Michael D'Antonio v. Borough of Allendale

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 22-1329
__________
MICHAEL D’ANTONIO,
Appellant
v.
BOROUGH OF ALLENDALE; STILES THOMAS; JOHN ALBOHM;
DAVID BOLE, ESQ.; DAVID T. PFUND, ESQ.; MARY C. MCDONNELL, ESQ.;
LOUIS CAPAZZI; PASSAIC RIVER COALITION; BERGEN COUNTY SHERIFFS
DEPARTMENT; THOMAS P. MONAHAN, ESQ.; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-00816)
District Judge: Honorable Claire C. Cecchi
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 11, 2022
Before: RESTREPO, RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 19, 2022)
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OPINION *
___________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Michael D’Antonio appeals from orders of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss, and denying his
request for reconsideration, in a civil action challenging alleged interference with the use
and development of property in Allendale, New Jersey. For the reasons that follow, we
will affirm.
The property, located at 316 East Allendale Avenue, was owned by Calm
Development, Inc. (Calm) from 1997 until 2013, when, following a foreclosure action, it
was sold at a sheriff’s sale. Although D’Antonio was a director of Calm and resided on
the property, he did not maintain an ownership interest in it when the alleged interference
occurred. Nevertheless, before D’Antonio filed the underlying civil action, he and Calm
were parties to several several state court lawsuits pertaining to the property.
Following the failure to achieve relief in those lawsuits, D’Antonio filed in the
District Court a complaint, claiming that the Borough of Allendale and others took
various actions to thwart his plans to build homes on the property. The District Court
dismissed that complaint – as well as a second amended complaint filed with the
assistance of counsel – without prejudice for lack of standing and invited D’Antonio to
file amended complaints. (ECF 80 & 81; 259.) In the order dismissing the second
amended complaint, the District Court directed D’Antonio to file “an amended complaint
(to be titled the ‘Third Amended Complaint’) that specifically alleges why [he] has
standing to bring claims related to the Subject Property if he was not the owner of the
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Subject Property[.]” (ECF 259, at 3.) The defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the
District Court granted, stating that “[b]ecause [D’Antonio] has failed to plausibly allege
that he, as opposed to Calm, ever maintained an actionable legal interest in the Subject
Property during the Relevant Period, he cannot demonstrate any injury, let alone
causation or redressability, and therefore lacks standing to bring his claims.” (ECF 334,
at 10.) The District Court further held that, even if D’Antonio had standing, res judicata
precluded him from bringing claims that he had, or could have, litigated in state court and
that, in any event, he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Id.)
D’Antonio timely filed a motion for reconsideration. (ECF 336.) The District Court
denied that motion. (ECF 348 & 349.) D’Antonio next filed a notice of appeal,
identifying the orders dismissing his third amended complaint and denying his motion for
reconsideration. 1 (ECF 350.)
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our
review of a dismissal for a lack of standing is plenary. Goode v. City of Philadelphia,
539 F.3d 311, 316 (3d Cir. 2008). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a
court must grant a motion to dismiss if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a claim.
1
D’Antonio’s notice of appeal also listed several additional orders, including the orders
dismissing his earlier complaints and an order denying an application for appointment of
counsel. To the extent that those orders that might have been drawn in by the dismissal
of his third amended complaint, see Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177,
184 (3d Cir. 2010), he has forfeited any challenge by not addressing those orders in his
opening brief. See M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124
n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that claims were forfeited where appellant failed to raise them
3
See Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that “[a]
motion to dismiss for want of standing is … properly brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),
because standing is a jurisdictional matter”). Because the defendants alleged that
D’Antonio’s third amended complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations to establish
standing, those motions are properly understood as facial attacks. See Mortensen v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). In considering such an
attack, “the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents
referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).
Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary to the
resolution of cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “That case-or-controversy
requirement is satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing.” Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P.
v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273 (2008). To establish Article III standing, a
plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) . . . an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.” Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)). Here, the injury-in-fact element is
determinative, as it often is. Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 138
(3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). For there to be an injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must claim
in her opening brief).
4
“the invasion of a concrete and particularized legally protected interest” resulting in harm
“that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch.
Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
561 (1992)).
Applying these concepts to the facts of this case, we agree with the District Court
that D’Antonio’s attempts to establish standing are unavailing. 2 According to the third
amended complaint, the property was owned by Calm, not D’Antonio, when the alleged
interference occurred. And there is no indication in the third amended complaint or
D’Antonio’s subsequent submissions that he had some other interest in the property that
was sufficient to establish standing. Cf. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1977) (stating that “economic injury is not the only kind of
injury that can support a plaintiff’s standing”). D’Antonio alleged that he invested
money in Calm. But an individual lacks standing to bring a claim for damages suffered
by a corporation, even if the individual faces the risk of financial loss as a result of
injuries to the corporation. See Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 836 F.2d 731,
736 (2d Cir. 1987) (explaining that “[a] shareholder—even the sole shareholder—does
2
We also conclude, for essentially the same reasons as the District Court, that the
defendants’ motions to dismiss adequately demonstrated that D’Antonio’s claims are
barred by res judicata because they were, or could have been, litigated in prior state court
proceedings. See United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984);
see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005)
(recognizing that “a federal court may be bound to recognize the claim- and issue-
preclusive effects of a state-court judgment”).
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not have standing to assert claims alleging wrongs to the corporation”). Moreover,
D’Antonio’s role as Calm’s director does not by itself establish standing. Cf. Pitchford v.
PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that plaintiff, the shareholder and
officer of a corporation, lacked standing to file an antitrust action where “[t]here [was] no
proof that any of the restraints were directed against [plaintiff] individually as a
shareholder or as an officer” of the businesses).
In addition, D’Antonio’s vague and unsupported assertion that the Borough of
Allendale “purchased an insurance policy in [his] name alone” does not establish that he
suffered an injury. See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d
625, 633 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting “threadbare recitals of the elements of standing,
supported by mere conclusory statements” are “disregard[ed]” at the motion to dismiss
stage (internal citation omitted)). D’Antonio also attempted to establish standing for
himself by claiming that Calm ceased functioning as a corporation when it failed to pay
corporate filing fees to New Jersey. As the District Court properly concluded, however,
even if Calm dissolved, it could still “sue and be sued in its corporate name and process
may issue by and against the corporation in the same manner as if dissolution had not
occurred.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:12-9(2)(e). And there is no merit to D’Antonio’s
assertion that the District Court “granted” him standing when it reopened the case and
allowed him to proceed pro se. The decisions related to reopening and D’Antonio’s pro
se status were independent of the standing issue.
6
D’Antonio also suggested that he had standing because he was named as a
defendant in a foreclosure action that was brought by a mortgage company. But, under
New Jersey law, “even a party who has no title interest in the subject property is a proper
party in a foreclosure action, and a necessary party if there is any intention to pursue a
deficiency judgment against that party.” River Edge Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Clubhouse
Assocs., Inc., 428 A.2d 544, 547 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981). Therefore, the fact
that D’Antonio was named as a defendant in the foreclosure action – presumably because
he signed the mortgage note, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:50-2 – does not establish that he
suffered an injury sufficient to confer standing.
D’Antonio further argued that he had standing because he “held a lease” to reside
on the property and was evicted following the sheriff’s sale. Although eviction may
constitute an injury-in-fact, see Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442,
446-47 (9th Cir. 1994), D’Antonio’s claim is not plausible. In particular, he did not have
a valid lease, as evidenced by the New Jersey Superior Court’s denial of his motion to
stay the eviction. In the decision denying D’Antonio’s stay motion, the Superior Court
concluded that the lease he provided was a “sham” and that he previously had admitted in
deposition that “there is no lease.” 3 (ECF 301, at 66 of 104.) Consequently, in the
3
The Superior Court’s decision was attached to one of the defendants’ motion to dismiss
the third amended complaint. In relying on the facts from that state court decision, not
just its existence, the District Court should have converted the motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment. See Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 229 (3d
Cir. 1987). Any error, however, is harmless, as there is no set of facts on which
7
absence of a “leasehold interest” or “lawful tenancy rights,” D’Antonio lacked standing.
Ruiz v. New Garden Twp., 376 F.3d 203, 212 n.16 (3d Cir. 2004).
Finally, we note that D’Antonio’s brief does not meaningfully contest the District
Court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. Therefore, any challenge to that
decision is forfeited. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016). In any event,
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration,
see Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999), which
improperly attempted to relitigate issues that the District Court had already considered.
See Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he scope of a
motion for reconsideration . . . is extremely limited” and may not “be used as an
opportunity to relitigate the case.”).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 4
D’Antonio could possibly recover. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 1989).
4
To the extent that D’Antonio’s “Request [for] Leave of the Court” (Doc. 50) seeks to
strike portions of the Appellees’ supplemental appendices, it is denied. D’Antonio’s
“Request [for] Leave of the Court to Deny Mr. Albohm’s Submissions as Affidavits …”
(Doc. 63), which is construed in part as a motion for sanctions against Appellee Albohm,
is denied. We grant appellant’s “Request [for] leave of court to submit supplemental
objection to Appellees’ brief and appendices” (Doc. 65), and we have considered that
document as Appellant’s reply brief.
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