Joseph Kastaleba v. John Judge

Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
4-28-2009
Joseph Kastaleba v. John Judge
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-3607
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"Joseph Kastaleba v. John Judge" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1464.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-3607
_____________
JOSEPH R. KASTELEBA,
Appellant
v.
JOHN JUDGE; MICHAEL L. GREEN; ALLEN CASTOR; JEFFREY R. IMBODEN;
GARY LUCHT; GERARD N. MASSARO; SEAN RYAN; MICHAEL M. WEBSTER;
LLOYD WHITE; JOHN R. TUTTLE; MARGARET E. THOMPSON;
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 3-05-cv-01739
District Judge: The Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 14, 2009
Before: McKEE, SMITH, Circuit Judges
and STEARNS, District Judge *
(Filed: April 28, 2009)
OPINION
*
The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, District Judge for the United States District Court
for Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
1
STEARNS, District Judge.
On August 3, 2005, appellant Joseph Kasteleba brought a complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against appellee John Judge alleging violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.1 He timely appeals from the District Court’s allowance of summary
judgment in Judge’s favor.2 We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment.
Prusky v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 252, 265 (3d Cir. 2008).
In 1982, Kasteleba was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment and seven
years of probation after pleading guilty to false imprisonment and attempted robbery in
Broward County, Florida. While serving his probation, Kasteleba moved to Pennsylvania.
Supervision was transferred to the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“Board”).3
On February 25, 1985, Kasteleba was arrested for a probation violation after being identified
as the person who had assaulted two people (and robbed one of them at gunpoint) in a bar
in Plains, Pennsylvania, a week earlier.4
The Interstate Compact required Pennsylvania to hold a probable cause hearing on
1
The complaint originally named a number of individual defendants, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. By
agreement of the parties, all defendants were dismissed except for Judge.
2
We have jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
The Board accepted supervision of Kasteleba pursuant to the Interstate Compact for
the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers, Act of June 25, 1937, P.L. 2086, No. 415
(codified as amended at 61 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 321-323).
4
Kasteleba was cited by the Board for failing to report a change in employment status,
changing employment without authorization, possession of a dangerous weapon, engaging
in assaultive conduct, and failing to pay his outstanding public defender fees in Florida.
2
Kasteleba’s alleged probation violations and to forward the findings to Florida for final
disposition. The probable cause hearing was held on March 5, 1985. Judge, the parole agent
assigned to supervise Kasteleba, testified that he had interviewed the two victims, and that
both had identified Kasteleba “with certainty.” Although the victims later submitted
mistaken identity withdrawal of prosecution forms, Judge stated his belief that they had been
intimidated by Kasteleba into doing so.
On the hearing examiner’s recommendation, the Board made a written request to the
State of Florida to issue a warrant for Kasteleba’s extradition. However, the Board did not
receive a response, and Kasteleba was released from custody on April 18, 1985. Kasteleba
claims that upon his release Judge threatened that he would “get him.” The Board eventually
terminated Kasteleba’s supervision. Judge dictated a final supervision report on December
2, 1985. Judge had no further contact with Kasteleba until this lawsuit was filed.
On April 30, 1985, twelve days after Kasteleba’s release, a Broward County, Florida
judge issued a warrant for Kasteleba’s arrest, presumably in response to the Board’s
extradition request. In October of 1985, Kasteleba was injured in an automobile accident in
Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. While hospitalized, Kasteleba was held under armed guard
pending extradition pursuant to the Broward County warrant. When no official from Florida
appeared to take custody of Kasteleba, he was again released.5 Despite having been informed
of the outstanding Broward County warrant while in the hospital, Kasteleba never made
5
Kasteleba was not extradited to Florida because, according to Florida probation
records, “witnesses stated in trial that D was not the man that assaulted them. He was not
guilty.”
3
inquiry of Florida authorities to have the warrant cleared.
Nineteen years later, on April 20, 2004, Kasteleba was stopped in Lee County,
Florida, for failing to stop at a stop sign. A routine traffic check uncovered the 1985
Broward County warrant, and Kasteleba was arrested. Kasteleba was released from custody
on July 9, 2004, after it was determined that Kasteleba’s Florida probation had been
terminated in April of 1985.
The District Court ruled that Kasteleba’s § 1983 claims were time-barred. We agree
with the District Court’s well-reasoned opinion. The period of limitations for a § 1983 action
is governed by the forum state’s statute for personal injury actions. See Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 276-280 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds, as stated in Jones v.
R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377-378 (2004). Thus, in Pennsylvania, the
limitations period for a § 1983 action is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524; see
also Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2002).
It is “the standard rule that [accrual occurs] when the plaintiff has a complete and
present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Here,
Kasteleba’s cause of action unmistakably accrued in October of 1985, when Kasteleba was
held under armed guard awaiting extradition. Kasteleba’s arguments that Judge was
responsible for the issuance of the Broward County warrant because of personal animus for
Kasteleba lends nothing to the analysis. He did not bring suit until August 3, 2005, almost
twenty years after he first had a “complete and present cause of action.”
4
Substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court, we will affirm the judgment.
5