Adefumi v. City of Philadelphia

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-2107
___________
OLANIYAN ADEFUMI,
Appellant
v.
THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-00586)
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 23, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 26, 2011)
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OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
Olaniyan Adefumi appeals District Court orders dismissing his complaint
and denying his motion for reconsideration. We will affirm.
As the parties are familiar with the facts of this lawsuit (and Adefumi’s two related
1
lawsuits), we will not recapitulate them here. Having reviewed the record, 1 we are
satisfied that the District Court correctly granted the motion to dismiss in favor of the
City of Philadelphia on the grounds of claim preclusion. See generally Adefumi v. City
of Phila., No. 09-586, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34238 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2011). To
properly invoke claim preclusion, “the defendant must show there has been (1) a final
judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies; and
(3) a subsequent suit based on the same causes of action.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals
Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 260 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations, citations omitted). We take
“a broad view of what constitutes identity of causes of action,” analyzing “(1) whether
the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same . . . ; (2) whether the theory
of recovery is the same; (3) whether the witnesses and documents necessary at trial are
the same . . . ; and (4) whether the material facts alleged are the same.” United States v.
Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984). Here, the “same claim” test is
easily satisfied, as is the “final judgment on the merits” element.
With regard to privity, we requested that the parties brief the issue, and we
are convinced by the appellee’s argument that it and the Free Library should be construed
1
“We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 [and] [w]e review a
district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.” Beidleman v. Stroh Brewery Co.,
182 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 1999). Denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. See Confer v. Custom Engineering Co., 952 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir.
1991). To the extent that Adefumi’s original complaint was, in actuality, a motion to
reopen his first lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, we review the District
Court’s disposition for abuse of discretion. Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244,
251 (3d Cir. 2008).
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as parties in privity for the purposes of claim preclusion. Privity has “traditionally been
understood as referring to the existence of a substantive legal relationship, such as by
contract, from which it was deemed appropriate to bind one of the contracting parties to
the results of the other party’s participation in litigation.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. George V. Hamilton, Inc., 571 F.3d 299, 311 (3d Cir. 2009). The multiple connections
between the City of Philadelphia and its Free Library fall within the traditional definition
of privity; for example, the primary budgeting source for the Free Library is city funds, 2
and the Board of Trustees of the Free Library is governed by the City’s home-rule
charter. See 351 Pa. Code §§ 3.3-802, 4.4-800. In the present case, this alignment of
interests suggests that a judgment in favor of one party should preclude a renewed suit
arising from the same facts against the other.
Finally, should Adefumi’s complaint be read as attempting to reopen his
first case through the use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, we agree with the
District Court that relief under 60(b)(2)–(3) is time-barred, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1);
with regard to 60(b)(6), Adefumi has not shown the “extraordinary circumstances” that
would justify granting a 60(b)(6) motion, if such relief were available. Gonzalez v.
Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005). Nor is Rule 60(d) an option, as there is no evident
“grave miscarriage of justice,” see Mitchell v. Rees, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13309, at *4–6 (6th Cir. 2011, No. 09-5570), or fraud on the court.
2
See, e.g., Free Library of Phila. Annual Report, 2008 Fiscal Year 10 (2008), available
at http://www.freelibrary.org/annualreport/annualreport08/annualreport2008.pdf.
3
In sum, the District Court correctly decided this case, and therefore did not
abuse its discretion in declining to reconsider the outcome. We will affirm its orders.
4