Eric Rambert v. District Attorney Philadelphia

DLD-061 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 20-1593
___________
ERIC X. RAMBERT,
Appellant
v.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY PHILADELPHIA; GEORGE MURPHY, ASSISTANT D.A.;
DOUGLAS WECK, ASSISTANT D.A.; SIMRAN DHILLON, ASSISTANT D.A.;
ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA; ROBERT REID, EXECUTIVE DEPUTY
A.G.; STEPHEN ST. VINCENT, DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING; B. T.,
CORPORAL, STATE POLICE; JUDGE JAMES MCCRUDDEN, ESTATE OF; JULES
EPSTEIN, ATTORNEY AT LAW
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-19-cv-05249)
District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl
____________________________________
Submitted on a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, for
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 13, 2022
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 24, 2022)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Eric X. Rambert appeals from the District Court’s order
dismissing his complaint. For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm.
In 1983, Eric Rambert pleaded guilty in the Philadelphia County Court of
Common Pleas to rape, robbery, burglary, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and
conspiracy. He was sentenced to ten to twenty-five years in prison. Rambert has been
unsuccessful in numerous rounds of state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus
proceedings.
In November 2019, Rambert commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In his
operative amended complaint, he asserted several claims based on his belief that he was
unlawfully classified as a career criminal when he pleaded guilty. First, he claimed that
George Murphy, the Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted his case, and Jules
Epstein, his defense attorney, violated his constitutional rights by relying on “false” prior
convictions in designating him a career criminal. Next, he claimed that Attorney General
Josh Shapiro, Executive Deputy Attorney General Robert Reid, and Stephen St. Vincent,
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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the Director of Policy and Planning at the Attorney General’s Office, unlawfully denied
his request that they correct his criminal record through an action under Pennsylvania’s
Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA). Lastly, Rambert claimed that
Philadelphia District Attorney Lawrence Krasner and Assistant District Attorneys
Douglas Weck, Simran Dhillon, and Benjamin Jackal violated his constitutional rights by
maintaining improper records or failing to correct them in response to his “right to know
law requests.”
The District Court screened the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed it. Rambert appealed.1
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B). See
Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2020). We may summarily affirm on any
ground supported by the record if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;
I.O.P. 10.6.
We will affirm.2 First, Rambert failed to state a claim against Attorney Epstein
because public defenders are not state actors under § 1983 when they “perform[] a
1
Rambert’s application to proceed IFP is granted. See Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19
(3d Cir. 1976). He is required to pay the full $505.00 fee in installments regardless of the
outcome of the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b). The Clerk’s Office is directed to issue an
appropriate order to assess these fees.
2
To the extent that the District Court dismissed certain claims based on Heck v.
3
lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”3 See
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Rambert also failed to state a claim
against ADA Murphy because “[a]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the
initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as
an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.” Buckley
v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
Next, Rambert’s claim based on the alleged failure of defendants Attorney General
Shapiro, Deputy Attorney General Reid, and Director St. Vincent to institute an action
under the CHRIA does not implicate a constitutional right. See generally McMullen v.
Maple Shade Twp., 643 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[B]y its terms, § 1983 provides a
remedy for violations of federal, not state or local, law.”); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (explaining that “a private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”).
Finally, Rambert’s claims against District Attorney Krasner and the ADAs fail
because their actions do not fall afoul of the constitutional provisions on which he relies.
First, their alleged failure to correct Rambert’s records in accordance with Pennsylvania
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), we affirm the dismissals on the alternative
bases discussed below. Nonetheless, we note that insofar as Rambert may be using
§ 1983 to challenge his conviction and sentence, § 1983 is not the appropriate means for
doing so.
3
Although defense attorneys may act “under color of” state law when they conspire with
state officials to deprive a person of his or her federal rights, see Tower v. Glover, 467
U.S. 914, 923 (1984), Rambert did not meaningfully allege that Epstein did so.
4
law does not implicate the Eighth Amendment, see U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”). Second, Rambert did not allege facts to support a plausible
Equal Protection claim, see Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 243 (3d Cir.
2008) (explaining that to state an equal protection claim on a “class of one” theory, “a
plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly
situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the
difference in treatment”). Third, Rambert’s allegations do not state a procedural or
substantive due process claim. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The
fundamental requirement of [procedural] due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (quotation marks omitted)), Mulholland v.
Government County of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 241 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that to state a
substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must allege facts raising the inference that
defendants’ actions were so arbitrary, ill-conceived or malicious as to shock the
conscience).
Finally, the District Court acted within its discretion when it declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr.,
850 F.3d 545, 567 (3d Cir. 2017) (“A court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) when it dismisses all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” (quotation marks omitted)).
5
Accordingly, because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will
affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
6