G. Jackson v. Coleman Brown

GLD-083 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-3778
___________
MR. G. JACKSON,
Appellant
v.
MR. COLEMAN BROWN; MR. STEVE COOPER;
TRUE BLUE; LABOR READY INC., et al
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-00702)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 6, 2012
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 31, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
Gregory Jackson filed a pro se complaint alleging that he worked for various
temporary employment agencies, including defendant Labor Ready, from 2001 until
2010. During this time, Jackson contends, “he relentlessly sought revelation and
resolution of the mass murderous lethal environmental crimes that he has titled „The
Phantom Evil.‟” Compl. at 1 (emphasis omitted). Jackson allegedly had “discovered that
a deadly peril was being allowed to never cease inflicting fatalities and health hazards on
mass millions of people in the public at large[.]” Id. Jackson‟s efforts to expose this
“Phantom Evil” were not well received, see id. at 2-3, and he contends that “conflict”
over his efforts led to termination of his employment. Id. at 2. Jackson claims that “his
employment terminated for malicious and discriminatory reasons that [were] intended to
deprive him of the cash flow needed to successfully litigate court ordered public disclose
[sic] of the Phantom Evil.” Id. at 3. Jackson seeks damages from the defendants (who
are allegedly “employees of the aforementioned labor agencies or employees of clients,”
id. at 4), claiming that he was the victim of discrimination, “obstructed justice,” and a
“cover up and censorship . . . by clients of Labor Ready” and others. Id. at 3-4.
The District Court deferred ruling on Jackson‟s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP) and directed him to file an amended complaint, noting that its review
indicated that Jackson‟s claims as pleaded were subject to dismissal as frivolous. The
District Court entered a separate order directing Jackson to communicate with the court
exclusively by written motion, citing Jackson‟s “prior improper contacts with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.” Docket # 6 at 1. Jackson responded by
filing a “Motion for Court Communication Status and [IFP] Hearing,” docket # 7,
arguing that he is the victim of “abuses by clerks of this court and other courts” seeking
to suppress information about the “Phantom Evil.” Id. at 1. Jackson did not file an
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amended complaint as directed.
The District Court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i),
concluding that Jackson‟s allegations “fall within the fanciful, delusional, and/or
frivolous categories.” Docket # 8 at 3. The District Court denied Jackson‟s motion to
proceed IFP as “moot.” Jackson timely filed this appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because Jackson has been granted
leave to proceed IFP on appeal, we must determine whether the appeal is subject to
dismissal as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An appeal is frivolous if it has
no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). After a
review of the record, we conclude that this appeal must be dismissed as frivolous.
Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “authorizes the dismissal of a[n IFP] complaint as
factually frivolous if a court determines that the contentions are clearly baseless.”
Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995). Here, the crux of Jackson‟s
complaint is that he experienced various wrongs (e.g., termination of his employment, a
“cover up and censorship”) due to his efforts to expose unspecified “mass murderous
lethal environmental crimes” – the so-called “Phantom Evil.” Because Jackson‟s claims
for relief, if any, against the named defendants are plainly entwined with the existence of
this “Phantom Evil,” the District Court properly determined that the complaint is fanciful
and baseless. “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged
rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are
judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
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25, 33 (1992). Jackson did not amend his complaint to cure this deficiency in pleading
despite being afforded an opportunity to do so.1 On this record, his complaint was
properly dismissed for frivolousness.2
In sum, this appeal has no arguable basis in law or fact and will be dismissed for
that reason under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
1
Jackson‟s complaint is also legally frivolous insofar he seeks relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for “negligence and malicious disregard of his constitutional rights.” Compl.
at 1. “To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted
under color of state law, in other words, that there was state action.” Great Western
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1798 (2011). Jackson names private individuals and entities
as defendants, and there is no alleged state action.
2
We note the District Court‟s decision to deny as “moot” Jackson‟s motion to
proceed IFP. It is settled that a district court must use “a two-step analysis in
evaluating motions to proceed under § 1915. First, the district court evaluates a
litigant‟s financial status and determines whether [he] is eligible to proceed [IFP]
under § 1915(a). Second, the court assesses the complaint under § 1915([e]) to
determine whether it is frivolous.” Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir.
1990). If the litigant is indigent, IFP status ordinarily should be granted. Gibbs v.
Ryan, 160 F.3d 160, 161 n.1 (3d Cir. 1998). As a procedural matter, therefore, the
District Court should have addressed Jackson‟s IFP motion before dismissing the
complaint as frivolous, rather than deny the IFP motion as moot after dismissal. This
procedural misstep notwithstanding, the District Court was undoubtedly correct in its
determination regarding the frivolity of Jackson‟s complaint.
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