Hyon Scouten v. Commissioner Social Security

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-2214
___________
HYON HUI SCOUTEN,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1-15-cv-02084)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on January 19, 2018
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 22, 2018 )
O P I N I O N*
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Hyon Hui Scouten appeals the District Court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her claim for disability insurance benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434. For the reasons set forth
below, we will affirm.
I. Background
As the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recounted in detail,
Scouten claims disability based on physical impairments, such as compression fractures
of the thoracic and lumbar spine and knee pain, and the mental impairment of depression.
In September 2012, Scouten filed an application for disability insurance benefits, alleging
a disability onset date of April 15, 2007. After the Social Security Administration denied
her application, Scouten requested a hearing before an ALJ.
Applying the sequential evaluation process under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)–(g), the
ALJ determined that Scouten was not disabled at any time from the alleged onset date
through December 31, 2011, the date she was last insured. The ALJ found that Scouten’s
compression fractures and knee pain were severe physical impairments but that she did
not have a severe mental impairment. The ALJ further found that Scouten had the
residual functional capacity to perform light work and that she could perform jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy. Based on these findings, the ALJ
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determined that Scouten was not disabled and therefore not eligible for disability
benefits.
After the Appeals Council denied Scouten’s request for review of the ALJ’s
decision, Scouten sought review in the District Court, which affirmed the
Commissioner’s determination. This appeal followed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review over all legal issues, Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d
857, 858 (3d Cir. 1995), but we must accept the ALJ’s factual findings if supported by
substantial evidence, Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012).
Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” or “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d
Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)).
III. Discussion
Scouten raises four arguments in support of her contention that the determination
of the ALJ was not supported by substantial evidence. None is persuasive.
First, Scouten argues that the ALJ did not give enough weight to the opinion of her
treating primary physician, Dr. Prince, that she had a limited physical capacity and could
not sit or stand for more than three hours a day. We disagree. A treating source’s
opinion is not entitled to controlling weight if it is “inconsistent with the other substantial
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evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). The ALJ considered Dr.
Prince’s opinion, which was offered after the date Scouten was last insured, and found it
inconsistent with the physician’s contemporaneous medical records from the relevant
period indicating Scouten’s normal gait and strength, full range of motion, and intact
sensation. The ALJ was entitled to consider the complete medical record and to place
greater reliance on the contemporaneous entries than on the doctor’s later, inconsistent
opinion. See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 430.
Second, Scouten challenges the ALJ’s finding that her depression was not a severe
impairment, asserting that the ALJ improperly credited a non-examining psychological
consultant over her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Berger. Yet, because Dr. Berger’s opinion,
like Dr. Prince’s, was inconsistent with her medical records and was based on a short
treatment history that began well after the date she was last insured, the ALJ was entitled
to give the opinion limited weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (explaining that the
weight given to a medical opinion depends on factors including the “[l]ength of the
treatment relationship,” the “[n]ature and extent of the treatment relationship,” and the
opinion’s “[c]onsistency . . . with the record as a whole”). Even accepting, as Scouten
contends, that the consultant’s opinion was based on an incomplete record, the ALJ
himself did consider the complete record and determined that it was consistent with the
consultant’s conclusion, and the ALJ, not physicians or consultants, must make the
ultimate disability determinations. See Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356,
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361 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ’s finding that Scouten did
not have a severe mental impairment is supported by substantial evidence.
Third, Scouten challenges the ALJ’s finding that her own testimony was only
partially credible. The ALJ considered Scouten’s testimony about the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms but found that the objective medical
evidence—which revealed routine, conservative, and limited treatment—was inconsistent
with the severity of her assertions. Substantial evidence therefore supports the ALJ’s
finding that Scouten’s testimony was only partially credible. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312
F.3d 113, 130 (3d Cir. 2002).
Finally, Scouten argues that the ALJ, without proper explanation, failed to credit
her husband’s testimony, but again, the record demonstrates otherwise. The ALJ
discussed Scouten’s husband’s testimony in detail, and then considered the other
evidence in the record, including Scouten’s MRI results and contemporaneous treatment
records, that undermined his testimony. In light of this comprehensive review, we are
satisfied that the ALJ fulfilled his “duty to hear and evaluate all relevant evidence.”
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court
upholding the Commissioner’s denial of Scouten’s disability claim.
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