Saundra Russell v. City of Philadelphia

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 16-3680
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SAUNDRA S. RUSSELL;
KEITH SADOWSKI,
Appellants
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; DEPUTY COMMISSIONER KEVIN BETHEL,
PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITY; DEPUTY COMMISSIONER WILLIAM BLACKBURN,
PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITY; CAPTAIN WILLIAM BROADBENT, RETIRED, PHILADELPHIA
POLICE DEPARTMENT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
INSPECTOR JAMES KELLY, PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; CAPTAIN MELVIN SINGLETON,
PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITY; LIEUTENANT THOMAS HYERS, RETIRED, PHILADELPHIA
POLICE DEPARTMENT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
LIEUTENANT JACK FEINMAN, RETIRED, PHILADELPHIA POLICE
DEPARTMENT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; LIEUTENANT
EDWARD SPANGLER, RETIRED, PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, IN
HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; LIEUTENANT LAVERNE VANN,
PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITY; INSPECTOR AARON HORNE, PHILADELPHIA POLICE
DEPARTMENT, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; CARROLL
MADDEN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ADMINISTRATOR, PHILADELPHIA
POLICE DEPARTMENT IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
COMMISSIONER CHARLES RAMSEY,PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT,
IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-13-cv-03151)
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
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Argued: July 11, 2017
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Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 12, 2017)
Matthew B. Weisberg, Esq. [ARGUED]
Weisberg Law
7 South Morton Avenue
Morton, PA 19070
Counsel for Appellants
Elise Bruhl, Esq. [ARGUED]
City of Philadelphia Law Department
1515 Arch Street
17th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Appellees
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OPINION ∗
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MCKEE, Circuit Judge.
∗
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
Plaintiffs Saundra Russell and Keith Sadowski are both Philadelphia police
officers who brought several discrimination and retaliation claims against the City of
Philadelphia and related entities and individuals. 1 The District Court dismissed the suit
and granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants based solely on technical
deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ claims. 2
Specifically, the District Court found that Plaintiffs did not comply with the very
basic requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. That Rule requires that litigants
who file a response to a motion for summary judgment “cit[e] to particular parts of the
materials in the record” to support their assertions that certain facts were genuinely
disputed. 3
Since it is the attorney’s job (not the court’s) to closely examine the record to
determine if sufficient issues of fact exist to warrant a trial, we will affirm the dismissal
for the reasons set forth by the District Court. 4 We note moreover that, to the extent that
1
Though Sadowski remains employed by the Philadelphia Police Department, Russell
was terminated from employment in July 2009.
2
See Russell, et al. v. City of Phila., et al., No. 13-3151, 2016 WL 4478764 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 25, 2016)
3
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
4
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
Plaintiffs’ attorney cited to the record before the District Court and before this Court,
none of these citations support the claims of either Plaintiff.
We recognize that our Order affirming this dismissal based solely on Plaintiff’s
attorney’s failure to comply with a rudimentary procedural rule extinguishes any
meritorious claims Plaintiffs may have had. Plaintiffs’ loss therefore results solely from
their attorney’s ineffective representation rather than any defect that may (or may not)
have existed in Plaintiffs’ claims.
Nevertheless, our review is limited to the propriety of the District Court’s order
dismissing the complaint and granting judgment to Defendants as a matter of law. Since
we conclude that the dismissal was appropriate, Plaintiffs’ only possible recovery must
come from their attorney’s malpractice insurer, not from any of the Defendants. In order
to ensure that Plaintiffs are aware of this potential recourse, we will instruct Plaintiffs’
attorney to share this opinion with his clients and to ask them to send a letter to the Clerk
of this Court confirming that they have read this opinion, and that they fully understand
their potential recourse.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment to Defendants.
4