Chetty Holdings Inc. v. NorthMarq Capital, LLC

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 13-2481
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CHETTY HOLDINGS INC; CARL E. CHETTY,
T/A Millville Apartment Homes, LP,
Appellants
v.
NORTHMARQ CAPITAL, LLC; TIMOTHY C. KUHN
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-11-cv-04640)
District Judge: Thomas N. O'Neill, Junior
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 23, 2014
Before: FUENTES and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and STARK,* District Judge.
(Filed: February 10, 2014)
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OPINION
____________
*
The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, District Judge for the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware, sitting by designation.
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Appellants Chetty Holdings, Inc. and Carl E. Chetty (collectively, “Chetty”)
appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their third amended complaint. Chetty alleged
that Appellees NorthMarq Capital, LLC (“NorthMarq”) and its employee Timothy C.
Kuhn (collectively, “Appellees”) were negligent and made certain negligent
misrepresentations that prevented Chetty from obtaining a mortgage refinancing loan
insured by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).
Because the District Court properly concluded that Chetty failed to establish proximate
cause, we will affirm.
I.
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
Chetty financed the purchase of the Millview Apartment Homes (the “Millview
Property”) through a fifteen-year forward mortgage for approximately $27 million with
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company (“Northwestern Mutual”). The mortgage
contained a provision that imposed a prepayment penalty in the event Chetty sought to
pay off the mortgage in full. In response to the financial crisis and a downturn in
occupancy, Northwestern Mutual offered to waive the prepayment penalties to allow
Chetty to refinance the loan on the Millview Property in early 2009.
2
Shortly thereafter, Kuhn (on behalf of NorthMarq) initiated discussions with
Chetty about securing a loan for the refinancing. Kuhn reviewed the financial status of
the Millview Property and Chetty Holdings and recommended that Chetty apply for a
refinancing loan through NorthMarq’s underwriting arm, AmeriSphere Mortgage
Finance, LLC (“AmeriSphere”).1 Chetty alleges that Kuhn was the “point person for
Plaintiffs throughout the [application] process,” and that Kuhn made negligent
misrepresentations about the application process and the anticipated outcome. App. at
349. Kuhn presented Chetty with a proposed engagement letter on July 7, 2009 that
purported to set forth an agreement between Chetty and AmeriSphere, in which
AmeriSphere would “provide Mortgage Insurance processing services . . . for a mortgage
loan.” App. at 231. Pursuant to the engagement letter, Chetty provided a substantial
amount of information and documentation to AmeriSphere about the Millview Property.
Before Northwestern Mutual would issue a written modification of the terms of
the mortgage (by waiving the prepayment penalty), it requested a timeline for completion
of the refinance application process. Kuhn provided the timeline, which specified
“approximate” start and end dates for each phase, and specified that the dates were
“anticipated subsequent milestones related to the . . . refinance.” App. at 75 (emphasis
added). The timeline provided that the loan was anticipated to close by July 31, 2010.
1
The third amended complaint indicates that Chetty was to apply for a “223(f)
FHA/HUD loan.” App. at 348. As noted by Appellees, AmeriSphere agreed to provide
the loan, provided that Chetty secured mortgage insurance from HUD. Appellees’ Br. at
22 n.10. AmeriSphere is no longer a party to this case.
3
Northwestern Mutual thereafter issued a written loan modification agreement that waived
the prepayment penalty until July 31, 2010. Kuhn allegedly represented to Chetty that
Northwestern Mutual would be lenient with imposing the prepayment penalty, even after
the July 31, 2010 date.
Kuhn “strenuously objected” to Chetty’s attempts to list the Millview Property for
sale, and Chetty turned down one offer to purchase the property. App. at 353. Chetty
therefore alleges that Appellees negligently failed to recommend that Chetty pursue the
sale of the Millview Property while applying for the refinance loan to ensure that either
the loan would close or the property would sell before the waiver period ended.
In April 2010, AmeriSphere completed Chetty’s application. AmeriSphere’s
internal loan processing committee assessed and approved the application, concluding
that it met all essential criteria for HUD’s firm commitment to insure the loan. Chetty
wired a $95,040 application fee to AmeriSphere, which was sent, along with the
application, to HUD. HUD denied Chetty’s application on July 30, 2010 due to Chetty’s
failure to make timely payments on its existing mortgage and the Millview Property’s
inconsistent occupancy. Chetty alleges it then “had no choice but to pursue a sale of the
Millview Property” after the July 31, 2010 deadline. App. at 358. As a result of that
sale, Chetty incurred $2.6 million in prepayment penalties, in addition to the $95,040
application fee, a $5,000 processing fee paid to NorthMarq, and $22,000 in consultant
fees, also paid to NorthMarq.
4
Chetty filed suit in the District Court and filed a third amended complaint on May
25, 2012, asserting claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. By
Memorandum Opinion and Order dated April 22, 2013, the District Court dismissed the
third amended complaint on the ground that Chetty failed to adequately plead the
necessary element of proximate cause. This appeal timely followed.
II.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise de novo review over
the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing AT&T v. JMC
Telecom, LLC, 470 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 2006)). When analyzing a motion to dismiss
we, like the district court, “must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as
true . . . [and] must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678-79 (2009)). Conclusory allegations without factual support are insufficient to
survive the plausibility standard. Id. at 210.
III.
The parties dispute the extent to which proximate cause may be determined by the
court. Chetty maintains that proximate cause is an inherently fact-based question that
5
should generally be resolved by a jury. See Ford v. Jeffries, 379 A.2d 111, 114 (Pa.
1977) (explaining that the issue of proximate cause “should not be taken from the jury if
the jury may reasonably differ as to whether the conduct of the defendant was a
substantial cause or an insignificant cause” (emphasis added)). Appellees counter that
proximate cause is a question of law properly decided by the court. See Vattimo v. Lower
Bucks Hosp., Inc., 465 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. 1983) (recognizing that proximate cause is
an issue of legal policy); Eckroth v. Pa. Elec., Inc., 12 A.3d 422, 427-28 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2010) (stating that proximate cause is an issue of law for the court to determine). As
Ford makes clear, however, nothing precludes a court from determining proximate cause
as a matter of law if a jury could not reasonably differ on the issue. 379 A.2d at 114.
Because a jury could not reasonably conclude that Appellees’ alleged actions proximately
caused Chetty’s injury, the District Court did not err in dismissing the case.
A party suing for negligence must prove, inter alia, causation between the alleged
wrongful act and the plaintiff’s alleged injuries.2 Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 55 A.3d 1088,
1103 (Pa. 2012) (Todd, J., dissenting). Proximate or legal causation is “that point at
which legal responsibility should attach to the defendant as a matter of fairness because
the plaintiff has demonstrated . . . that the defendant’s act was a ‘substantial factor’ or a
‘substantial cause,’ as opposed to an ‘insignificant cause’ or a ‘negligible cause,’ in
2
Causation is a necessary element in both negligence and negligent
misrepresentation claims. See Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 771 (3d
Cir. 2009) (negligent misrepresentation under Pennsylvania law); Toogood v. Owen J.
Rogal, D.D.S., P.C., 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (Pa. 2003) (negligence).
6
bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.” Id. (quoting Ford, 379 A.2d at 114). Pennsylvania
courts have adopted the “substantial factor” theory of proximate cause from Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 431 (1965). Ford, 379 A.2d at 114. Under § 431, an “actor’s
negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if [] his conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm . . . .” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431.
Pennsylvania has also adopted the Restatement’s definition of “substantial factor.”
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 (1965); Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27,
56 n.36 (Pa. 2012) (acknowledging that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “has cited
Section 433 as consistent with Pennsylvania law” (citing Vattimo, 465 A.2d at 1233-34)).
Section 433 provides:
The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with one
another important in determining whether the actor’s conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another:
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and
the extent of the effect which they have in producing it;
(b) whether the actor’s conduct has created a force or series of forces which
are in continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or has
created a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the
actor is not responsible;
(c) lapse of time.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433. The District Court properly took these
considerations into account in finding that no jury could reasonably conclude that
Appellees’ negligence—if proved—was a substantial factor in causing Chetty’s alleged
injury.
7
The District Court identified a number of “other factors” that contributed
substantially to Chetty’s injury. Chief among them were Chetty’s agreement to a
mortgage that included substantial prepayment penalties and Chetty’s decision to sell the
Millview Property. Appellees had no involvement in those decisions, and it was Chetty’s
decision to sell the Millview Property—not any negligence on Appellees’ part—that
ultimately led Chetty to incur the $2.6 million in penalties due to Northwestern Mutual.
Appellees likewise had no control over HUD’s decision to reject the application
for mortgage insurance. Instead, the rejection was the result of several additional factors
identified by the District Court, including: (1) the drop in occupancy at the Millview
Property; (2) Chetty’s failure to make timely payments on the mortgage; and (3) HUD’s
conclusion that Chetty did not qualify for a loan and its refusal to provide insurance.
Although Chetty maintains that Appellees’ negligence caused HUD’s rejection (and the
resulting fees), that argument misses the mark. The complaint indicates that it was
AmeriSphere, not NorthMarq or Kuhn, whose “internal loan processing committee had
approved Plaintiffs’ application and determined that Plaintiffs’ application met all of the
essential criteria for the issuance of a HUD Firm Commitment.” App. at 355. Taken
together, these external factors were the substantial factor that brought about Chetty’s
alleged harm.
Other pleaded facts demonstrate how Appellees’ conduct merely “created a
situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which [they are] not
8
responsible.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(b). Assuming Appellees were
negligent (as we must) does not change the substantial impact of: (1) the economic
hardships on the Millview Property; (2) HUD’s decision to reject the loan insurance
application; and (3) Northwestern Mutual’s decision not to extend the penalty waiver.
These facts independently operated to derail Chetty’s application and led to imposition of
the resulting prepayment penalty. Appellees’ encouragement of the refinance was
“harmless” absent these external factors.
Chetty focuses on the timeline3 as evidencing Appellees’ control over when the
prepayment penalties began to accrue. This argument fails, however, because the
timeline makes clear that it merely sets forth “anticipated subsequent milestones” for the
refinancing, and includes only “approximate” start and end dates for each stage. App. at
75 (emphasis added). It was ultimately Northwestern Mutual that made the decision
about when it would no longer suspend the prepayment penalties. Moreover, this
argument misses the larger point that it was the sale after the deadline—not the deadline
itself—that caused Chetty to incur the prepayment penalties.
Finally, the engagement letter informed Chetty of the risks by noting that “FHA
may issue an FHA Firm Commitment. If the FHA Firm Commitment is issued . . .” App.
3
Both the timeline and the engagement letter (discussed infra) are referenced in
the complaint and are part of the record on appeal. They may, therefore, be considered at
the motion to dismiss stage. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus.,
Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that a court may consider the
allegations in the complaint and documents referenced therein when deciding a motion to
dismiss).
9
at 232 (emphasis added). The letter further provided that “[t]his Engagement is not and
shall not be construed as a commitment of or by Lender to make the Loan or any other
loan to you,” and “[t]he Borrower understands, acknowledges and agrees that: (i) Lender
has not made any representations or warranties regarding the results of the FHA
Mortgage Insurance processing . . . . While Lender will seek to obtain an FHA Firm
Commitment and provide a Loan at an interest rate satisfactory to you, we cannot
promise or otherwise assure you that we will be successful.” App. at 234. The complaint
acknowledges that Kuhn gave this notice to Chetty. Even assuming Appellees
negligently advised Chetty during the application process, Chetty was very much aware
that the HUD insurance was not a foregone conclusion. This bolsters the District Court’s
conclusion that any negligence merely created a situation that was harmless absent the
myriad causative factors discussed above.4
Appellees could not guarantee that Chetty would receive the financing and Chetty
acknowledged that fact. The costs incurred were likewise the result of Chetty’s own
decisions and of matters outside Appellees’ control. The District Court looked to these
facts and properly concluded that they satisfied two elements of the Restatement’s
4
Chetty argues that none of the factors considered by the District Court were “the
type of ‘superseding cause’ necessary to absolve [Appellees] of their liability.”
Appellants’ Br. at 23-27. This argument likewise fails because the District Court did not
rely upon a “superseding cause” analysis; instead, it properly followed the Restatement
by considering the “other factors which contribute[d] in producing the harm” and
concluding that Appellees’ negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Chetty’s
harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(a).
10
definition of substantial factor. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 (“The following
considerations are in themselves or in combination with one another important in
determining whether the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor . . .” (emphasis added)).
In light of these facts, no jury could reasonably conclude that Appellees’ alleged
negligence proximately caused Chetty’s injury.
IV.
For the above stated reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of
Chetty’s third amended complaint.
11