Donte Lawrence v. Superintendent Dallas SCI

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 19-2350
_____________
DONTE LAWRENCE,
Appellant
v.
SUPERINTENDENT DALLAS SCI;
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF
THE COUNTY OF CHESTER;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
______________
On Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D.Pa. Civil No. 2-17-cv-00871)
District Court Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert
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Argued: May 20, 2021
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Before: McKEE, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 10, 2021)
Thomas A. Dreyer, Esq. [Argued]
30 Running Brook Road
Glen Mills, PA 19342
Nicholas J. Casenta, Jr., Esq. [Argued]
Chester County Office of District Attorney
Suite 4450
201 West Market Street
P.O. Box 2746
West Chester, PA 19380
Ronald Eisenberg, Esq.
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1600 Arch Street
Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19103
OPINION *
_______________________
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Donte Lawrence appeals the District Court’s denial of his writ of habeas corpus
petition. He argues that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by
failing to object to the Commonwealth’s characterization of him as a “cold-blooded
murderer” during its opening statement. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the
District Court. 1
I.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Lawrence must show that
trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that
trial counsel’s errors prejudiced his defense. 2 In determining whether trial counsel’s
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 2253. Because the District
Court ruled on the habeas petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, our review of
its decision is plenary. Dellavecchia v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 819 F.3d 682, 691 (3d
Cir. 2016).
2
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
2
performance was deficient, we must be “highly deferential” and “indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” 3 Here, trial counsel’s choice to withhold objection is entitled to double
deference under Strickland v. Washington and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act. 4 Accordingly, counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.” 5 Even if we were to find that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, we
would then have to determine that the state court’s contrary holding was unreasonable
under the Supreme Court’s decision in Harrington v. Richter, wherein the Court
explained that “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal
habeas relief so long as ‘fair-minded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state
court’s decision.” 6
During the Post-Conviction Relief Act hearing, trial counsel explained that he did
not believe the comment would warrant a mistrial and did not want to further highlight
the Commonwealth’s characterization of his client. 7 That was certainly a reasonable
strategy. However, even if we concluded it was an unreasonable dereliction of the
standard of professionalism owed Lawrence, the double deference that Richter requires
3
Id. at 689.
4
See, e.g., Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 121-23 (2011).
5
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 22 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
6
562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
7
App. at 127.
3
would still preclude our holding that the state court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable.
Nevertheless, before concluding, we emphasize that the fact that we must affirm
the District Court’s denial of Lawrence’s habeas petition in no way suggests that the
prosecutor’s opening statement here was appropriate or proper. On the contrary, the
prosecutor’s opening was the kind of argument that should be reserved for summation,
where such argument is allowed so long as it is based on the trial record. Given the zeal
of the Commonwealth’s opening statement here, it is apparently necessary for us to
remind counsel of a fundamental principle of trial advocacy: “[t]he purpose of an opening
[statement] is to give the broad outlines of the case to enable the jury to comprehend it. It
is not to poison the jury's mind against the defendant . . . .” 8 Neither the emotion of the
courtroom nor adversarial zeal should blind attorneys to the fact that “[a]n opening
statement has a narrow purpose and scope. It is to state what evidence will be presented,
to make it easier for the jurors to understand what is to follow, and to relate parts of the
evidence and testimony to the whole; is not an occasion for argument.” 9
Nevertheless, a habeas petitioner must establish more than an ill-advised or
unprofessional opening statement by a prosecutor to establish relief under Strickland.
For the reasons we have explained, any professional transgression here is simply not
sufficient to establish that Lawrence is entitled to relief.
8
United States v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464, 470 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Gov’t of
Virgin Islands v. Turner, 409 F.2d 102, 103 (1968)).
9
Id. at 471 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612 (1976) (Burger C.J.,
concurring)).
4
II.
Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Lawrence’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.
5