DocketNumber: 15901
Judges: Ganey, Smith, Freedman
Filed Date: 5/25/1967
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/4/2024
OPINION OF THE COURT
This appeal is from the dismissal of a complaint in which the only
Although the writ of mandamus has been abolished by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 81(b), 28 U.S. C.A., the procedural relief available in lieu thereof is still governed by the “All Writs Act,” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651. The statute provides that the federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” (Emphasis added.)
It has been uniformly held in a long line of decisions that a federal court is without authority to issue a writ of mandamus except in aid of its jurisdiction already acquired under an applicable federal statute. Knapp v. Lake Shore Railway Co., 197 U.S. 536, 541-543, 25 S.Ct. 538, 49 L.Ed. 870 (1905); Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Hager, 203 U.S. 109, 111, 27 S.Ct. 24, 51 L.Ed. Ill (1906); Marshall v. Crotty, 185 F.2d 622, 626 (1st Cir. 1950). There are other cases in point but we see no reason to cite them in this opinion. The relief here sought by the plaintiff is plainly not ancillary to a suit now pending in the district court. The issuance of the writ would not be in aid of the lower court’s jurisdiction; it would simply terminate the litigation.
The appellant argues that jurisdiction having been acquired by reason of diversity of citizenship and a requisite amount in controversy, the district court had authority to issue a writ of mandamus conformably to State practice. This argument is untenable. The jurisdiction of the district courts under § 1332(a) of 28 U.S.C.A. is limited to “civil actions.”
We recognize that a federal court may enforce a state-created substantive right, and to do so fashion an appropriate remedy. Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105-107, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945). However, we are not here concerned with the question of remedy but one of jurisdiction. The general jurisdiction of the district courts is limited and defined strictly by statute, in this case by § 1651(a) of Title 28 U.S.C.A., supra. United States ex rel. State of Wisconsin v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n., 248 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. den. 355 U.S. 957, 78 S.Ct. 543, 2 L.Ed.2d 533. When thus limited and defined it cannot be extended by local statute. “The basic purpose of § 1651, and of its statutory predecessors, was to assure
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.