Arie Oren v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 22-1512
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ARIE OREN,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
JOHN E. WETZEL, Secretary of Department of Corrections;
LAUREL R. HARRY, Superintendent of SCI-Camp Hill;
SERGEANT RIVERA, Correctional Officer SCI-Camp Hill;
LAGOVINO, Unknown staff member SCI-Camp Hill
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3:20-cv-02451)
Magistrate Judge: Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a):
January 18, 2023
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Before: AMBRO, PORTER, and FREEMAN,
Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 19, 2023)
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OPINION ∗
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∗
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not
binding precedent.
PORTER, Circuit Judge.
Arie Oren was an inmate at SCI-Camp Hill in Pennsylvania from 2013 to 2019
before being deported to Israel. He sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and
four of its officials (“Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving him of his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. A magistrate judge properly dismissed these
claims, so we will affirm.
I
The parties consented to jurisdiction before Magistrate Judge Saporito. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(1). The Court had federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We
have jurisdiction over its final order under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(3) and 1291. Jones v.
Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 2019).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain factual allegations that,
if accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6). We review a District Court’s order granting a
motion to dismiss de novo. Chang v. Child.’s Advoc. Ctr. of Del. Weih Steve Chang, 938
F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2019).
II
According to Oren, in March 2019, prison officials searched the cell that he shared
with another inmate. The officials discovered a cell phone and placed Oren in
administrative custody pending investigation. One month later, Oren was notified that he
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was no longer under investigation but would remain in administrative custody due to
safety concerns. After a stay of 123 days in administrative custody, Oren was paroled on
July 30, 2019, and transferred to immigration detention. He was deported in April 2020.
Oren says that the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights against cruel
and unusual punishment by unjustifiably placing him in administrative custody. He
concedes that the initial stay of 30 days was permissible for investigative reasons but
challenges the remaining 93 days. “To prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment, an
inmate must show that he has been deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Oren correctly states this rule but provides no supporting
allegations. And we have made clear that, standing alone, placement in administrative
custody is not cruel and unusual punishment. Id. So the magistrate judge correctly
dismissed this claim.
Oren also argues that the Defendants violated his due process rights by not
explaining why he remained in administrative custody after the investigation into the cell
phone incident concluded. To secure the protection of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must assert a protected life, liberty, or property
interest. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). “As
long as the conditions or degree of confinement . . . is not otherwise violative of the
Constitution,” inmates do not have a protected interest in serving their sentence at a
particular prison or custody status. Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). So
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Oren’s due process claim never gets off the ground, and the magistrate judge properly
dismissed it.
After the magistrate judge dismissed his claims, Oren asked for leave to amend his
complaint. In civil rights cases, trial courts are required to grant such leave unless it
would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002). The magistrate judge correctly concluded that an amendment would be futile
because, in addition to the shortcomings discussed above, Oren failed to assert that any
individual defendants were personally involved in his administrative custody. The Court
considered Oren’s supplemental submissions aimed at establishing personal involvement
and found them unpersuasive. We review a denial of leave to amend for an abuse of
discretion. Id. We find none here.
III
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court.
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