Halpin v. City of Camden

Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
2-11-2009
Halpin v. City of Camden
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-2711
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Recommended Citation
"Halpin v. City of Camden" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1883.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1883
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 07-2711
_____________
KIMBERLY HALPIN
v.
CITY OF CAMDEN; CAMDEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT;
MAURICE GIBSON, Detective; JOHN DOE, #1 and #2;
ROGELIO PEREZ, Detective; EDWARD SPILLANE, Detective;
JULIO RIOS, Detective
Maurice Gibson,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-02088)
District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 5, 2009
Before: RENDELL and ROTH, Circuit Judges,
and PADOVA, District Judge.*
(Filed: February 11, 2009)
*Honorable John R. Padova, Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
OPINION OF THE COURT
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Detective Maurice Gibson appeals the District Court’s denial of qualified
immunity in this case arising out of his arrest of the plaintiff, Kimberly Halpin. On June
18, 2004, after a concert at the Tweeter Center in Camden, New Jersey, Halpin was
assaulted and robbed of her money, keys, and phone. Distressed and bleeding, she went
to the Camden Police Administration Building to seek assistance. She pushed the buzzer
at the window to get an officer’s attention. Detective Gibson approached the window and
Halpin, crying, told him that she had just been mugged. Gibson told her to calm down
and claims that Halpin started using foul language and racial slurs to describe her
attackers. Gibson then arrested Halpin, handcuffed her, and put her into a cell. He
charged her with disorderly conduct for her offensive language under N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C:33-2b, which prohibits “unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive
language” with “purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer.” She was released later
that night with a summons. Halpin acknowledged that she was crying and upset, but
denied using any foul language or racial slurs.
Halpin filed an unlawful arrest complaint, and Gibson asserted a qualified
immunity defense. In a qualified immunity analysis, the court must determine if the facts
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alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the injured party, show a constitutional
violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If there was such a violation, the
court then determines whether there was a reasonable mistake of law or fact. If the
constitutional right in question was clearly established at the time of the violation, such
that an objectively reasonable officer could not be mistaken that his conduct violated that
right, then there is no mistake of law. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
The District Court found that Gibson was not entitled to qualified immunity. The
statute under which Halpin was charged is unconstitutional when applied to anything less
than language that would incite the hearer to immediate violence or cause an immediate
breach of the peace. That has been the state of the law for more than 20 years. In re
H.D., 501 A.2d 1016, 1018 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985). The District Court found
that it was unreasonable to believe that Halpin’s words in the police station would incite
someone to violence.1 Therefore, Gibson lacked probable cause to arrest Halpin. The
District Court then found that no officer could have an objectively reasonable belief that
he could arrest someone simply for using foul language when the statute had been found
unconstitutional more than 20 years before. The court concluded that, viewing the facts
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The District Court analyzed the situation as though Halpin had used foul language:
“[A]ccepting, as the Court must, that Plaintiff used foul language only and not racial slurs
. . . .” (App. 16.) The District Court should have considered the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Halpin denies using foul language, and her version of the
events should have been credited in the qualified immunity analysis. However, the error
does not affect the outcome of the case.
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in the light most favorable to Halpin, there was no probable cause and no reasonable
mistake of law or fact. Accordingly, Gibson was not entitled to qualified immunity.
We agree with the reasoning of the District Court.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we will AFFIRM the Order of the District Court.
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