Richard Potts v. Ronnie Holt

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-2650
___________
RICHARD POTTS,
Appellant
v.
RONNIE HOLT; WAYNE RYAN;
A.F.S.A. DESHAWN CHINA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-12-cv-01441)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 8, 2015
Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed June 24, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Richard Potts appeals pro se from the District Court’s order entering summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. We will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
for further proceedings.
I.
In reciting the factual background of this case, we accept as true the factual
allegations in Potts’s amended complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from the
record in his favor. Potts is a federal prisoner who was incarcerated at the United States
Penitentiary, Canaan (“USP-Canaan”) but who has since been transferred. Potts also is a
practicing Muslim and has participated in the Bureau of Prisons’ certified religious meal
program for over ten years. On June 26, 2011, USP-Canaan was placed on lockdown for
approximately two weeks when numerous inmates became ill after eating meals
contaminated with salmonella. During that time, prison officials relocated food
preparation to an adjacent facility, approved modified diets, and suspended the certified
religious meals program.
Potts filed suit pro se under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that the defendant prison officials1 violated the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and his First and Eighth Amendment
rights. In his amended complaint and a subsequent sworn declaration, Potts alleged that
defendants unnecessarily suspended the certified religious meal program without notice
on June 27, 2011, did not resume it until July 13, 2011, and denied him thirty-six or more
1
Because the alleged conduct of particular defendants is not relevant to our disposition of
this appeal, we refer to them collectively as “defendants” without suggesting that any
particular defendant was responsible for any of the particular conduct discussed herein.
2
certified meals during that time. He further alleged that none of the certified meal
program participants had fallen ill because the certified meals were not tainted by
salmonella and that defendants should have known that fact when suspending the
program, or at least by July 1 when they had an exact count of the inmates who had fallen
ill and when they approved a modified menu.2 Thus, he asserted, defendants violated his
rights by suspending the program in the first place and by not reinstating it sooner than
they did. Finally, Potts alleged that the alternative meals defendants provided during the
lockdown were not religiously acceptable, that no one notified him that the certified
meals program had been suspended, and that he thus ate “very little and most of the time
nothing” for two weeks out of fear of being removed from the certified meal program for
failing to comply with it. Potts requested both monetary damages and an injunction
requiring defendants to serve certified religious meals during lockdowns in the future.
Defendants filed a pre-discovery motion to dismiss Potts’s amended complaint or
for summary judgment, and a Magistrate Judge recommended granting it on various
grounds, including qualified immunity. The District Court sustained several of Potts’s
objections, but it ultimately agreed that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and
entered summary judgment solely on that basis. Potts appeals pro se.3
2
In other filings, Potts suggested that defendants could have resumed the certified meals
program on July 7, when food preparations at USP-Canaan resumed, or July 9, when
USP-Canaan reinstated the pre-lockdown menu.
3
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review of the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment and the legal issues underpinning a claim of
3
II.
We apply “a two-part analysis” to claims of qualified immunity and ask “(1)
whether the official’s conduct violated a constitutional or federal right; and (2) whether
the right at issue was clearly established.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir.
2012) (quotation marks omitted). The District Court concluded that whether defendants
violated Potts’s rights under the First Amendment and RFRA was materially in dispute
but that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because those rights were not
clearly established. Although defendants have not challenged the District Court’s ruling
that Potts adequately showed a violation of his rights at this stage, our consideration of
whether those rights were clearly established will benefit from some preliminary
discussion of our agreement on that point.
Potts alleges that defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment and
RFRA by suspending the certified religious meals program for two weeks without
sufficient justification. We have long held that prisoners generally are entitled to
religiously acceptable meals while in prison. See Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 192
qualified immunity.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014). In doing so,
we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that
party the benefit of all reasonable inferences” therefrom. Id. Defendants bear the burden
of establishing qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. See id. at 288. The
parties dispute whether the defense of qualified immunity applies to RFRA claims, which
we have not decided, but we need not address that issue because we conclude that
defendants have not shown entitlement to qualified immunity on Potts’s RFRA claim.
We also do not address Potts’s Eighth Amendment claim because he has not challenged
the District Court’s entry of judgment on that claim, but we note that we would affirm as
to that claim for the reasons explained by the District Court.
4
(3d Cir. 2006); Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003); DeHart v. Horn,
227 F.3d 47, 52, 59 & n.8 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). Thus, Potts’s First Amendment claim
turns on whether defendants’ suspension of the certified religious meals program during
the salmonella outbreak and resultant lockdown was reasonable under the four factors set
forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See Williams, 343 F.3d at 216-17; DeHart,
227 F.3d at 50-51, 59 & n.8.4 Potts’s RFRA claim turns on whether defendants’
suspension of the certified meals program was (1) the “least restrictive means” of (2)
furthering “a compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
The District Court determined that defendants had not adduced evidence sufficient
to show that their suspension of the certified meals program was reasonable under Turner
or that it satisfied the RFRA standard. We agree with these determinations because, inter
alia, defendants did not establish the nature or even the existence of any nexus between
the salmonella outbreak/lockdown and their suspension of certified religious meals.5
4
The Turner factors are: (1) whether there is “a valid, rational connection between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2)
“whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates”; (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4)
whether there is an “absence of ready alternatives” to the regulation. Williams, 343 F.3d
at 217 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
5
Defendants relied on Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 4700.05, which provides
that an “alternate menu” may be offered “[i]n emergency situations such as an institution
lockdown.” (ECF No. 43-1 at 59.) Defendants, however, presented no evidence or
argument showing how (or even that) this particular emergency required suspension of
the certified meals program. Defendants also presented no evidence or argument on
whether it was possible to provide certified religious meals during some or all of that
5
The District Court concluded, however, that Potts’s rights were not clearly
established at the time of defendants’ alleged conduct. “In determining whether a right
has been clearly established, the court must define the right allegedly violated at the
appropriate level of specificity.” Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159. The District Court defined the
right at issue in this case as the right to “religious meals during a prison-wide lockdown
that resulted after an outbreak of food poisoning (or disease generally) in the inmate
population.” (ECF No. 54 at 23.) The District Court further concluded that such a right
was not clearly established because there is no case law addressing an inmate’s right to
religious meals in a similar factual scenario.
There does indeed appear to be a dearth of such case law. Cf. Eason v. Thaler, 14
F.3d 8, 9-10 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding only that a similar claim was not frivolous for
purposes of the in forma pauperis statute). “Even though there may be no previous
precedent directly on point,” however, “an action can still violate a clearly established
time, how burdensome it would have been to do so, or whether they even considered that
possibility. Nor have they provided any evidence regarding operation of the certified
meals program itself, such as whether the certified meals served at USP-Canaan are
prepared at USP-Canaan or whether, as Potts asserted in one of his briefs, USP-Canaan
receives them prepackaged from an outside vendor. Defendants also presented no
evidence or argument rebutting Potts’s allegations that they could have resumed the
certified meals program sooner than they did and need not have suspended it at all. To
the contrary, as the District Court concluded, “the evidence in the record when viewed in
the light most favorable to Potts suggests that religious diet meals could have been
prepared during the lockdown.” (ECF No. 54 at 15.) In sum, none of defendants’
evidence explains why they withheld thirty-six or more certified meals from Potts over a
period of two weeks. See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 800 (7th Cir. 2008) (“We can
only give deference to the positions of prison officials . . . when the officials have set
forth those positions and entered them into the record.”).
6
right where a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law applies
with obvious clarity.” Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159.
Such is the case here. At the time of defendants’ alleged conduct, it was clearly
established in this Circuit that prisoners’ general right to freely exercise their religion
gives them the more specific right to be served religiously acceptable meals while in
prison. See, e.g., Williams, 455 F.3d at 192. It also had long been established that prison
officials may constitutionally infringe that specific First Amendment right when prison
administration so requires, but only when the infringement is reasonable under the Turner
factors. See Williams, 343 F.3d at 216-17; DeHart, 227 F.3d at 50-51, 59 & n.8. And
RFRA clearly establishes that defendants may not substantially burden an inmate’s
exercise of religion without satisfying the standard set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
Thus, at the time of defendants’ alleged conduct, it was clearly established both
that Potts had a right to religiously acceptable meals and that defendants could not
infringe on that right without sufficient justification under Turner and RFRA. See Wall
v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 502-03 (4th Cir. 2014); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 198-99
(4th Cir. 2006); Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2d Cir. 2003). In light of our
precedent addressing prisoners’ religious diets, no reasonable prison official could have
believed that he or she could simply withhold Potts’s religious meals for two weeks in the
absence of some justification. And in light of Turner and RFRA, no reasonable prison
official could have believed that the salmonella outbreak and lockdown provided such
7
justification in the absence of some nexus between the outbreak/lockdown and
defendants’ ability to provide religious meals, which the current record does not reveal.
The District Court’s definition of the right in question does not account for Turner
and RFRA, which already anticipate that prison officials are called upon to act in a
variety of factual scenarios and that the lawfulness of their actions will be judged in the
context of those specific scenarios. See, e.g., DeHart, 227 F.3d at 59 n.8 (collecting cases
addressing religious diets and noting that Turner requires “a contextual, record-sensitive
analysis”). The District Court’s application of its definition also runs afoul of the
summary judgment standard because it effectively inferred in defendants’ favor the
existence of a nexus between the outbreak/lockdown and defendants’ suspension of
religious meals that the record does not reveal. Cf. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861,
1866 (2014) (per curiam) (“[C]ourts must take care not to define a case’s ‘context’ [in
defining a right for qualified immunity purposes] in a manner that imports genuinely
disputed factual propositions.”). We have no doubt that the outbreak and lockdown
posed significant challenges, and a more developed record might ultimately reveal that
those challenges warranted a two-week suspension of the certified religious meals
program. The mere fact that defendants acted against that backdrop, however, is not
dispositive for qualified immunity purposes.
The District Court relied on one other factor in concluding that Potts’s right to
religiously acceptable meals was not clearly established in this context. The District
Court wrote that it reached its conclusion “especially in view of the fact that inmates
8
were provided with nutritionally adequate meals containing non-meat, religiously
acceptable food choices.” (ECF No. 54 at 25.) The District Court did not cite any record
support for that conclusion, defendants cite no such support on appeal, and this point
appears to be disputed.
Potts alleged in his amended complaint that the meals offered to him during the
lockdown “were cooked in animal bases that were unKosher/Halaal.” (ECF No. 36 at 4.)
The only evidence in defendants’ submissions that they may have offered him religiously
acceptable alternatives appears to be an e-mail dated July 8, 2011, from defendant
DeShawn China to the Food Service Department. That e-mail reads in relevant part:
“Also, remember to prepare no flesh alternatives as well. My suggestion is to utilize the
Religious Diet Meals (Vegan) to accomplish this.” (ECF No. 43-1 at 16.) Even drawing
the inference against Potts that defendants actually began offering these meals to him on
July 8 (which we will not do at this stage), China did not send this e-mail until twelve
days into the lockdown. This e-mail thus does not account for Potts’s allegations (which
defendants thus far have not disputed) that defendants could have resumed serving
certified religious meals at least by July 1 and need not have suspended the certified meal
program at all.6
6
Potts also expressly asserts in his brief in opposition to defendants’ motion that all of
the food he was offered during the lockdown was non-kosher/halaal and that defendants
never offered him a “no-flesh” meal. (ECF No. 47 at 7.) These allegations are neither
sworn nor contained in a pleading, but the District Court did not discredit them for those
reasons or otherwise address them.
9
In sum, the District Court erred in concluding on this record that defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity on Potts’s First Amendment and RFRA claims. We
express no opinion on the merits of those claims or on whether, at some later stage,
defendants might show that they are entitled to qualified immunity. We also express no
opinion on the arguments in defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment that
the District Court did not reach and that defendants have not raised on appeal. Finally,
we express no opinion on Potts’s claim for injunctive relief, which the District Court did
not address.7
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court as to
Potts’s Eighth Amendment claim, vacate it as to his claims under the First Amendment
and RFRA, and remand for further proceedings
7
Qualified immunity provides a defense to claims for monetary damages but not for
injunctive relief. See Montanez v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 488 (3d Cir.
2014). It appears that Potts’s claim for injunctive relief may have become moot because
he has been transferred to a different facility, see Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 222
n.2 (3d Cir. 2000), but the District Court can address that issue as appropriate on remand.
10