Singh v. Garland

20-2159
Singh v. Garland
BIA
Kolbe, IJ
A206 894 356
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of October, two thousand
twenty-three.
PRESENT:
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Chief Judge,
JON O. NEWMAN,
BETH ROBINSON,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
KARANBIR SINGH, AKA HARPREET
SHERPA, AKA KARANVIG SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 20-2159
NAC
MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Anas J. Ahmed, Esq., Jackson Heights, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director;
Kristin Moresi, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
Petitioner Karanbir Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a
June 24, 2020, decision of the BIA affirming a July 12, 2018, decision of an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 In re Karanbir
Singh, No. A 206 894 356 (B.I.A. June 24, 2020), aff’g No. A 206 894 356 (Immig. Ct.
N.Y. City July 12, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
facts and procedural history.
We have considered the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA, i.e.,
including the denial of Singh’s motion to remand. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417
F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review factual findings for substantial evidence
1 Singh did not address the agency’s denial of his CAT claim in his brief, nor did he argue it before the BIA.
Accordingly, he has waived this issue. Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998).
2
and questions of law de novo. Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014).
“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). We review the agency’s denial of a motion to remand for abuse of
discretion. See Li Yong Cao v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 421 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 2005).
Singh, who is a Sikh from Punjab and a member of the Shiromani Akali Dal
Amritsar Party, also known as the Mann Party, asserted that members of the rival
Akali Dal Badal Party (“Badal Party”) beat him and threatened to kill him if he did
not join their party. An asylum applicant must show that he has suffered past
persecution, or has a well-founded fear of future persecution, on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). Where, as here, the agency
assumes past persecution, there is a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear
of future persecution based on the original claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The
Government may rebut that presumption if it shows by a preponderance of the
evidence either that (1) “[t]here has been a fundamental change in circumstances
such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution,” or
(2) “[t]he applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of
3
the applicant’s country of nationality . . . and under all circumstances, it would be
reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” Id. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i) (asylum),
1208.16(b)(1)(i) (withholding of removal).
We conclude that the agency reasonably determined that the Government
demonstrated that Singh could safely relocate within India and that it would be
reasonable for him to do so. Factors relevant in determining the reasonableness of
relocation include “whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the
place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country;
administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and
social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial
ties.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) (effective to Nov. 2018);2 Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th
106, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2021).
The record before the IJ contained the following evidence. First, the 2017
U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices on India, which
2This version of the regulation was in effect at the time of the IJ’s decision. The current
version lists the factors as: “the totality of the relevant circumstances regarding an
applicant’s prospects for relocation, including the size of the country of nationality or last
habitual residence, the geographic locus of the alleged persecution, the size, numerosity,
and reach of the alleged persecutor, and the applicant’s demonstrated ability to relocate
to the United States in order to apply for asylum.”
4
indicated that “[t]he law provides for freedom of internal movement.” The
Government in addition submitted a map entitled “Ruling Parties in Different
States of India,” which showed that the Badal Party was not in power in any state
in India in 2017; the Indian National Religion Census of 2011 indicating that,
though their population is small, there are Sikhs living in every state in India; a
report from the Law Library of Congress on the feasibility of relocation for Sikhs
in India which states that “there appear to be no legal obstacles for members of the
Sikh faith to relocate to other areas of India”; and a report from the Immigration
and Refugee Board of Canada stating that “Sikhs do not face difficulties relocating
to other areas of India.”
The IJ also considered Singh’s personal circumstances. Singh testified that
he had never committed any crimes in India, that he was not a high ranking
official, and that he had never led a militant group. Singh is young, single,
childless, and healthy; he has a high school education plus one year of college; and
he was able to find work as a cashier while living in the United States. Based on
this evidence, the IJ reasonably concluded that Singh could relocate to another part
of India where he would not face persecution from the Badal Party and that it
would not be unreasonable for him to do so. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3).
5
The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s request to remand
for consideration of additional country conditions evidence. See Li Yong Cao, 421
F.3d at 157 (explaining that an abuse of discretion occurs where the BIA’s “decision
provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies,
is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements;
that is to say, where the Board has acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”
(quoting Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 2001))). In his
brief to the BIA, Singh argued that he could not reasonably relocate because the
Badal Party is allied with the Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”), which is in power at
the national level, and that both parties will target him throughout India on
account of his Mann Party membership and support of Khalistan (the creation of
an independent Sikh state). He attached three news articles to show the alliance
between the Badal Party and the BJP. The articles refer to the BJP as the Badal
Party’s “major partner” and “old ally,” and state that they had meetings to
coordinate a strategy for elections in Punjab. But the articles do not discuss
whether the BJP and Badal Party coordinate acts of violence against members of
the Mann Party; the articles refer to their alliance only in terms of campaign
strategy specific to Punjab. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
6
concluding that the new evidence would not change the outcome. See Jian Hui
Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that movant has the
“heavy burden of demonstrating that the proffered new evidence would likely
alter the result in h[is] case” (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988))).
Singh’s additional challenges to the agency’s relocation finding are
unavailing. He does not cite evidence to support his claims that movement within
India is not possible for Sikhs or that the police throughout India support the Badal
Party. Contrary to his argument, the IJ did not deny asylum because he was a low-
ranking member of his party. Rather, the IJ reasonably concluded, based on
Singh’s own testimony, that it would be reasonable for him to relocate to another
region of India because there was no indication that police had any interest in
locating or pursuing him for any reason. Additionally, as the Government points
out, he did not exhaust his argument that the Government did not identify a
specific part of India to which he could relocate. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 107 n.1, 122 (2d Cir. 2007).
The agency’s conclusion that DHS rebutted the presumption of a well-
founded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that Singh could reasonably
relocate is dispositive of both asylum and withholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R.
7
§§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B). Accordingly, we do not reach the
agency’s alternative fundamental change determination. See INS v. Bagamasbad,
429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to
make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they
reach.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending
motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
8