Michael Daniels v. Laurie Cynkin

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-3648
___________
MICHAEL J. DANIELS,
Appellant
v.
LAURIE E. CYNKIN; ANDREW M. ROSENBERG;
SUSAN J. SNYDER LIVING TRUST; ESTATE OF SUSAN J. SNYDER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-13-cv-06027)
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 16, 2014
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 22, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Michael J. Daniels, a retired attorney proceeding pro se, appeals from the order of
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint
that arose from divorce proceedings in Florida state court. For the reasons that follow,
we will affirm the District Court’s order.
I.
In 2002, Daniels and Susan J. Snyder signed a prenuptial agreement and then
married. Daniels received Social Security benefits due to the marriage, which were in
addition to his own Social Security benefits. In 2009, Snyder left Daniels and filed for
divorce in Florida state court, alleging that the marriage was irretrievably broken. In
August 2010, a Florida trial court issued a divorce decree that upheld the prenuptial
agreement, dissolved the marriage, and held that Daniels was not entitled to alimony or
attorneys’ fees. Daniels filed an appeal in Florida state court challenging the lack of a
money award, but that appeal was unsuccessful.
In July 2011, Snyder passed away. After her death, Daniels learned that he had
been disinherited from her will, which he believed was a violation of the prenuptial
agreement.1 He moved to set aside the divorce decree, but the trial court denied that
request and his appeal was unsuccessful.2
1
Daniels alleges that Snyder induced him to sign the prenuptial agreement by promising
to “provide for [him] as she had provided for [her second husband], as long as we were
married.” (Compl. 5.)
2
Daniels later filed additional challenges in Florida state court but those, too, were
2
Thereafter, in October 2013, Daniels filed a pro se complaint in the District Court,
raising a host of allegations relating to the divorce proceedings. The complaint, brought
against Snyder’s two adult children (her heirs), her estate, and the Susan J. Snyder Living
Trust (“Appellees”), sought (1) a declaration that the prenuptial agreement was null and
void, (2) modification, vacatur, or reversal of the divorce decree, (3) reinstatement of the
Social Security benefits that had ceased due to the divorce, and (4) attorneys’ fees from
the Florida state court proceedings.
Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint. On July 23, 2014, the District Court
granted that motion, concluding that it “lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the domestic relations exception,[3] and federal
law regarding finality for Social Security appeals.” (J.A. at 24.) This appeal followed.4
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Daniels’s complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Freidrich v. Davis, 767 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir.
unsuccessful.
3
“The Supreme Court has long recognized a domestic relations exception to federal
diversity jurisdiction.” Matusow v. Trans-County Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 245
(3d Cir. 2008) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693-94 (1992)). This
exception encompasses “cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child
custody decree.” Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704.
4
Because Daniels concedes that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over his request to
reinstate the Social Security benefits that ceased after the divorce, (see Daniels’s Opening
Br. 10), we do not discuss that issue further here.
3
2014). We may affirm the court’s decision on any basis supported by the record. See
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a federal court from exercising jurisdiction
over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Four requirements must be met for the doctrine
to apply: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of
injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before
the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and
reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615
F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp., 544
U.S. at 284). Much of Daniels’s complaint attacked the Florida trial court’s handling of
his divorce proceedings and sought to disturb the trial court’s rulings in that case. For
substantially the reasons provided by the District Court, we agree with the District Court
that these claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Daniels’s complaint also alleged that Snyder breached the prenuptial agreement,
and that she and her attorney, Leanna Freeman, misled and lied to the Florida trial court
during the divorce proceedings. Additionally, Daniels claimed that Snyder’s children
conspired with Freeman “to keep the truth from being told . . . and to keep all of the
benefits that they have received.” (Compl. 15.) These claims are not barred by the
4
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 167
(explaining that, when “a federal plaintiff asserts injury caused by the defendant’s actions
and not by the state-court judgment, Rooker-Feldman is not a bar to federal
jurisdiction”); see also id. at 168 (“Even though the injuries of which the plaintiff
complained helped to cause the adverse state judgments, these claims were independent
because they stemmed from some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, to the extent that these claims alleged
constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, they are not barred by
the “domestic relations exception.”5 See McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 312-13
(3d Cir. 1989). Nevertheless, as explained below, these claims were properly dismissed.
To obtain relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the
defendant(s) acted under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Great W. Mining &
Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 175-76. Here, however, all of the actors — Snyder, her
children, and Freeman (who is not even named as a defendant in this lawsuit) — were
5
To the extent that these claims were brought under state law and pursuant to the District
Court’s federal diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, we agree with the District
Court that they are barred by the domestic relations exception because Daniels has
asserted them as a means to modify, vacate, or reverse the divorce decree, see Matusow,
545 F.3d at 244-45. To the extent that Daniels argues that the District Court’s
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 was a basis to exercise jurisdiction over
these claims, we disagree because all of his constitutional claims were subject to
dismissal. See Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]here the claim
over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district
court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for
doing so.”) (quotation marks omitted).
5
private parties. “Although a private party can be liable under § 1983 if he or she willfully
participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a constitutional
right,” Max v. Republican Comm. of Lancaster Cnty., 587 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2009),
those circumstances are not present here.6 Accordingly, Daniels’s § 1983 claims were
subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Any claims brought by Daniels under § 1985 were also subject to dismissal. That
statute contains three subparts. Section 1985(1) is clearly inapplicable here, as that
provision “prohibits two or more persons from interfering with a federal officer’s
performance of his duties.” Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 423
n.1 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Sections 1985(2) and (3) do not
apply here either because, inter alia, Daniels has not alleged that Snyder and the others
“colluded with the requisite racial[] or . . . otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus.” Davis v. Twp. of Hillside, 190 F.3d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing § 1985(2)); see Farber v. City of Paterson,
440 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing § 1985(3)).
6
Daniels alleged that Snyder and Freeman “acted under the color of law made possible
by status of the [Florida trial court] judge.” (Compl. 7.) This allegation is insufficient to
trigger § 1983 because there is no indication that the judge participated in the alleged
conspiracy. Cf. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 176. Indeed, Daniels’s
allegations that Snyder and Freeman misled and lied to the judge make clear that the
judge was not part of the alleged conspiracy.
6
In light of the above, the District Court did not err in dismissing Daniels’s
complaint.7 We will affirm that judgment.
7
There was no need for the District Court to grant Daniels leave to amend his complaint
because any amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
7