United States v. Axel Gomez

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 13-3715
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AXEL GOMEZ,
Appellant
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-10-cr-00321-001
District Judge: The Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 7, 2014
Before: SMITH, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 8, 2014)
_____________________
OPINION
_____________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, Axel Gomez was convicted of various crimes, including
21 U.S.C. § 841 (distribution of cocaine and heroin), 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy),
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking
offense), and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon).
On appeal, Gomez challenges these convictions on two grounds: (1) that police
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using pen registers and trap and trace
devices without a warrant, and (2) that the evidence adduced at trial was
insufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846.1 For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
The DEA began investigating Gomez for drug distribution in 2009. In May
2009, the DEA arranged the sale of 20 grams of heroin from Gomez to a
government informant. This informant provided the DEA with the number to
Gomez’s cellular telephone, and from July 9, 2009, to at least August 18, 2009, the
1
Gomez raises two other issues, but acknowledges that they are foreclosed by
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and United States v.
Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), and presents them only for purposes of
preservation. They are: (1) his Fifth/Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he was
exposed to greater punishment based on a putative prior conviction that was neither
charged in the indictment nor proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the
Commerce Clause does not authorize federal regulation of firearm possession based
solely on the gun’s one-time travel in interstate commerce.
2
DEA used a pen register2 and a “trap and trace” device3 to monitor this phone’s
activity pursuant to court orders issued under 18 U.S.C. § 3123. These devices
allowed the DEA to record a large amount of call data, such as the telephone
numbers dialed by Gomez, the telephone numbers of persons who called Gomez,
and the time of day and duration of these communications. Importantly, all of this
information was disclosed to Gomez’s cell phone carrier, Sprint Corporation, when
the calls were placed. This call data revealed that Gomez regularly communicated
with suspected drug traffickers and individuals using prepaid phones, which
suggested that Gomez was involved in the distribution of illegal drugs. During this
period, the DEA also successfully arranged and recorded multiple drug purchases
from Gomez to confidential informants.
Using the call data and the evidence obtained through the undercover
purchases, the DEA obtained an order for a wiretap and began intercepting and
recording Gomez’s cell phone conversations on August 24, 2009. On September
12, 2009, Gomez abruptly stopped using the tapped phone. A confidential
informant provided the DEA with Gomez’s new cell phone number and the DEA
2
A pen register records outgoing dialing information from the subject’s phone (i.e.,
what numbers the subject dialed, when he dialed them, whether the call was connected,
and the duration of the call). See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (defining pen register).
3
A “trap and trace” device records incoming dialing information to the subject’s
phone (i.e., when the caller dialed the subject’s number, whether the call was connected,
and the duration of the call). See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (defining trap and trace device).
3
obtained authorization for a wiretap for the new phone. Both wiretaps yielded
additional evidence that Gomez was engaged in the distribution of illegal drugs.
Using all of the foregoing evidence, the DEA obtained and executed a search
warrant for Gomez’s apartment, where they recovered almost $6,000 in cash, drug
packaging materials and a digital scale, and a loaded .40 caliber handgun with an
obliterated serial number. Thereafter, Gomez was indicted on charges of
distribution of controlled substances, conspiracy, and possession of a firearm in
connection with drug trafficking.
Prior to trial, Gomez moved to suppress the introduction of much of the
foregoing evidence, arguing that the DEA violated his Fourth Amendment rights
by engaging in extensive call pattern surveillance without a warrant. The District
Court denied this motion, concluding that Gomez’s argument was squarely
foreclosed by Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
At trial, Government cooperators Raphael Pagan and Ramon Sanchez
testified that they sold large quantities of heroin to Gomez on a regular basis.
Importantly, they testified that they always sold Gomez heroin on credit and were
not paid until after he distributed the drugs to his customers. They also testified
that Gomez occasionally sold them cocaine, and that they had sometimes helped
Gomez cook crack cocaine.
The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts and the District Court
4
sentenced Gomez to a term of 25 years’ imprisonment. This timely appeal
followed.
II.4
Gomez first argues that the DEA’s prolonged warrantless use of a pen
register and trap and trace device violated his privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment. We agree with the District Court that this argument is foreclosed by
Smith. Gomez provided a third party—in this case, Sprint—with all the data that
the DEA obtained through the use of the pen register and trap and trace device. In
so doing, Gomez abandoned his privacy interest in this data because he “assumed
the risk that the information would be divulged to police.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
Although Justice Sotomayor has urged the Court to reconsider Smith’s holding that
“an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties,” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring), we remain bound by Smith until a majority of the
Court endorses this view.5
4
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s legal
conclusions with respect to a motion to suppress. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318,
336 (3d Cir. 2002). When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and will sustain the
verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
5
In the proceedings below, Gomez conceded that his position was “contrary to”
Smith, but cited Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones for the proposition that “Smith
is antiquated and must be reconsidered.” J.A. 60. Gomez presents a different argument
5
Gomez next argues that the evidence presented at trial did not support his
conspiracy conviction. Specifically, he argues that the evidence demonstrated, at
most, a “wholesale buyer-seller relationship” between himself and the
Government’s cooperating witnesses—not a conspiracy. Gomez concedes that he
did not raise this issue in the District Court and, accordingly, that plain error is the
proper standard of review in this appeal. See United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d
372, 381 (3d Cir. 2005).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we
conclude that a reasonable jury could have found the essential elements of a
conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Pagan and Sanchez testified that they
always provided Gomez with heroin on credit. In the context of large-scale drug
distribution, this fact alone provided the jury with sufficient evidence of a
on appeal. Instead of urging us to overrule Smith’s “third party doctrine,” Gomez
contends that this doctrine has already been “cabined” by five Justices of the Supreme
Court—a number he reaches by combining Justice Sotomayor’s and Justice Alito’s
concurrences in Jones. Appellant’s Br. 27, 31. As Gomez did not raise this argument
before the District Court, it is waived. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329,
336 (3d Cir. 2009).
In any event, we reject Gomez’s contention that the concurrences in Jones
“cabined” Smith. Justice Alito’s concurrence did not explicitly seek to limit Smith, and
indeed relied heavily on the fact that drivers of automobiles do not expect third parties to
possess detailed, long-term data regarding their location. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito,
J., concurring). By contrast, cell phone users do expect service providers to possess
detailed, long-term data regarding the numbers they dial because this information is
necessarily conveyed in the course of connecting a call. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743. By
disclosing this data, cell phone users, unlike drivers of automobiles, “assume[] the risk”
that a third party will convey it to law enforcement. Id. at 744. Therefore, we are not
persuaded that the two concurrences in Jones have limited Smith to short-term call
monitoring.
6
conspiracy. United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2008).
Additionally, these witnesses testified that Gomez sold them cocaine, and that they
helped Gomez cook crack cocaine. Accordingly, we see no reason to disturb
Gomez’s conspiracy conviction.
In light of the foregoing analysis, we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
7