D'Angelo v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Ass'n (In Re D'Angelo)

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 15-1972
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In re: JAMES ALBERT D'ANGELO, SR. & CAROLYN MARIE D'ANGELO,
Debtors
CAROLYN MARIE D'ANGELO; JAMES ALBERT D'ANGELO, SR.,
Appellants
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 2-14-cv-02084)
District Judge: Hon. Jan E. DuBois
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 11, 2016
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Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 21, 2016)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
MCKEE, Chief Judge
James Albert D’Angelo, Sr. and Carolyn Marie D’Angelo appeal the order of the
District Court affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Count Nine of their Second
Amended Complaint with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write for the parties who are already familiar with the facts and
procedural history, we set forth only the background necessary to our conclusion. The
District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of the D’Angelos’ attempt to
invalidate their note and mortgage pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) and (b). The District
Court also held that the Bankruptcy Court had properly concluded that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine barred review of the state court’s equitable lien order.
While the § 544 appeal was pending, the D’Angelos commenced another
proceeding, seeking to avoid as a preferential transfer the equitable lien against the
property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547. The Second Amended Complaint filed by the
D’Angelos contained a total of nine counts. The Bankruptcy Court initially dismissed all
of the counts in the D’Angelos’ Second Amended Complaint, except Count Nine, which
sought to avoid the equitable lien as a preferential transfer. In reviewing Count Nine, the
Bankruptcy Court concluded that the equitable interest acquired by JPM through the
equitable lien was an interest assigned to JPM in 2006 when JPM succeeded to the
interests previously held by the prior mortgagee of the property. The Bankruptcy Court
characterized the equitable lien as an “equitable assignment” or “subrogation.” Therefore
2
no interest of the D’Angelos was transferred to JPM during the preference period as
required by § 547(b). This appeal followed.
II.
We review the Bankruptcy Court’s decision de novo.1 We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s legal determinations.2 The Bankruptcy Court’s decision will not
be disturbed absent “a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an
improper application of law to fact.”3
The primary issue before us is whether the Bankruptcy Court correctly found that
the D’Angelos could not establish that the 2011 equitable lien order imposed by the state
court transferred a property interest to JPM such that it was a voidable transfer under 11
U.S.C. § 547(b). This provision allows a bankruptcy trustee to recover certain transfers
of interests in property made by a debtor within 90 days prior to filing a petition in
bankruptcy.4
The D’Angelos allege their original pleadings demonstrate that the equitable lien
involved a transfer of an interest in their home and JPM’s admission to fraud establishes
1
See In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 298 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing In re
Telegroup, Inc., 281 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002)).
2
See In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.,145 F.3d 124, 131 (3d Cir. 1998).
3
In re 15375 Memorial Corp., 589 F.3d 605, 616 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing In re SGL Carbon
Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1999)).
4
There are several elements that a debtor must satisfy to establish such a claim: (1) a
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property; (2) the transfer was made to or for the
benefit of a creditor of the debtor; (3) the transfer was made on account of an antecedent
debt; (4) the transfer was made while the debtor was insolvent; (5) the transfer was made
either (a) within ninety days of the petition date; or (b) if the creditor was an insider,
within the year of the petition date; and (6) the transfer enabled the creditor to receive
more than it would have received pursuant to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. §
547(b)(1)–(5).
3
that the equitable lien involved an interest of the D’Angelos unlawfully transferred to a
fraudulent actor as a matter of law. However, as the Bankruptcy Court succinctly and
correctly explained, the equitable lien given to JPM consisted of nothing more than the
equitable lienholder’s right of subrogation to the rights of the prior lienholder.5 It did not
constitute an assignment of an interest of the D’Angelos’. The Bankruptcy Court
correctly reasoned that, since § 547(b) requires an actual transfer of an interest in
property, the assignment between the lenders fell outside of the scope of § 547(b).
To the extent that the D’Angelos argue the equitable lien transferred an interest of
theirs where none existed before—allegedly as a result of JPM’s fraud—the District
Court concluded that it was deprived of jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. That conclusion was correct because summary judgment was entered against
the D’Angelos in state court before they filed for bankruptcy in federal court.6
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm.
5
See Lewis v. Diethorn, 893 F.2d 648, 651 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Bridge, 18 F.3d 195, 201
(3d Cir. 1994).
6
See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) (holding lower federal
courts are courts of original, not appellate, jurisdiction and lack federal jurisdiction to
review final judgment entered by a state court); Madera v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. (In
re Madera), 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009).
4