Aaron Houston v. City of Philadelphia

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-3048
___________
AARON HOUSTON,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA;
COMMISSIONER PHILADELPHIA POLICE;
P.O. DET. MARY CALDWELL, Bdg. No. 0784;
ANTHONY BARBERA, Bdg. No. 3044;
AUSTIN, Bdg. No. 5190; FIU UNIT;
JOHN JENKINS, File Clerk;
EVELYN RAMOS; THOMAS CARMODY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-04442)
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 11, 2016
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 13, 2016)
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OPINION *
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding
precedent.
Pro se appellant Aaron Houston (“Houston”) appeals from a final order of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. We will affirm the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment.
I.
Houston, a resident of Philadelphia (“the City”), was involved in an altercation
with his former roommates and two of their associates. Houston, who legally owned a
pistol, pulled it in self-defense but did not fire it. Subsequently, he was arrested by the
Philadelphia police, and his pistol was confiscated. Criminal charges were brought
against Houston and later dismissed. Houston successfully had his criminal records
expunged, and he sought the return of his pistol. Because he did not comply with the
City’s legal procedures for the return of confiscated property, the pistol was not returned.
Subsequently, Houston bought a new pistol, and sought a license to carry from the City.
The application was denied for several reasons, 1 and when Houston appealed the denial
to the relevant city agency, that agency affirmed that denial. 2 Houston declined to appeal
the agency decision to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.
Houston filed his complaint in the Eastern District in July 2013, raising claims
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and under state law. Specifically, he
raised: (1) a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim against Officer Barbera; (2) a Fourth
Amendment search and seizure claim; (3) a fabrication of warrant claim against Detective
1
See Dist. Ct. Op. (dkt. # 53) at 5.
2
Id.
2
Caldwell; (4) a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against the City; and (5) a
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the City. The defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment, and the latter was fully briefed. In a sur-reply, Houston
provided an affidavit stating that he witnessed Officer Barbera confiscate his firearm
without a warrant at 4:30 a.m. that morning. See dkt # 48 at 20. By contrast, a police
report entered by the defendants indicated that a warrant was obtained at 10:15 a.m., and
that Houston’s bedroom was searched and his weapon seized after. Id. at 8. Houston had
specifically testified at a deposition, however, that Officer Barbera was not the police
officer who seized the gun. The District Court granted summary judgment on all claims,
and Houston timely appealed.
II.
We will affirm the District Court’s decision for substantially the reasons it
provided in its July 20, 2015, decision. 3 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and exercises plenary review over a District Court’s order granting
summary judgment. See Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 812 F.3d 319, 327-28 (3d Cir.
2016). A district court may grant summary judgment only when the record “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of
the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of the judge.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
3
To the extent that Appellant raised other claims, we deem such claims waived. See
United States v. Menendez, ___ F.3d ___, slip op. at 34-35 (3d Cir. Jul. 29, 2016, No. 15-
3459) (quotation omitted).
3
First, Houston failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to his false
arrest and false warrant claims. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141
(3d Cir. 1988); Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997). Second, he
failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to his search and seizure claim,
and the District Court appropriately disregarded the affidavit attached to his sur-reply
because of the inconsistencies between his prior deposition and the subsequent affidavit.
See Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 254 (3d Cir. 2007); see also
EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2010). Third, Houston
failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding his equal protection and
due process claims. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 535 (1984); Alvin v. Suzuki,
227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d
Cir. 2006). Finally, Houston failed to demonstrate a violation of his Second Amendment
rights. See Binderup v. Att’y Gen., ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 4655736, at *6 (3d Cir. Sept.
7, 2016, Nos. 14-4549 & 14-4550) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614
F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)).
4