United States v. Booth

22-1522
United States v. Booth
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
3 New York, on the 31st day of October, two thousand twenty-three.
4
5 PRESENT:
6 GERARD E. LYNCH,
7 MICHAEL H. PARK,
8 Circuit Judges,
9 JESSICA G. L. CLARKE,
10 District Judge. *
11 _____________________________________
12
13 United States of America,
14
15 Appellee,
16
17 v. 22-1522
18
19 Ronnell Booth,
20
21 Defendant-Appellant.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR APPELLEE: KEVIN T. SULLIVAN (Kimberly J. Ravener and
25 David Abramowicz, on the brief), Assistant United
26 States Attorneys, for Damian Williams, United
27 States Attorney for the Southern District of New
28 York, New York, NY.
*
Judge Jessica G. L. Clarke, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, sitting by designation.
1 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: COLLEEN P. CASSIDY, Federal Defenders of New
2 York Inc., New York, NY.
3
4 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
5 New York (Engelmayer, J.).
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
7 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
8 Ronnell Booth pleaded guilty to a violation of supervised release for committing
9 harassment in the second degree in violation of N.Y.P.L. § 240.26(1). The district court
10 (Engelmayer, J.) imposed a revocation sentence of 11 months’ imprisonment followed by 14
11 months of supervised release. Booth appeals, claiming that his sentence was both procedurally
12 and substantively unreasonable. He argues that the district court (1) based its sentence on
13 dismissed allegations and (2) disregarded Booth’s 20-month rehabilitative progress, instead
14 relying on an unproven “threat” to conclude that he still presented a danger. 1 We assume the
15 parties’ familiarity with the facts, the procedural posture, and the issues on appeal.
16 I. Procedural Reasonableness
17 Booth argues that the district court erred in relying on dismissed allegations when
18 determining the seriousness of his violation and the court’s ultimate sentencing decision. Booth
19 did not make that argument in the district court, so we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim.
1
Error! Main Document Only.We note that Booth has already completed his term of
imprisonment, so that even if we agreed with his arguments, we can no longer offer him any effective relief
from his sentence of imprisonment. That does not render his appeal moot, however. “[A]n appeal
challenging a criminal sentence will not be rendered moot when the defendant is released from prison so
long as the defendant is still subject to a term of supervision,” at least where “[a]rguments for a shorter
overall sentence could potentially cause the district court to reduce a defendant’s term of supervision.”
United States v. Chestnut, 989 F.3d 222, 224 (2d Cir. 2021).
2
1 P. 52(b); see also United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting that plain error
2 requires showing that “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to
3 reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant's substantial rights; and (4) the error
4 seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”).
5 First, the district court found, and Booth admitted, that he “la[id] hands on a
6 woman . . . without her consent.” App’x at A-154. The district court explained that non-
7 consensual touching and restraint of a woman in a domestic violence situation is “gravely serious.”
8 Id. Second, the district court had authorized Booth to resume contact with the victim, after a
9 period of time during which such contact had been prohibited as a protective measure, such that
10 any offense against the same victim, particularly in the context of prior instances of domestic
11 violence, breached the trust that the court had placed in him. Id. at 154-55. Third, Booth’s
12 conduct was particularly serious in light of his history of committing acts of domestic violence
13 while on supervised release. Id. at 155. The district court thus sufficiently explained the
14 seriousness of Booth’s violation. See also United States v. Cassesse, 685 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir.
15 2012) (noting that “Section 3553(c) requires no specific formulas or incantations; rather, the length
16 and detail required of a district court’s explanation varies according to the circumstances”).
17 The district court also made explicitly clear that it was not “resolving the parties’ factual
18 disputes” or “assuming or finding the disputed facts to be in the government’s favor,” and instead
19 was “treating the assaultive conduct as limited to Mr. Booth’s un-consented to laying hands on
20 Ms. Rivera in his restraint of her.” App’x at A-154. The district court noted that if the disputed
21 allegations had been proven, an above-Guidelines sentence would have been appropriate. See id.3
1 at A-157. Booth cannot demonstrate error, let alone plain error, in the district court’s sentencing.
2 The sentence was procedurally reasonable.
3 II. Substantive Reasonableness
4 Booth also argues that the district court failed to consider his 20-month rehabilitative
5 progress since the violation. He argues that the district court improperly relied on a phone call
6 from Booth to his then-girlfriend to conclude that he still presented a risk. This argument is
7 meritless. The district court expressly considered Booth’s 20 months of rehabilitative progress,
8 acknowledging Booth’s efforts and the support of his family. See App’x at A-156. The district
9 court also determined that the phone call was in fact threatening because Booth’s words “cultivated
10 the fear that something would happen.” Id. The district court also noted “Booth’s track record
11 of recidivism in the area of domestic violence.” See id. The district court thus did not abuse its
12 discretion in assessing mitigating and aggravating factors relevant to Booth’s sentencing. See
13 United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d. Cir. 2012) (“The particular weight to be
14 afforded aggravating or mitigating factors is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the
15 sentencing judge.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
16 Given the “particularly deferential” nature of our review, we determine the district court’s
17 sentence to be substantively reasonable. United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 255 (2d Cir. 2015)
18 (“We will set aside sentences as substantively unreasonable only in exceptional cases where the
19 trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions, that is, when
20 sentences are so shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law
21 that allowing them to stand would damage the administration of justice.”) (internal quotation
4
1 marks and citations omitted). Booth’s within-Guidelines sentence cannot credibly be said to
2 “shock the conscience.” We thus reject Booth’s claim of substantive unreasonableness.
3 We have considered all of Booth’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
4 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
5
6 FOR THE COURT:
7 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
8
5