Charles Talbert v. Corizon Medical Contractor

BLD-228 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-1236
___________
CHARLES TALBERT,
Appellant
v.
CORIZON MEDICAL;
Ms. M. TREMBLE;
Ms. GAY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-05177)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 4, 2015
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 8, 2015)
_________
OPINION*
_________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Charles Talbert, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s
order denying his requests for a preliminary injunction.1 For the reasons set forth below,
we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
In 2014, Talbert filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the defendants for
allegedly ignoring his medical needs, causing him undue suffering.2 He then filed several
motions for a preliminary injunction to require the defendants to address one of his
medical needs: the reversal of his ileostomy. He alleged that he scheduled the surgery
several times in 2013 and 2014, but the defendants prevented him from attending the
appointments. The District Court held a preliminary injunction hearing on January 7,
2015. Dr. Bruce Blatt, an employee of defendant Corizon Medical who has examined
Talbert’s ileostomy, testified at the hearing, and Talbert cross-examined him. After the
hearing, the District Court denied Talbert’s motions for a preliminary injunction. Talbert
timely appealed.
1
Several months after Talbert appealed the denial of his preliminary injunction motions,
the District Court appointed counsel for him. Although counsel recently entered an
appearance in this appeal, Talbert’s filings, which predated his appointment of counsel,
were drafted pro se.
2
Talbert is a pre-trial detainee at the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
2
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, and “[w]e review the denial of
a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or a clear mistake in
the consideration of proof.” Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir.
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such deferential review “is appropriate
because a court nearly always bases the grant or denial of an injunction on an abbreviated
set of facts, requiring a delicate balancing of the probabilities of ultimate success at final
hearing with the consequences of immediate irreparable injury.” Klitzman, Klitzman &
Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 958 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy
Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1438 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that we review factual
findings for clear error, “which occurs when we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We
will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment because this appeal does not present
a substantial question. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
A court ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction must consider the
following four factors:
(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on
the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of
the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater
harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary
relief will be in the public interest.
3
Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting ACLU
of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (en
banc)). The District Court denied Talbert’s motion because he failed to show irreparable
harm. Specifically, the District Court credited Dr. Blatt’s testimony that Talbert’s
ileostomy was functioning well and there was no emergent need to reverse it. Indeed, Dr.
Blatt testified that reversing the ileostomy would be an elective procedure. Talbert
produced no evidence to undermine Dr. Blatt’s testimony or otherwise adequately
demonstrate irreparable harm.
In support of his appeal, Talbert argues that his condition “may” have deteriorated.
He also alleges other speculative or remote harms. But an injunction will not issue “to
eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury.” Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chems.
Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). Injunctive
relief is appropriate only when there is a “clear showing of immediate irreparable injury[]
or a presently existing actual threat.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Talbert makes no such showing. Nor has he demonstrated that the District Court
committed clear error in its factual findings or otherwise abused its discretion. See
Duraco Prods., Inc., 40 F.3d at 1438.
III.
There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm
the judgment of the District Court.
4