Vandyke Johnson v. Rose Duncan

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 17-2164
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VANDYKE JOHNSON,
Appellant
v.
NJ PROBATION OFFICER ROSE DUNCAN, in
her official and individual capacity; JOSEPH CHARLES,
JR., in his official and individual capacity; BENJAMIN
BERNOUY, in his individual and official capacity;
HUDSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT;
COUNTY OF HUDSON COUNTY NEW JERSEY
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 17-cv-02624)
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
__________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 3, 2017
Before: RESTREPO, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed October 4, 2017)
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OPINION
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
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Vandyke Johnson appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his in
forma pauperis complaint sua sponte pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) and denying him leave to amend. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm
with a modification.
On April 17, 2017, Johnson filed his civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against the County of Hudson
and its Sheriff’s Department, Benjamin Bernouy, a Sheriff’s Department employee,
Probation Officer Rose Duncan, and Family Court Judge Joseph Charles, Jr., alleging
federal and state violations of his rights. Johnson alleged that he was detained at JFK
International Airport in New York by United States Customs Officer Kevin Adetola on
April 15, 2015, when he arrived back from a vacation in the Dominican Republic.
Specifically, federal officer Adetola detained Johnson on the basis of an outstanding
Hudson County, New Jersey warrant for his arrest. Complaint, at ¶¶ 21-23. Johnson
claimed that the warrant was invalid because it was based on a fabricated criminal
complaint that he had violated his probation when in fact his probation had expired. Id.
at ¶¶ 2, 24-25. Johnson alleged that, while detained at the airport, he contacted his
attorney and was able to obtain documentation to show that the warrant was invalid. Id.
at ¶ 23. Adetola, after being advised by Johnson that the warrant was invalid, allegedly
contacted defendant Detective Bernouy of the Hudson County Sheriff’s Department, id.,
and Detective Bernouy allegedly told Adetola that the warrant was valid, id. at ¶ 29. A
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New Jersey judge vacated the warrant the next day, on April 16, 2015, id. at ¶ 2, and after
that Johnson was released. In addition to these allegations, Johnson alleged that
defendant Probation Officer Rose Duncan caused the invalid warrant to be issued even
though she knew that Johnson was no longer on probation, id. at ¶ 25.
The specific counts alleged in the complaint were as follows. In Count I, Johnson
alleged a violation of § 1983 for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution against
Duncan for seeking the 2013 warrant based on information she knew to be false and
against Bernouy for telling Adetola that the warrant was valid when it was not. In Count
II, Johnson alleged the same § 1983 claims against the Hudson County Sheriff’s
Department for failing to adequately train and supervise Detective Bernouy and for
failing to promulgate adequate policies. In Counts III and IV, Johnson sought an
injunction invalidating a Final Restraining Order -- issued by Judge Charles allegedly in
violation of Johnson’s Fourteenth Amendment rights -- and restoration of his Second
Amendment rights. In Count V, Johnson alleged a state law tort of false imprisonment
against Duncan and Bernouy. In Count VI, Johnson alleged that the defendants
negligently violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by obtaining a warrant under false
pretenses and “not deleting the warrant out of their computer,” and against Hudson
County for allegedly failing to adequately train and supervise Duncan and Bernouy.
Johnson sought money damages and injunctive relief.
The District Court granted Johnson leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and then,
in an order entered on May 18, 2018, the Court sua sponte issued a form order dismissing
Johnson’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), Rule 12(b)(6),
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), for failure to state a claim upon which relief
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may be granted. The Court stated without explanation that Johnson’s claims were barred
by the statute of limitations, and that, in addition, several defendants would be protected
by immunity from suit. The Court further held that any amendment would be futile.
Johnson appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may affirm
on any basis supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir.
2011) (per curiam). A complaint that is filed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a) may be dismissed “at any time” if the District Court determines that it “fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted,” id. at § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(a)(2) calls for sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “[T]he Federal Rules do not
require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its
factual context.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009).
In his pro se brief, Johnson argues that his suit is timely filed within two years of
the date he was released from detention under Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911
(2017), which held that the Fourth Amendment provides a basis under § 1983 for
challenging unlawful pretrial detention. He further contends that the District Court erred
in immunizing some of the defendants from suit. Johnson has clarified that his probation
supervision was transferred to New York from New Jersey and that it ended on October
10, 2013, about a month before the warrant for his arrest issued. Appellant’s Informal
Brief, at 2. He has clarified that his attorney provided Adetola with documentation
concerning the transfer to New York, id., that Adetola was not satisfied, and that he then
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contacted New York Port Authority Police Officer Darby about making an arrest, id. He
then was taken into custody by Port Authority Officer Darby, id.1 Johnson has clarified
that he telephoned his attorney on April 16, 2015 and that his attorney then went to the
Hudson County Courthouse and “had [the] invalid warrant recalled by [a] New Jersey
State Judge,” id. at 3, and that he then was released from custody on April 17, 2015, id.2
We will affirm. We address the matters that are relatively straightforward first.
With respect to defendant Family Court Judge Charles, Johnson has failed to allege any
action, either in his complaint or his Informal Brief, that would be adequate to
demonstrate personal involvement on the part of Judge Charles in connection with the §
1983 claims of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. See Rode v. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate
that each defendant was personally involved in alleged wrongdoing). The November 15,
2013 warrant, which Johnson attached to his complaint, was issued by a different state
judge; it was issued when Johnson, in apparent contempt of court, failed to appear before
the Honorable Frederick J. Theemling, Jr. on the probation violation matter. Johnson’s
allegations of Fourteenth and Second Amendment violations and request for injunctive
relief appear to concern, not his claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution,
but rather a Final Restraining Order issued against him in a domestic violence matter,
which remains in force. Accordingly, we uphold the sua sponte dismissal of Johnson’s
1
Johnson has sued Adetola and Darby in federal court in the Southern District of New
York. Id. at 2-3.
2
Because of the thoroughness of Johnson’s Informal Brief, a remand so that he may
amend his complaint would be futile, see Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d
103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
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complaint as to Judge Charles on the basis of lack of personal involvement in the matter
of Johnson’s alleged unlawful detention. With respect to the Final Restraining Order, we
uphold the dismissal of the complaint on the basis of immunity from suit. Johnson
alleged no facts to show that Judge Charles’ actions were taken in the clear absence of
jurisdiction, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978), and thus, Judge Charles is
absolutely immunized from a suit for damages. As to Counts III and IV, injunctive relief
is not available against a judicial officer unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief is unavailable, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v.
Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2000), which Johnson does not allege.
We further conclude that the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects Hudson
County and its Sheriff’s Department from suit in federal court, as well as defendants
Duncan and Bernouy to the extent that they were sued in their official capacities. The
Eleventh Amendment protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in
federal court. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
A state cannot be sued in federal court by citizens of another state or its own citizens,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974), or by citizens of a foreign state, Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). Moreover, a suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity “is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s
office.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). As such, it is no
different from a suit against the State itself. Id. Hudson County and its Sheriff’s
Department are agents of the state of New Jersey for Eleventh Amendment purposes and
therefore not amenable to suit in federal court, see Wright v. State, 778 A.2d 443 (N.J.
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2001).3 Accordingly, we uphold the sua sponte dismissal of the complaint in its entirety
as to Hudson County and its Sheriff’s Department and defendants Duncan and Bernouy
to the extent that they were sued in their official capacities.
We turn our attention then to the issue of the timeliness of Johnson’s § 1983
claims against Duncan and Bernouy in their individual capacities. Johnson contends in
his pro se brief that his false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims accrued on
April 17, 2015 when he was released from detention, see Manual, 137 S. Ct. 911, such
that the instant action, filed on April 17, 2017, was timely filed within two years, which
he assumes is the allotted time. Appellant’s Informal Brief, at 4. We take a somewhat
different approach to the timeliness of Johnson’s complaint. The statute of limitations for
a civil rights action is determined by the applicable state’s statute of limitations for
personal injury actions. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985). Courts should
apply the statute of limitations of the state where the cause of action arose. Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). See also Pearson v. Secretary Dep’t of Corrections, 775
F.3d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 2015).4 Here, there are two candidates for consideration: New
Jersey and New York. The District Court appears to have concluded that New Jersey’s
two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims should govern, see N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:14-2(a); Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Dep’t, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir.
3
Johnson noted in his complaint that he has pursued a state tort claim against the
defendants in connection with his alleged unlawful detention. Complaint, at ¶ 14.
4
To the extent that we applied a “forum state” rule in Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176,
190 (3d Cir. 1993), we note that, in that case, the forum state and the state where the
harm occurred were the same: Pennsylvania.
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1989), and that the cause of action accrued on the day of the arrest, April 15, 2015, see
Bayer v. Township of Union, 997 A.2d 1118, 1129 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2010) (claim for false
arrest accrues on date of arrest). However, the arrest and detention, which are the source
of the harm to Johnson, occurred in New York. Therefore, an argument can be made that
Johnson’s § 1983 counts for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution accrued not in
New Jersey but in New York, in which case New York’s three-year statute of limitations
applies, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).
With those principles in mind, we uphold the dismissal of the complaint against
Duncan in her individual capacity as time-barred. Even if we apply New York’s three
year statute of limitations, her contribution to the harm ended no later than November 15,
2013, when the warrant, which allegedly was based on her intentionally providing false
information to the court, issued. Any § 1983 action against her under New York’s statute
of limitation would have to have been filed by November 15, 2016. Although Count VI
may be read to state an ongoing claim of negligence against Duncan (and the other
defendants) for “not deleting the warrant out of their computer” system, a negligent
deprivation of rights is not actionable under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment,
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Accordingly, we uphold the sua sponte
dismissal of the § 1983 claims against Duncan in her individual capacity as time-barred
and the dismissal of Count VI, the negligence count, in its entirety.
Defendant Bernouy is alleged to have verified the existence of the warrant on or
about April 15, 2015. If New York law applies, whether the § 1983 claim against him for
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution accrued on April 15, 2015 or April 17,
2015 need not be decided; if New York law applies, at a minimum, Johnson’s complaint
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was not due until April 15, 2018. Accordingly, we decline to uphold dismissal of the §
1983 claims against Bernouy in his individual capacity on timeliness grounds.
Nevertheless, dismissal was proper on the basis of qualified immunity. The doctrine of
qualified immunity protects a government official from a claim for damages when his
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
“The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns
of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685
(quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment)). Thus, qualified immunity shields officers who have “reasonable, but
mistaken beliefs” as to the law. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). See also
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). Here, Bernouy merely conveyed to
federal officer Adetola the existence of a facially valid warrant for Johnson’s arrest.
Johnson did not allege that the warrant was not facially valid when Bernouy
communicated with Adetola, and, in fact, he specifically acknowledged that the warrant
was not quashed by a judicial officer until April 16, 2015. Bernouy’s reliance on a
facially valid warrant for Johnson’s arrest was objectively reasonable. Id. Thus, we
uphold the dismissal of the § 1983 claims against him in his individual capacity. Cf.
Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 1997) (concluding that state trooper who
was inaccurately told by another trooper that there was warrant for plaintiff's arrest was
qualifiedly immunized from suit).
Last, we will modify the District Court’s order to state that dismissal of Count V,
the state tort claim for false imprisonment, is without prejudice. Because the District
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Court dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction and did not specifically
address Count V, it was proper to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that
count. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court sua sponte
dismissing Johnson’s complaint with prejudice as to all parties and all claims, except that
Count V, the state tort count, is dismissed without prejudice.
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