John Gerholt, Sr. v. Wetzel

DLD-178 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 20-3398
___________
JOHN LEWIS GERHOLT, SR.,
Appellant
v.
JOHN E. WETZEL, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; K. SUBEN,
IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; STEPHEN ST. VINCENT, IN
HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MS G. ORLANDO, IN HER
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; DAVID A. THOMAS, JR., IN HIS
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; C. STEFFENIO, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-04079)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 13, 2021
Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 26, 2021)
__________
OPINION*
PER CURIAM __________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
John Gerholt, Sr., an inmate at State Correctional Institution – Phoenix (“SCI-
Phoenix”) proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s
order dismissing his amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for
failure to state a claim. Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will
summarily affirm.
I.
In August 2020, Gerholt filed a civil rights complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against WellPath “(aka) Correct Care
Solutions,” a private contractual healthcare provider at SCI-Phoenix, as well as
Pennsylvania Secretary of Corrections John Wetzel, SCI-Phoenix Warden K. Soben,1
Department of Corrections Director of Policy Stephen St. Vincent, and SCI-Phoenix
employees David A. Thomas, Jr., Ms. G. Orlando, and C. Steffenio. Gerholt sued all
defendants in their individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Gerholt’s allegations arose out of a January 30, 2020 incident in which his hand
became trapped in the pinch point of a closing cellblock door, injuring his fingers.
Gerholt alleged that WellPath was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in
its treatment of his injury, and that several of the individual defendants violated the
Eighth Amendment by failing to provide warning signs at pinch points or otherwise
1
For purposes of this opinion, we adopt the spelling of defendant Soben’s name utilized
in Gerholt’s complaint and the District Court’s opinions.
2
guard against Gerholt’s injury. Gerholt also alleged that defendants Soben, Orlando, and
Steffenio violated his constitutional rights in their handling of a grievance he filed in
relation to his injury and medical care.
On August 31, 2020, the District Court dismissed Gerholt’s official capacity
claims, grievance-related claims, and Eighth Amendment claims against the individual
defendants with prejudice under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) upon determining that leave to
amend would be futile. However, the District Court afforded Gerholt leave to amend his
claim against WellPath to demonstrate that it had a policy or custom amounting to
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs or to allege deliberate indifference
against an individual medical provider.
Gerholt filed an amended complaint on November 3, 2020. The amended
complaint no longer included WellPath as defendant and instead named the “SCI-
Phoenix Medical Department,” against which Gerholt raised similar allegations of
inadequate medical care. Gerholt otherwise raised largely the same allegations as those
in his initial complaint against Wetzel, St. Vincent, Thomas, and Steffenio, naming
several of those defendants in their individual and official capacities even though such
claims were previously dismissed with prejudice. Gerholt sought monetary damages.
On November 5, 2020, the District Court sua sponte dismissed the amended
complaint with prejudice under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and terminated WellPath as a
defendant. Although the District Court had already dismissed Gerholt’s claims against
3
Wetzel, St. Vincent, Thomas, and Steffenio with prejudice in its August 31 opinion, it
screened the amended complaint in its entirety and reiterated its reasons for dismissing
those claims. Gerholt timely appealed and filed a document in support of his appeal with
this Court.2
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s order dismissing the amended complaint. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). As a pro se litigant, Gerholt is entitled to liberal construction of
his complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). We may
summarily affirm the District Court’s decision “on any basis supported by the record” if
the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246,
247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
III.
As an initial matter, the District Court properly concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment barred Gerholt’s official capacity claims. See A.W. v. Jersey City Pub.
2
In addition to referring to the November 5 order, Gerholt’s notice of appeal mentions an
order entered November 3, 2020 dismissing the action for failure to prosecute. The same
day it issued that order, however, the District Court received the amended complaint.
The District Court therefore vacated the November 3 order in its November 5 order.
4
Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that “[a] state is generally entitled to
immunity in federal court from suits by private parties,” and this protection extends to
“state officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages”). As the District
Court noted, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its sovereign immunity
with respect to the claims here at issue. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8521(b), 8522(b).
The District Court’s dismissal of Gerholt’s claims related to the handling of his
grievance was also proper. Gerholt alleged that Steffenio “apologized to” Gerholt after
reviewing his allegations but did “not order the defective door fixed” and declined “to
compensate plaintiff for [his] injury.” Am. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 8. Insofar as Gerholt
alleged a Due Process violation arising out of the handling of his grievance, the District
Court correctly recognized that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to prison
grievance procedures. See Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001); Flick
v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Further, to state a claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant had “personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs,” which can be shown through particularized “allegations of personal
direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). While Gerholt conclusively alleged that Steffenio had
“personal knowledge and involvement with the entire incident,” he did not allege
particularized facts demonstrating Steffenio’s involvement in the conditions giving rise to
Gerholt’s injury or in his medical treatment. See Am. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 8. The act
5
of merely responding to or reviewing a grievance does not rise to the level of personal
involvement required to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Cf.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d at 1208.
Gerholt similarly failed to state a claim against the SCI-Phoenix Medical
Department because a prison medical department is not a “person” that can be sued under
§ 1983. See Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam). Gerholt
did not name any individual medical providers as defendants in his amended complaint.
The District Court was therefore correct to dismiss this claim.3
The District Court also correctly dismissed Gerholt’s remaining Eighth
Amendment claims. As the District Court recognized, an Eighth Amendment conditions
of confinement claim includes a subjective and an objective component. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must allege prison officials
exhibited subjective “deliberate indifference” to an objectively “substantial risk of serious
harm.” Id. Regarding the subjective component, a prison official acts with deliberate
indifference where he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
3
Gerholt argues that the District Court incorrectly dismissed his Eighth Amendment
claim against WellPath and contends that WellPath was deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs by failing to provide “a more aggressive method of emergency
care.” See Resp. at 2-3, ECF No. 9. As noted, however, the District Court afforded
Gerholt leave to amend his claim against WellPath, but Gerholt did not do so. We have
noted that “parties voluntarily dropped from an amended complaint do not remain in the
case,” and that claims against such defendants “may not be challenged on appeal.”
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 221 n.13 (3d Cir. 2017). Therefore, we will not
consider Gerholt’s claim against WellPath on appeal.
6
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at
837.
Gerholt’s complaint includes conclusory allegations that the individual
defendants—largely due to their supervisory roles—knew or should have known of the
risks posed by the facility doors yet failed to guard against Gerholt’s injury. For
example, Gerholt alleged that Wetzel placed him “in a facility he knew or should have
known was not fully inspected to prevent any pervasive risk situation of injury to
plaintiff”; that Thomas “knew or should have know[n],” as the person responsible for
facility maintenance, that cautionary tags indicating pinch points were required; and that
St. Vincent had a duty to ensure facility doors did not open or close prematurely. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 11, 15-18, ECF No. 8. Gerholt also alleged, inter alia, that all defendants
knew “they had problematic doors” yet failed to “guard against accidents.” Id. at ¶ 24.
The amended complaint, however, does not contain sufficient factual matter from which
the Court may conclude that defendants were aware that the allegedly defective doors
could expose Gerholt to “an excessive risk” of harm and consciously disregarded that
risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. As the District Court recognized, Gerholt at most
alleged negligence on the part of the individual defendants, which is insufficient to state a
deliberate indifference claim. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).
Because we find that Gerholt failed to plausibly allege deliberate indifference, we need
7
not address the objective prong, and we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that
Gerholt failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against the individual defendants.4
As noted, the District Court afforded Gerholt the opportunity to cure the defects in
his original complaint and provided guidance on how to do so. Further, the District Court
analyzed the sufficiency of the amended complaint’s allegations against the individual
defendants despite having already dismissed those claims with prejudice, essentially
providing Gerholt with a second opportunity to state claims against those defendants.
Given that Gerholt failed to correct the original complaint’s deficiencies in his amended
complaint, the District Court did not err in dismissing the action without further leave to
amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)
(explaining that leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile).5
IV.
For substantially the same reasons as the District Court and because this appeal
does not present a substantial question, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
4
To the extent that Gerholt challenges the earlier dismissal with prejudice of his claims
against defendants Orlando and Soben for their handling of his grievance and against
Soben for his alleged knowledge of the existence of the pinch point that injured Gerholt,
we see no error in the District Court’s decision for substantially the same reasons
described herein and articulated in the District Court’s August 31, 2020 opinion.
5
In his response to the Court’s order listing his appeal for possible dismissal or summary
action, Gerholt raises a host of new allegations pertaining to conditions within SCI-
Phoenix, many of which are unrelated to those in the amended complaint. Resp. at 3-4,
ECF No. 9. We decline to address these new allegations for the first time on appeal. See
Simko v. U.S. Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021).
8