Jean-Baptiste v. Almonte Stream Food Corp.

23-438-cv
Jean-Baptiste v. Almonte Stream Food Corp.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
6th day of November, two thousand twenty-three.
Present:
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Chief Judge,
AMALYA L. KEARSE,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
HAROLD JEAN-BAPTISTE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 23-438
ALMONTE STREAM FOOD CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee,
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: HAROLD JEAN-BAPTISTE, pro se, Rosedale,
NY.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: No appearance.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Pamela K. Chen, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Harold Jean-Baptiste, proceeding pro se, sued Almonte Stream Food Corp.
under a variety of federal statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging that the
company—a grocery store on Long Island—colluded with FBI agents to poison him. He paid
the filing fee. Observing the many similar allegations Jean-Baptiste had brought in prior cases,
the district court dismissed his second amended complaint sua sponte as factually frivolous
without providing Jean-Baptiste advance notice or an opportunity to be heard. We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
“[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff
has paid the required filing fee . . . .” Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d
362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam). An action is frivolous when “the factual contentions are
clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy” or when “the
claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage
Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]
finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available
to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
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The district court properly dismissed the second amended complaint as factually
frivolous. Jean-Baptiste alleged that he was poisoned by Almonte, which colluded with an
unknown FBI agent to tamper with his food. But he set forth no facts that suggested such
collusion was remotely plausible. Simply put, Jean-Baptiste’s assertion of the grocery store’s
collusion with the FBI was irrational and fell solidly in the realm of fantasy or delusion. See
Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 368–69 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of claims as
frivolous where plaintiff alleged conspiracy of government officials to commit terrorism but did
not allege any facts demonstrating a “consistent” or “plausible” theory).
Jean-Baptiste argues that the district court failed to allow him an opportunity to appear
or respond before dismissing his complaint. As he observes, we have repeatedly emphasized
that “dismissing a case without an opportunity to be heard is, at a minimum, bad practice in
numerous contexts and is reversible error in others.” Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp.,
899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018). Sua sponte dismissal can be permissible, however, when it is
“unmistakably clear” that “the complaint lacks merit or is otherwise defective.” Snider v.
Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 1999).
Under the circumstances in this case, the district court did not err by dismissing the
second amended complaint sua sponte. As noted by the district court, Jean-Baptiste has filed
similar lawsuits alleging government conspiracies against him. See, e.g., Jean-Baptiste v.
United States Dep’t of Just., No. 22-CV-8318 (LTS), 2023 WL 2390875 at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
6, 2023); Jean-Baptiste v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 22-CV-1861 (TSC), 2022 WL
3027010 at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2022). Jean-Baptiste was therefore constructively on notice that
claims similar to these would be vulnerable to dismissal. Moreover, he had been given two
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opportunities to amend his complaint, yet the allegations were still patently frivolous. It was
therefore not reversible error to dismiss the second amended complaint sua sponte.
Jean-Baptiste further contends that the district court was biased against him. But aside
from the dismissal of his second amended complaint, Jean-Baptiste points to nothing in the
record to suggest bias on the part of the district court. And without more, an adverse ruling is
not evidence of bias. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings
alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”).
* * *
We have considered Jean-Baptiste’s remaining arguments and find them to be without
merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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