Khan’s claims
against Doe for her 2018 hearing statements because Khan’s
complaint sufficiently pleads the malice necessary to defeat such
immunity. See Khan v. Yale Univ., 346 Conn. at 54–57.
To the extent that conclusion implicates both state substantive
and federal procedural law, we are bound by the Connecticut
Supreme Court’s ruling only as to the first. See generally Gasperini v.
Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (“Under the Erie
doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law
and federal procedural law.”). Nevertheless, we need not here
delineate a bright line between the substantive and the procedural
because, like the Connecticut Supreme Court, we conclude that the
allegations in Khan’s complaint—when viewed in the light most
favorable to him, as they must be at this stage of the litigation—suffice
to plead the malice required to defeat qualified immunity at this stage
of the proceedings. See supra Note 21 (quoting complaint allegations);
Khan v. Yale Univ., 347 Conn. at 55 n.41 (defining “malice” for
purposes of defeating qualified immunity).
25
To conclude, because neither absolute nor qualified immunity
presently supports the dismissal of Khan’s claims based on Doe’s 2018
statements at the Yale UWC hearing at issue, we vacate that part of
the challenged judgment and remand to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Timeliness of Khan’s Tortious Interference Claim
Khan alleges that Doe tortiously interfered with his business
relationship with Yale—specifically, his “contract[] for . . . education,”
Compl. ¶ 118—by falsely accusing him of rape in 2015 and by
repeating that accusation in 2018. The 2015 statements were made
orally to counselors at Yale’s Women’s Center and in a formal written
complaint to the university. As a result, Yale officials immediately
suspended Khan and barred him from campus, which actions, he
submits, left him homeless. The 2018 statements were made at Yale’s
UWC hearing, which led to Khan’s expulsion from the university. 22
The district court, having ruled that absolute quasi-judicial
immunity shields Doe from any claims based on her 2018 hearing
statements, further concluded that insofar as that left Khan with a
tortious interference claim based only on Doe’s 2015 statements, that
claim had to be dismissed as untimely. See Khan v. Yale Univ., 511
F. Supp. 3d at 228. 23 As a result, the district court found it
22Khan argues that his expulsion resulted from “almost four years of persistent
false testimony” by Doe. Appellant’s Br. 21. He does not dispute, however, that
absolute immunity shields Doe for testimony given at Khan’s criminal trial. See
Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th at 811 n.4. Thus, we understand his claims here to be
based only on Doe’s 2015 and 2018 statements to Yale personnel.
23 In so ruling, the district court determined that Khan’s action commenced on
January 24, 2020, the date on which Doe was deemed served by virtue of Khan’s
filing of Doe’s executed waiver of service. See Khan v. Yale Univ., 511 F. Supp. 3d
26unnecessary to address Khan’s argument that, at least with respect to
his tortious interference claim, Doe’s 2015 and 2018 statements were
part of a timely continuing course of conduct. See id. at 228 n.15.
Our vacatur of the dismissal of Khan’s 2018-based claims now
requires consideration of his continuing course of conduct argument
in order to determine whether his tortious interference claim is
limited to injuries caused by Doe’s 2018 statements or extends back to
her 2015 statements. It is not necessary to remand for this purpose
because the law is established and the pertinent dates undisputed.
Thus, we can ourselves conclude that the continuing course of
conduct doctrine does not apply in the circumstances of this case. On
that ground, we affirm the dismissal of so much of Khan’s tortious
interference claim as is based on Doe’s 2015 statements. See Jusino v.
Fed’n of Cath. Tchrs., Inc., 54 F.4th 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2022) (holding that
appeals court “may affirm on any ground with support in the record,
including grounds on which the district court did not rely” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). This does not mean that
Doe’s 2015 statements cannot be admitted as relevant background
evidence to Khan’s timely 2018-based claims. It means only that Khan
cannot recover damages for injuries attributable only to Doe’s 2015
statements, specifically, his 2015 suspension from Yale. See generally
at 226–27 & n.14 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)). Thus, it concluded that any claims
accruing before January 24, 2017, were presumptively time barred by Connecticut
General Statutes § 52-577 (“No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but
within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.”); see Essex
Ins. Co. v. William Kramer & Assocs., LLC, 331 Conn. 493, 503, 205 A.3d 534 (2019)
(holding that § 52-577 runs from date of tort not date injury discovered); Barrett v.
Montesano, 269 Conn. 787, 794, 849 A.2d 839 (2004) (instructing that, while § 52-577
is frequently referred to as a “statute of limitations,” it “technically function[s]
more like [a] statute[] of repose”). The parties do not dispute these calculations on
appeal.
27
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002)
(holding, in employment discrimination suit, that employee is not
barred from using acts outside limitations period “as background
evidence in support of a timely claim”).
To explain our conclusion, we rely on Connecticut law
pertaining to the continuing course of conduct doctrine. That law
states that, “[w]hen the wrong sued upon consists of a continuing
course of conduct,” the relevant statute of limitations or repose “does
not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed.” Flannery
v. Singer Asset Fin. Co., 312 Conn. 286, 311, 94 A.3d 553 (2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The doctrine is “generally applicable
under circumstances where it may be impossible to pinpoint the exact
date of a [tortious] act or omission that caused injury or where the
[tort] consists of a series of acts or omissions and it is [therefore]
appropriate to allow the course of action to terminate before allowing
the repose section of the limitation period to run.” Essex Ins. Co. v.
William Kramer & Assocs., LLC, 331 Conn. 493, 503, 205 A.3d 534 (2019)
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Martinelli v.
Fusi, 290 Conn. 347, 356, 963 A.2d 640 (2009) (stating that “continuing
course of conduct doctrine reflects the policy that, during an ongoing
relationship, lawsuits are premature because specific tortious acts or
omissions may be difficult to identify and may yet be remedied”). To
invoke the doctrine, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant,
“(1) committed an initial wrong upon the plaintiff; (2) owed a
continuing duty to the plaintiff that was related to the alleged original
wrong; and (3) continually breached that duty.” Flannery v. Singer
Asset Fin. Co., 312 Conn. at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted). To
demonstrate that the defendant owed the plaintiff a continuing duty,
the plaintiff may plead “either a special relationship between the
parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful
28
conduct of a defendant related to the prior act.” Essex Ins. Co. v.
William Kramer & Assocs., Inc., 331 Conn. at 504 (emphases in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Khan does not attempt to plead a special relationship
with Doe. Rather, he urges that Doe’s 2018 hearing statements
constituted “later wrongful conduct” that sufficiently related to Doe’s
2015 statements (i.e., the “initial wrong”) for the two events to
constitute a continuing course of conduct. Appellant’s Br. 20–21. We
agree that Doe’s 2015 statements “relate” to her 2018 statements
insofar as the latter repeat the former’s accusations of rape, and
insofar as the 2015 formal complaint was the predicate for the 2018
UWC hearing. We nevertheless conclude that the statements do not
manifest the sort of continuing course of conduct for which
Connecticut’s statute of repose should not begin to run until the last
act concludes.
First, far from being impossible to date, Doe’s allegedly tortious
acts are dated in Khan’s own complaint at least as to month and year
(early November 2015 and November 2018, respectively) and, with
discovery, can likely be pinpointed given that the 2015 complaint was
documented and the 2018 statements were made at a Yale UWC
hearing before five identified UWC members.
Second, the statements do not reflect a series of continuing acts
affecting his status at Yale but rather two acts separated by three
years: Doe’s initial 2015 accusation, documented in a formal
complaint; and her 2018 repetition of that accusation at the UWC
hearing. The significant temporal distance, moreover, is attributable,
at least in part, to Khan, who—while under suspension by Yale—
sought and obtained a stay of Yale’s disciplinary proceedings
pending the conclusion of his criminal case. See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27
29
F.4th at 811. 24 In these circumstances, Khan cannot claim that “it
would be inequitable for the limitations period to begin to run”
because he was “incapable of bringing [a tortious interference] action
because he [was] under the control of [Doe] and . . . thus unable to
bring an action.” Watts v. Chittenden, 301 Conn. 575, 591, 22 A.3d 1214(2011).
Third, Doe’s 2015 and 2018 statements caused distinct injuries.
Khan pleads that Doe’s 2015 complaint caused his immediate
suspension from Yale, while her 2018 hearing statements resulted in
his expulsion. Moreover, the 2015 suspension was lifted in the fall of
2018, months before Doe’s hearing statements. Insofar as Khan was
re-suspended in October 2018, that was triggered by a Yale Daily News
article reporting events not involving Doe. Nothing in these
circumstances supports tolling the time for Khan to complain of
tortious interference in November 2015 until November 2018. Not
only was Khan immediately aware of the suspension injury in
November 2015, but also there was no sound reason for him to have
delayed pursuing that claim pending the outcome of the 2018 UWC
hearing. A favorable decision at that hearing would not have
remedied or even mitigated the suspension injury, which Khan had
sustained fully by the fall of 2018. And the unfavorable decision
actually reached at the hearing did not aggravate the completed
suspension but, rather, imposed the additional injury of expulsion.
On remand, Khan can seek full compensation for the latter injury by
pursuing his timely tortious interference claim based on Doe’s 2018
hearing statements.
24As noted in our certification opinion, Yale’s Sexual Misconduct Policy then in
effect stated that UWC proceedings should not be stayed in such circumstances.
See Khan v. Yale Univ., 27 F.4th at 811 n.3.
30
Thus, while Khan characterizes Doe’s actions as an ongoing
“crusade,” Compl. ¶ 119, his pleadings fail plausibly to demonstrate
a continuing course of cognizable wrongful conduct by Doe as
necessary to plead a timely claim of tortious interference dating back
to 2015. See generally Thea v. Kleinhandler, 807 F.3d 492, 501 (2d Cir.
2015) (“When a plaintiff relies on a theory of equitable estoppel to
save a claim that otherwise appears untimely on its face, the plaintiff
must specifically plead facts that make entitlement to estoppel
plausible (not merely possible).”).
Accordingly, at the same time that we vacate the dismissal of
Khan’s tortious interference claim based on Doe’s 2018 statements
because those statements are presently not shielded by absolute or
qualified immunity, we affirm dismissal of Khan’s tortious inference
claim based on Doe’s 2015 statements as untimely.
CONCLUSION
To summarize,
1. In light of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s responses to
our certified questions in this case, see Khan v. Yale
University, 347 Conn. 1, 295 A.3d 855 (2023), we conclude
that Khan’s state-law claims against Doe for defamation
and tortious interference with contract should not have
been dismissed insofar as they are based on Doe’s 2018
statements at a Yale UWC hearing because,
a. that hearing lacked the procedural safeguards
necessary to qualify as a quasi-judicial proceeding
and, therefore, Doe is not shielded by absolute
immunity for her hearing statements; and
b. although qualified immunity is available to
participants in university and college sexual
31
assault proceedings, Khan’s complaint sufficiently
pleads the malice required to defeat such
immunity at this stage of the case.
2. Insofar as Khan bases his tortious interference claim on
Doe’s 2015 statements, the claim was properly dismissed
as untimely because it falls outside the relevant three-
year statute of repose and Khan fails adequately to plead
a continuing course of conduct by Doe that would toll
that statute through the time of her 2018 statements.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM IN PART so much of the partial
judgment as dismissed as untimely Khan’s tortious interference claim
based on Doe’s 2015 statements; we VACATE IN PART so much of
the partial judgment as dismissed on absolute immunity grounds
Khan’s defamation and tortious interference claims based on Doe’s
2018 statements; and we REMAND the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
32