Darrell Prince v. United States Government

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 17-1482
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DARRELL PRINCE,
Appellant
v.
US GOVERNMENT; OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT;
SUPREME COURT UNITED STATES; US CONGRESS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-16-cv-06702)
District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sánchez
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 1, 2017
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 5, 2017)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se appellant Darrell Prince appeals the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of
his complaint for lack of standing. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
The complaint is a mix of vague allegations concerning the recent election of
President Donald Trump. It principally alleges a flawed apportionment of Electoral
College voters and federal representatives, in violation of Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and it additionally contends that President Trump’s financial holdings give
him “unprecedented opportunities” to violate the Emoluments Clause. Doc. No. 3 at 1-3.
Filed in December 2016 (after the 2016 presidential election, but before Inauguration
Day), the complaint sought “an immediate delay in the electoral college proceedings,
until these matters can be worked out.”1 Doc. No. 3-1 at 1.
This Court exercises plenary review over district court orders dismissing a
complaint for lack of standing. N. Jersey Brain & Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc., 801 F.3d
369, 371 (3d Cir. 2015). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) an injury-in-fact; (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341
(2014); Finkelman v. Nat'l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2016). Of these
three required elements for standing, “the injury-in-fact element is often determinative.”
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Though some aspects of Prince’s suit may now be moot, we need not resolve this appeal
on mootness grounds; standing is a similarly fundamental justiciability doctrine used to
enforce the “constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
controversies.” Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quotations omitted).
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Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted). Here the injury-in-fact element is determinative.
For there to be an injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must claim “the invasion of a concrete
and particularized legally protected interest” resulting in harm “that is actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d
247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992)). In this regard, “‘[the Supreme Court] ha[s] consistently held that a plaintiff
raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to
his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.’” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S.
437, 439 (2007) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499 (1975) (“[W]hen the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally
does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted).
We agree with the District Court that Prince lacks standing to bring this suit
because he has suffered no injury particularized to him. Indeed, we have already
determined that individuals such as Prince lack standing to challenge a President’s
eligibility to serve. See Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234, 240 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a
plaintiff pursuing a claim that President Barack Obama was ineligible to run for, and
serve as, President of the United States, lacked standing because “his ‘interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws[]’” was shared with all voters; and that the
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“relief he sought would have ‘no more directly tangibly benefit[ed] him than . . . the
public at large.”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74)). Accordingly, the District Court
did not err when it dismissed Prince’s complaint, and it did not abuse its discretion in
doing so without leave to amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
108 (3d Cir. 2002). The motion for oral argument is denied.
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