Robert Hankins v. John Wetzel

ALD-085 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-2324
___________
ROBERT HANKINS,
Appellant
v.
JOHN E. WETZEL, Secretary of the Penn. Dept. of Corrections; SHIRLEY MOORE-
SMEAL, Acting Commissioner of the Penn. Dept. of Corrections; MARIROSA LAMAS,
Superintendent at SCI Rockview; ROBERT MARSH, Deputy Superintendent; JEFFERY
HORTON, Deputy Superintendent; TIM MILLER, Program Manager; WILLIAM
WILLIAMS, (Ted) Medical Director; DANIEL FOX; AMY NIXON; BRADLEY
NEWTON; JEFFREY WITHERITE; MICHAEL BELL, Grievance Officer; DORINA
VARNER; KURT GRANLUND; BRIAN THOMPSON, Deputy Supt. at SCI Rockview;
JEFFREY RACKOVAN; GEORGE SNEDEKER; JULIE PENSIERO/KOLTAY;
JEREMY TIPTON; JOHN GRICE; JOHN GRAHAM; SHARON CLARK; STEWART
BOONE; FRANCIS M. DOUGHERTY; BEATRICE RIVELLO; BUREAU OF
HEALTH CARE SERVICES; JOHN KNIGHT; JANE DOES Nurses at SCI Rockview
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-00953)
District Judge Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal for Jurisdictional Defect,
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 17, 2015
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 6, 2016)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Robert Hankins (“Hankins”) appeals from the judgment of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in his civil rights
case. As the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the
decision of the District Court.
I.
Hankins is a state prisoner currently housed at SCI-Huntingdon and previously
housed at SCI-Rockview. During his time at SCI-Rockview, Hankins was repeatedly
placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) and on a restricted list due to his conduct.
Hankins filed an amended civil rights complaint against members of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (“D.O.C.”),1 naming various SCI-Rockview administrators
and staff as defendants. For brevity’s sake, we will refer to these defendants as the
“D.O.C. Defendants.”
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
Defendants Bureau of Healthcare Services; D.O.C. Secretary John Wetzel; Deputy
Secretary Shirley Moore Smeal; Regional Staff Assistants Brad Newton and Jeffrey
Witherite; Grievance Officers Michael Bell and Dorina Varner; and Julie Pensiero/Koltay
and Jeremy Tipton were dismissed over the course of motions practice. Hankins also
named a set of Jane Doe nurses, but their identities were never clarified and so were
dismissed.
2
Hankins raised numerous claims, some of which were dismissed by the District
Court on motion of the D.O.C. Defendants, and others which were dismissed over the
course of discovery. The District Court allowed several of Hankins’s claims to go
forward, namely that: regulations unconstitutionally prevented him from buying and/or
receiving outside publications while housed in the RHU; he was subjected to retaliation
for pursuing his legal remedies; and his incoming mail was interfered with. The D.O.C.
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court granted. Hankins
appeals from that order.2
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District
Court’s order granting summary judgment. 3 See Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 177 (3d
Cir. 2015). A district court may grant summary judgment only when the record “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When making this analysis, a
2
This case was initially listed for possible dismissal due to a jurisdictional defect. The
District Court’s order granting summary judgment was entered on March 27, 2015.
Hankins filed a document on April 17, 2015, called “Objections,” and then filed his
notice of appeal on May 18, 2015. The District Court construed the “Objections” as a
motion for reconsideration and denied it on November 2, 2015. Because the document
was not a clear motion for reconsideration, Hankins’s notice of appeal appeared untimely,
but was, in fact, timely. Hankins did not appeal from the District Court’s November
order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over
the order granting summary judgment, but not the order denying reconsideration.
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district court must credit the evidence of the non-moving party, and draw all justifiable
inferences in the non-movant’s favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986). A mere “scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party]’s
position will be insufficient” to create a genuine issue of fact. Id. at 252. The non-
moving party “must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a
material fact.” See Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007). The
non-moving party cannot rest on his complaint, but must point to affidavits, depositions,
interrogatory answers, and/or any admissions in establishing that there are material,
disputed facts. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
A. First Amendment Claim
The District Court correctly entered summary judgment on Hankins’s First
Amendment claim. Where a prison regulation imposes restrictions on an inmate’s
constitutional rights, that regulation is valid only if “it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Turner sets forth
four factors for courts to consider when determining if a prison regulation is in fact
reasonable: (1) a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate,
neutral governmental interest; (2) any alternative means of exercising the infringed right;
(3) the burden that the accommodation imposes on prison resources; and (4) any readily
available alternatives existing that would fully accommodate the inmate’s rights with
3
We may summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a
substantial issue. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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little cost to legitimate penological interests. See Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 156
(3d Cir. 2012). The prison has the burden of demonstrating the first factor, and if it meets
that burden, we consider the three other factors. Id. Ultimately, the inmate bears the
burden of showing that the regulation is unreasonable. Id.Hankins specifically alleged that his First Amendment rights were violated by
SCI-Rockview’s restrictive publication policies. The first policy stated that books could
not be purchased on the behalf of RHU prisoners, and the second required newspapers to
be exchanged on a one-for-one basis. These policies were changed after Hankins filed
the current lawsuit.
While the defendants changed the policies, they defended the initial, more
restrictive policies as legitimate under Turner, and cited Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521(2006), and Iseley v. Beard, 841 A.2d 168 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004), to support their
position. Both cases upheld a more restrictive publication policy than what Hankins
challenged. Regarding the first Turner factor (and citing Iseley), the D.O.C. defendants
argued that there were legitimate, neutral governmental interests regarding the
publication regulations: reducing the risk of flammable materials; limiting an inmate’s
ability to hide or trade prison contraband; limiting available resources for potential
weapons; and providing a form of non-violent behavior modification. They submitted
disciplinary reports documenting Hankins’s many outbursts and threats in support of
these arguments. They then pointed to alternative means for Hankins and other prisoners
to exercise their rights under the second Turner factor. They noted that prisoners
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received publications from within the prison; were allowed to keep a copy of a religious
text; received materials from pre-existing subscriptions; were allowed to renew
newspaper subscriptions; and were allowed to have one newspaper at a time. Regarding
the third Turner factor, the defendants argued that the burden that Hankins’s
accommodation request posed a danger to correctional staff and inmates. They provided
evidence documenting his history of threatening staff, throwing bodily fluids on staff,
assaulting staff, and screaming obscenities. The defendants did not squarely discuss the
fourth Turner factor. However, the District Court stated that the defendants had
demonstrated that “there was an absence of available ready alternatives.”
Hankins did not submit evidence that established a genuine dispute over any
material fact. Hankins argued that Beard supported his position, but he read the case
incorrectly. In Beard, the Supreme Court upheld a blanket ban of publications - a more
severe policy than what Hankins challenged here. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 525-26.
Hankins also contended, without any support, that because a prior prison and the next
prison he was housed at gave him legal exemptions, that SCI-Rockview should have
given him the same privilege. Ultimately, we give state prison officials deference in
making such decisions. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. As such, the defendants were
entitled to summary judgment.
B. Retaliation Claims
The District Court correctly entered summary judgment on Hankins’s retaliation
claims because he did not provide evidence to establish a causal link between the exercise
6
of his rights and the disciplinary actions taken against him and did not show that his mail
was tampered with. In order to succeed in a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish
three elements. First, he must demonstrate that his conduct was constitutionally
protected. Then, he must show retaliatory action “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary
firmness from exercising his constitutional rights[.]” Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184,
191 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)). Finally, he
must establish a causal link between his constitutionally protected conduct and the
adverse action taken against him. Id. In the prison context, the plaintiff has the “initial
burden of proving that his constitutionally protected conduct was ‘a substantial or
motivating factor’ in the decision to discipline him.” Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333.
Hankins alleged that he was retaliated against because he exercised his right to
pursue legal remedies. He stated that: SCI-Rockview medical staff ignored his requests
to trim his toe-nails, for sensitive toothpaste, and for replacement eyeglasses; he was
denied permission to purchase or receive religious and non-religious publications; and he
was prevented from receiving incoming mail and newspapers. Hankins also alleged that
he was prevented from accessing his legal property and was improperly placed on total
movement restriction.
In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants most explicitly pointed to
record evidence regarding causation. First, regarding Hankins’s medical retaliation
claims, they noted his medical requests, while delayed, were in fact complied with. The
delays were due to D.O.C. bureaucratic requirements and restrictions. Next, regarding
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his publications retaliation claim, the defendants noted that the publication policies at
issue existed before Hankins was transferred to SCI-Rockview, and so that applying the
policies to him were not retaliatory. Next, the defendants argued that Hankins did not
adequately define his mail retaliation claim, but all the same, pointed to record evidence
showing that he received at least six letters from an attorney and letters from his sister,
and that he has been able to successfully access the courts with his filings. Regarding his
legal property retaliation claim, the defendants noted that under D.O.C. policy, Hankins
had access on a monthly basis to his legal property, and that in practice, his requests to
access that property was granted. Finally, regarding his restricted movement claim, the
defendants pointed to the fact that Hankins had a history of activities restrictions to
establish that placing him on total movement restriction was not unwarranted.
Despite all of the evidence he provided, Hankins did not establish a genuine
dispute over any material fact. He did not point to any facts actually raising a genuine
issue of fact regarding retaliatory motives on the part of the defendants. Accordingly, the
defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
For the reasons stated above, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
decision.
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