United States v. Frankie Taylor

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 13-1939
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
FRANKIE TAYLOR,
Appellant.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(District Court No.: 3-11-cr-00452-006)
District Court Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on January 13, 2014
(Opinion filed: March 12, 2014)
BEFORE: RENDELL, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges
OPINION
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
Frankie Taylor was found guilty on three counts of conspiracy to distribute
controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Specifically, he was convicted of
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute twenty-eight grams
or more of crack cocaine, and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute one hundred grams or more of heroin. The District Court sentenced him to 132
months for each count, to run concurrently, and five years supervised release.
Taylor now appeals alleging that the District Court erred in (1) permitting
testimony from Thomas Goodwyn as a co-conspirator regarding a statement made in
furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) considering venue as a question of fact for the jury; and
(3) denying Taylor’s motion for judgment of acquittal. For the reasons that follow, we
will affirm. 1
I. Background
Taylor worked at a car detailing and repair shop, referred to as “Motor City,”
owned by Carl Barnett. Barnett was the head of a large conspiracy “the purpose of which
was to profit from the distribution of controlled substances, chiefly heroin, cocaine and
cocaine base, in and around Trenton, New Jersey and Morrisville, Pennsylvania.” PSR
¶56. Aside from Taylor, there were 16 other co-conspirators, including Barnett, all of
whom pled guilty to a variety of charges related to the conspiracy.
During the course of the conspiracy the investigating officers used wire taps and
cameras to monitor Barnett and his associates. Taylor was observed by a “pole camera”
at Motor City putting a plastic bag in a car that another co-conspirator picked up a short
1
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
time later. (Supp. App. 164, 553.) This bag was allegedly filled with drugs. Taylor was
also heard on some wire taps referring to “hip hop.” (Supp. App. 1051.) Taylor
continuously asserted that he was an employee at Barnett’s legitimate Motor City
business and helped Barnett distribute his hip hop/rap music compact discs. He further
contended that he was unaware that the people with whom Barnett associated, were all
involved in a drug dealing conspiracy.
At the close of the Government’s case, Taylor made a motion for a judgment of
acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. 2 In his motion, Taylor
contended that the prosecution failed to establish proper venue in New Jersey as to all the
counts during its case-in-chief. The District Court dismissed two counts of possession
with intent to distribute, but reserved the remainder of Taylor’s motion, ultimately
denying it following the jury verdict. 3 In denying Taylor’s motion, the District Court
wrote:
Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the
circumstantial evidence presented by the Government was sufficient for a
reasonable jury to infer that [Taylor], along with other co-defendants, had a
unity of purpose, intended to achieve a common goal of distributing illegal
drugs, and agreed to work together towards that goal.
(Taylor App. 13.)
2
Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 29(a) reads: “After the government closes its evidence or after the
close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of
acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.”
3
Under Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 29(b) when a court reserves decision on a motion for
judgment of acquittal “it must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time
the ruling was reserved.”
3
In particular, the District Court noted Taylor’s discussions with Barnett during
various wiretapped calls in which Taylor referred to “hip hop.” (See Supp. App. 1051 (“I
need some hip hop too.”).) Further, the Court noted that Taylor was videotaped meeting
with a co-conspirator, and both are then joined by Barnett, who arrives to deliver “‘CDs,’
which denoted drugs.” (Taylor App. 14.) According to the District Court, this evidence,
along with other evidence in the record, could reasonably be relied upon by a jury to infer
that Taylor was a part of the conspiracy.
II. Discussion
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)
On appeal, Taylor’s first argument is that the District Court erred in allowing
Thomas Goodwyn to testify as to the meaning of certain terms used in the course of the
conspiracy. Specifically, Taylor challenges Goodwyn’s testimony regarding the meaning
of “hip hop” (crack-cocaine), “R&B” (powder cocaine), and “CDs” (quantity of drugs).
(Supp. App. 426.) Taylor urges that Goodwyn’s testimony should not have been
admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) 4 because (1) it was not a statement so it would
not be considered under the hearsay Rule; (2) it was not made in furtherance of the
conspiracy; (3) Goodwyn was involved in a separate conspiracy so he was not a co-
conspirator with Taylor; and (4) Goodwyn was not offered as an expert in code words.
Appellent’s Br. at 14-22. While Taylor is correct that Goodwyn’s testimony should not
4
Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)(E) reads: “A statement that meets the following conditions is
not hearsay . . . [t]he statement is offered against an opposing party and . . . was made by
the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
4
have been admitted under Rule 801, the District Court did not commit reversible error
because the testimony was nonetheless admissible.
A district court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is reviewed de
novo. United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 1989). The application of a
particular rule by a district court is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 437 (3d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we review the
District Court’s decision regarding whether a statement constituted hearsay for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 348 (3d Cir. 2011). We also note that
we can affirm an evidentiary ruling “for any reason supported by the record.” United
States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir. 2010).
Under Fed. R. Evid. 802, hearsay is not admissible unless permitted by federal
statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence or the United States Supreme Court. Hearsay is
defined as “a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the
current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). “Statement means a person’s oral
assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal assertion, if the person intended it as an
assertion.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(a).
Here, Taylor is correct that Goodwyn’s testimony should not have been considered
as hearsay, as it was not a statement. Goodwyn testified to facts of which he had
personal knowledge. He outlined the words that he and the other co-conspirator with
whom he spoke, Chartoine Oglesby, used to conduct their drug transactions. Neither he,
nor Oglesby, were making an assertion. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) Advisory Committee
5
Note (“If the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made,
no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.”).
Indeed, Taylor concedes as much in his brief by arguing that the “statement sought to be
admitted was a not an assertion.” Appellant’s Br. at 18. Absent an assertion, there is no
statement under Rule 801(a), which means there is no hearsay.
The District Court should not have applied rules regarding hearsay to Goodwyn’s
testimony, but this misapplication was harmless error. Goodwyn was testifying as to
words he, himself, used and the definition he ascribed to them. While Goodwyn dealt
only with Oglesby and never met Taylor, Oglesby was heard on multiple wire taps
discussing drugs with co-conspirator Terrence Smith, who frequently spoke with Carl
Barnett. The code words Oglesby used with Goodwyn could reasonably be inferred by a
jury to be the same code words Oglesby, and his other co-conspirators, including Taylor,
used when talking to each other. His testimony was, thus, admissible.
B. Venue
Taylor’s second contention is that the District Court erred by allowing the jury to
consider the question of venue even though there was no issue of material fact as to
venue.
Our review of a district court’s determination of venue is plenary. United States v.
Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 2011). Generally, venue is a question of law for
the court to determine. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 332 (3d Cir. 2002)
However, a defendant can object to venue and if that objection is based on a factual
dispute, the court has discretion to instruct the jury to decide the question. Id. The
6
government has the burden of proving venue and must do so by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. at 333.
Taylor objected to venue at the conclusion of the prosecution’s case-in-chief in his
motion for a judgment of acquittal. The District Court decided that venue was “in issue”
and told Taylor that it would instruct the jury to determine if venue was proper. (Taylor
App. 70.) On appeal, Taylor asserts that venue was not in issue and therefore, the District
Court should have decided the question of venue as a matter of law. Appellant’s Br. at
25.
A defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to be prosecuted in the district
where the alleged crime was committed. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; 18 U.S.C. §
3237(a). 5 With regard to a conspiracy charge, “venue can be established wherever a co-
conspirator has committed an act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Perez, 280 F.3d at
329.
Taylor’s argument primarily relies on the holding of Perez. There we wrote:
[W]here the indictment alleges venue without a facially obvious defect, if
(1) the defendant objects to venue prior to or at the close of the
prosecution’s case-in-chief,[ 6] (2) there is a genuine issue of material fact
with regard to proper venue, and (3) the defendant timely requests a jury
instruction, venue becomes a jury question and the court must specifically
instruct the jury on venue.
5
18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) reads: “Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of
Congress, any offense against the United States begun in one district and completed in
another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any
district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.”
6
If a defendant does not object to venue during, or immediately following, the
government’s case-in-chief, venue is deemed waived. See United States v. Sandini, 803
F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1986) (“challenge to venue in a motion for acquittal is timely”).
7
Id. at 334.
Taylor asserts he did not raise an issue of material fact, nor did he request a jury
instruction, and thus, the District Court had only two choices: Either determine venue as
a matter of law or allow the government to reopen its case to cure any venue defect. See
Id. at 335 n.13 (When the government presents no evidence on venue and the defense
objects “the District Court has the discretion to allow the Government to reopen its case.”
(emphasis added))
As the government points out, Taylor’s contention that the District Court had only
two choices is incorrect. Even if a defendant does not raise a question of fact as to venue,
aside from objecting to it, a district court has discretion to determine that testimony
presented by the prosecution put venue “in issue.” Id. at 335 n.12. In reviewing the
record, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to consider the
issue of venue. The conspiracy included 16 other individuals, some of whom lived in
Trenton, NJ. Several taped phone calls refer to New Jersey. Taylor is heard talking to
Barnett about Taylor’s cousin telling him that people are talking about Barnett in
Trenton.
Taylor argues that the government failed to present evidence of any overt act
being committed in New Jersey. As Taylor points out, an “overt act has been defined as
any act in furtherance of the plan.” Appellant’s Br. at 26 (quoting Perez, 280 F.3d at
329). The government counters by pointing to evidence of overt acts as to each count
that, at the very least, provide a basis for a reasonable juror to infer that members of the
conspiracy performed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy in New Jersey. We find
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there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to determine that venue was proper in
New Jersey. The District Court was justified in deciding venue was proper as a matter of
law, but given that Barnett lived in Morrisville, PA and distributed drugs from
Pennsylvania, as established by the evidence, it was well within the District Court’s
discretion to submit the question to the jury.
C. Fed. R. Crim. Pro. Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Finally, Taylor urges that the District Court’s denial of his motion for judgment of
acquittal was erroneous. The District Court reserved Taylor’s motion until after the jury
returned its verdict. “A Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal obliges a district court
to review the record in the light more favorable to the prosecution to determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based
on the available evidence.” United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006)
(internal quotations omitted). Rule 29(b) directs that where a district court reserves a
motion, “it must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was
reserved.” Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 29(b). We have plenary review of a district court’s
decision to deny a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Smith,
294 F.3d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 2002).
As cited by the District Court, the elements of conspiracy are “(1) a shared unity
of purpose, (2) an intent to achieve a common goal, and (3) an agreement to work
together toward that goal.” Bobb, 471 F.3d at 494 (quoting United States v. Mastrangelo,
172 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 1999)). When viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, the conclusion that Taylor was part of the Barnett conspiracy is
9
difficult to question. Taylor is heard on numerous wire taps talking to Barnett –
including use of the term “hip hop”– he accompanied him to a drug deal, and Taylor’s
name was listed on a pay sheet that included drug quantities. In short, there was ample
evidence for a jury to find that Taylor was a knowing participant in the conspiracy.
III. Conclusion
While the District Court and the government seemed unclear as to the contours of
Rule 801, the District Court’s mistake as to the admissibility of Goodwyn’s statement
was harmless error. As to venue, the District Court’s decision to instruct the jury was
within its discretion. Finally, the District Court’s decision to deny Taylor’s Rule 29
motion is well supported in the record. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is
affirmed.
10